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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines U.S. presidential learning—defined as a change in presidential
operational code beliefs due to their experiences in office—in the foreign policy decision-making
context. These beliefs are teased out from presidents’ representations of power relationships via
verb usage in their speeches. A database of more than 4,000 foreign policy-related speeches
obtained by the author was employed for this project, and with this data, I examine several
potential dynamics of and influences on learning.
I look at trends in belief change over time, and examine the relative stability and
interconnectedness of “core” versus “peripheral” beliefs. I then test the influence of factors in
both the domestic and foreign realms and in various “policy domains” on monthly belief change.
Additionally, I examine the impact of crises on belief change in both the short- and longer-terms.
I follow this by an analysis of pre-existing beliefs and crisis-related factors as influences on
belief change following crises. Finally, I look at the impact of belief change on policy behavior
itself. Based upon the accumulation of evidence provided here, presidents do not appear to
behave as “smooth transmission belts” between the political environment, belief change, and
subsequent policy behavior as anticipated by structural realists.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND OUTLINE OF THE PROJECT
1.1 Introduction
Learning (defined as a change in “beliefs”) is an important component of the systematic
study of politics, as many lessons could be learned from any given experience. Understanding
learning’s form, as well as when and how it occurs or fails to occur, can tell us much about
political reality. For instance, is elite-level, “experiential” learning very commonplace in the
domain of international relations? Do certain factors tend to influence learning in a predictable
way, and if they do, which factors matter more than others here? These are questions that have
garnered extensive speculation by a number of well-known theorists in the fields of international
relations and foreign policy analysis. However, despite this fact, much of the existing work on
learning is primarily theory-based, often containing anecdotal or case study evidence of, at most,
a small handful of examples to support the ideas promoted therein. As a result, we must often
treat these theories and findings cautiously, as we cannot know the degree to which they are
generalizable across cases.
This project is an attempt to provide large-scale, empirical tests to a number of
hypotheses concerning the influences on, and processes of elite-level learning in the context of
foreign policy decision-making. The theoretical frameworks referenced here stem principally
from the works of Robert Jervis, Deborah Larson, Russell Leng, Jack Levy, George Breslauer
and Philip Tetlock, Steven Walker, and Alexander George. Specific hypotheses examined
concern analyses of learning: following from the influences of one’s beliefs; following from the
impact of both domestic and international factors; in the respective domains of conflict and
cooperation and of similar and dissimilar states; and following crises and other conflict events.
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The above factors are expected to systematically influence learning defined as the degree
of change or stability of one’s beliefs—the set of cognitive “schemas” that an individual uses in
order to interpret his or her political reality—regarding foreign policy issues during an
individual’s time in office.
As the title to this project suggests, the focus of this study is that of learning, or the lack
of learning, by U.S. Presidents engaged in foreign policy decision making. However, my
operational definition of this phenomenon, following from the above discussion, is that of “belief
change.” I use the term learning instead of belief change two distinct reasons. First, learning is,
conceptually, what I am interested in, as I am not simply interested in the change of one’s
beliefs. Though perhaps ninety-nine times out of one hundred, any belief change that occurs in
foreign affairs can be attributed to learning as it is defined here, there might also be instances in
which belief change results from other sources. For instance epiphanies, or major
religious/philosophical shifts that result not from the influences of one’s outside environment or
logical thought processes, but rather from some “mystical,” instantaneous realization, are not
categorized here as “learning.” Further, if a leader were to suffer trauma to the brain following
an injury, or following from a degenerative disease such as Alzheimer’s, then this might also
lead to a change in one’s beliefs, but this would not be considered as “learning” as evaluated
here.
Secondly, given that the hypotheses tested are, for the most part, drawn from research
that describes the phenomena I am testing as “learning,” and as I hope that this work will
contribute to this larger literature, my use of this term also stems from a desire to adhere to
convention.
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A study that focuses explicitly on learning defined as belief change, this project places
itself in the company of works on the political psychology of political elites, as it affects foreign
policy decisions and outcomes. Here, a wealth of work exists evaluating the psychological
processes, structure, and content/make-up of political leaders. This includes examinations of
how actual decision-making takes place versus how we might expect to see such in a perfectly
“rational” world (Steinbruner 1974), given the impact of groupthink (Janis 1982), cognitive and
motivated biases including “mirror images” (Bronfenbrenner 1961; Holsti 1967) and
misperceptions broadly defined (Jervis 1976). Also included here is work evaluating the ways
that leaders view the world, and peers and adversaries within it, and what this says about
potential policy choice (George 1969; Walker 1977; Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998).
Research has also focused on leaders’ relative abilities to understand alternative viewpoints and
“shades of gray” (Schroder, Driver, and Streufert 1967; Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock 2003), as
well as the ways in which leaders with differential levels of political experience, interest, and
ability are able to succeed or fail to succeed (Hermann 2003).
This project is not, however, a traditional exercise in evaluating political psychology, as
this study draws on international conflict data, and a large database of quantitatively measured
psychological constructs. As such, in addition to making an empirical contribution to research
on learning, this project seeks to contribute to work in political psychology by expanding the
notion of how psychological can be used, and the types of questions that it can address. In
addition, this project contributes to the field of conflict studies, as it uses conflict data (the
International Crisis Behavior database, Militarized Interstate Dispute data, and Gary King’s
events data) as explanatory and dependent variables, as well as for determining thresholds for
and time periods during which learning will be evaluated.
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1.2. Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is intended to address lingering questions regarding elite-level learning
in the foreign policy decision-making domain concerning the nature of presidential belief
change, as well as factors that impact belief change and stability. I begin. in the next chapter, by
reviewing the literature on learning in the foreign policy decision-making context, and discussing
the ways in which this project differs from existing works and helps to “fill in gaps” in the
literature.
In chapter 3, I examine the major sources of data used in this project. In the process, I
discuss the operational code—the measure of “beliefs” used here—including the way in which
this information is obtained from leaders’ speeches and how specific indices are constructed. I
also discuss Gary King’s 10 million dyadic events, as well as the International Crisis Behavior
(ICB), and Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) databases, and how I have used this data to
address the questions posed in subsequent empirical chapters.
Chapter 4 is the first empirical chapter, and looks at the nature of presidential belief
stability and change. For instance: how does each president fall relative to others on each of the
10 operational code belief indices, and which presidents experience more or less belief change
than others during their respective times in office? In chapter 5, I develop a series of hypotheses
from existing works evaluating the nature of belief “systems,” (mostly based on the work of
Robert Jervis) and test the degree to which these hypotheses hold when looking at U.S.
Presidential operational code beliefs.
Chapter 6 examines the relative impact of various international, domestic, and
international/domestic factors on presidential belief change. Do domestically-based factors
impact presidential beliefs regarding the nature of the “self” and “others” in the international
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political environment to the same degree that foreign-based factors do? Here I also examine the
concept of “differential policy domains,” and examine whether presidents are selectively and
predictably influenced by specific components of their political world over others. In chapters 7
and 8, I examine the impact of crisis events on presidents, and test whether crisis exposure alone,
or crises in conjunction with pre-existing belief levels, impact learning following crises. In
chapter 8, I also look at the impact of crisis-related factors (such as crisis magnitude, territorial
proximity of the crisis to the U.S., and the order in which a crisis is experienced by a president)
on presidential learning.
Chapter 9 provides a preliminary examination of the impact of beliefs and belief change
on U.S. policy actions. The ultimate goal of research on elite-level learning in political science
is to understand its impact on policy, and I provide a preliminary examination of this here.
Finally, chapter 10 is an overview of the findings in this dissertation, and a discussion of what
these findings may mean, and where research can go from here.
Thus , through a fairly extensive analysis of U.S. Presidential beliefs, I provide empirical
findings that will help to address some important questions regarding the nature of belief stability
and change. In the process, I hope to promote different ways of thinking about research on both
political psychology and conflict studies, by integrating the two in data-supported analyses of
factors relating to U.S. Presidential learning.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ON LEARNING IN POLITICAL SCIENCE;
DEFINITION OF THE TERM AS IT IS USED IN THIS PROJECT
In this project, I evaluate U.S. presidential learning and non-learning. But what is
“learning,” anyway? This is a concept that means different things to different people, both inand outside of academia. As such, it is important to outline various definitions of learning and to
further explore the specific definition adopted in this project.
2.1 The Everyday Usage of Learning
The first way one might conceive of learning is as “the everyday usage of the term as
‘coming to know’” (Breslauer and Tetlock 1991, 9). That is to say, when one learns a new skill
such as how to drive a car, or when one learns not to touch a hot stove or an electrical fence, we
may say that we are using the term learning in this “common, everyday” sense. There is an
assumption here that the person describing the act of learning holds the new belief or
understanding gleaned from the “learning” process to be “valid, or true, or justified, or realistic”
(6). At a basic level, this form of learning has some behavioral component, where an individual
first learns “that” one component of reality works in a certain fashion, and then learns “how” to
deal with this reality in some, typically useful or functional, way.
There is also a more complex, “everyday” usage of learning than the simple learning of
“that” and “how.” This additional form of “learning” has strong normative underpinnings. For
instance, if we were to argue that Gorbachev “learned” that Communism was a failed ideology,
with the implication that failing to learn this specific lesson equates to a failure to learn anything
at all, then we would be applying a subjective value to the belief or knowledge that is to be
learned (Breslauer and Tetlock, 1991: 7). The same could be said if we were to argue that
Islamic extremists should “learn” that a liberal, democratic society is preferable to an autocratic
theocracy. As Breslauer and Tetlock note, this form of learning is “based on both a value
6

judgment. . .and a theory of cause-effect relations. . .” and “entails an implicitly counterfactual
claim about the state of the world” than we would otherwise see (7). Others, however, might not
hold these same value judgments. The subjectivity inherent in this definition of learning makes
it objectionable to many academics who, as self-perceived scientists, appreciate clearly defined
constructs that can be understood and evaluated with a minimum of such subjective
interpretation.
2.2 Alternative Definitions
While some academics, then, approach their evaluation of learning as it occurs in its
“common” usage (or at least, as something approaching the “common” usage), many others do
not. If we were to randomly select ten different articles evaluating “learning,” then we would
likely see a number of more or less different phenomena, all labeled “learning.” Stern (1997)
describes this problem in the following way:
Learning is a concept which cuts across virtually all of the major theoretical and metatheoretical cleavages in the social sciences. A broad range of positions on questions such
as the locus of social learning (who or what learns?); the nature of and ‘motors’ driving
such learning; developing corresponding criteria for distinguishing between learning and
non-learning-based change phenomena; and the relationship between power and learning
are visible in a diverse body of literature devoted to the concept (69).
Thus, in many ways, asking “what is learning” is akin to asking “what is politics,” or
“what is power.” Learning is a concept that exists in many manifestations, and in each of these
sundry forms attempts are made to explain an array of often very different phenomena related to
politics. Given this fact, a comprehensive literature review of “learning” would require an entire
book, and then some. Here I will briefly touch on some of the more utilized ways that learning is
evaluated in- and outside of political science scholarship, with a focus on one particular learning
type—the “cognitive psychological approach”—that is the approach to learning utilized in this
dissertation.
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Many conceptualizations of “learning” are discussed in what is the most comprehensive
known collection of work on learning in foreign policy—the edited volume by Breslauer and
Tetlock (1991), Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy. Here Tetlock (1991), through an
extensive review of the existing work on learning, provides a conceptual framework for
understanding these various learning “types.” These “conceptualizations of learning” consist of:
1) the neorealist conception of learning, which states that governments respond to objective
stimuli in a rational sense, by changing and updating behavior and preferences following from
one’s position in the international hierarchy of power; 2) the cognitive psychological approach to
learning, which argues that learning occurs within the minds of leaders, and that this learning is
strongly influenced by the simplifications of reality that they make; 3) the cognitive structuralist
approach to learning, which assesses cognitive/evaluative complexity or self-reflection/
metacognition as learning; 4) the efficiency definition of learning, which defines learning as
occurring when policymakers have learned to match means and ends up efficiently; and 5)
learning at the level of institutions and political cultures, which is not an evaluation of learning
based on the influence of institutions or cultures (as in the usage of “institutional learning” by
Rohrschneider, 1996), but rather the assumption that these large aggregations of individuals can,
somehow, “learn” themselves. I will briefly discuss these forms of learning here.
2.2.1 The Neorealist View
Much of the debate over “learning” in international relations concerns “how” one learns,
but there is also the “ontological” question discussed by Stern (1997): what or who is it that
actually learns? In international relations work broadly, particularly that rooted in neorealist
theory (see Waltz, 1979), the state is often viewed as the principle actor. From this perspective,
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questions of behavior narrowly, or of broader systemic issues of war and peace and international
stability or change, ultimately focus on the state.
The neorealist form of learning is thus applied to states rather than individuals, as from
this perspective, the state and major decision-makers within the state are difficult to disentangle
from one another. But beyond this, even if key individuals are viewed as largely constituting
“the state,” there would still be little reason for these researchers to focus on individuals and their
predispositions or decision-making processes because--given the incredible constraints provided
by international-level factors--individual leaders do not possess a great deal of agency in matters
of importance. The “state” is viewed as the true, most noteworthy actor in international
relations, and as such, a focus on “state behavior” is most appropriate.
Regarding the utility of state-level analyses of learning, Reiter (1996) argues that these
are “the most powerful . . . in the sense of explaining most directly the phenomena of greatest
interest in world politics” (18). Individuals and substate actors have limited influence in world
politics generally. Reiter also argues that evaluating the state allows the researcher to
empirically examine larger groups, which increases the validity and generalizability of results.
Finally, he suggests that this type of analysis allows for comparison of predictions made by
learning and that of “classical, state-oriented realist theory” (19).
The neorealist conception of learning, with its focus on state behavior, “black-box[es] the
foreign policy-making process and simply look[s] for lawful regularities between international
events and governmental responses” (Tetlock 1991, 24). Here, states respond to reward and
punishment in a reasonable (if not wholly rational) manner, and if they fail to do so, are
replaced by more realistic leaders (potentially originating in opponent states). Thus, learning
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here is often not a real choice, so much as the difference between “life” and “death.” Given the
focus on states and the systemic level of analysis, this form of learning might be used most
frequently by “traditional” or “conventional” international relations theorists.
However, Larson (1991) suggests that structural realists have a “limited” view of
learning, questioning the degree of nuance that can be explained via this perspective. For
instance, she notes that structural realism might have anticipated the coalition of the U.S. and
China against the Soviet Union under Nixon, but cannot explain how or why Nixon would
concurrently approach the Soviet Union in a cooperative manner. In his discussion of historical
learning, Reiter (1996) echoes Larson’s concerns, stating that “the bare-bones structure of
realism is a good starting point for understanding international relations,” but its “parsimony
either limits the accuracy of its predictions or displays an indeterminacy that prevents the
construction of falsifiable hypotheses” (11).
2.2.2 Liberal Theories of Learning
Larson (1991) additionally discusses learning as evaluated by neoliberal thinkers, and the
“diffusion of consensual knowledge” by which these theorists believe states shift their “beliefs”
toward more effective ways of dealing with one another (352). As an example of this type of
research, Adler (1992) evaluates the manner in which epistemic communities (scientists,
strategists, and other experts who are part of a “community” of largely like-minded individuals)
came together to create the “international shared understanding and practice of nuclear arms
control, which gave meaning to and helped coordinate expectations of superpower cooperation
during the Cold War” (101).
Though fundamentally different from the neorealist conception in terms of the causes and
types of learning that might take place, this view is similar to the neorealist view in that it, too
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treats the state as the primary actor of interest, and focuses on the impact of international factors
on state “learning.” Larson (1991) criticizes this perspective as a means to evaluating learning as
well, questioning the extent to which “consensual knowledge” really exists and reflects state
behavior, given the reality of power politics, and the fact that different individuals with different
goals and perceptions might have different motivations for behaving in similar ways to others.
2.2.3 The Cognitive Psychological Approach
The cognitive psychological approach conceptualizes learning quite differently than the
neorealist or neoliberal approaches. This perspective looks not at states, but rather individual
decision-makers within states. Advocates of this perspective argue that individual perceptions
and ideologies need to be taken into account if we are to understand “learning” in foreign policy.
Tetlock (1991) states that this perspective is based on two “simple functionalist premises:
(a) The international environment is extraordinarily complex;
(b) People—limited capacity information processors that we are—frequently resort to
simplifying assumptions to deal with the complexity, uncertainty, and painful tradeoffs inherent in foreign policy problems” (27).
George (1969) puts it this way:
Efforts at rational decision-making in political life are subject to the constraints of the
following kind: (1) The political actor’s information about situations with which he must
deal is usually incomplete; (2) his knowledge of ends-means relationships is generally
inadequate to predict reliably the consequences of choosing one or another course of
action; and (3) it is often difficult for him to formulate a single criterion by means of
which to choose which alternative course of action is best (197-98).
Thus, it is not enough to simply look at the “incentive structures” at play in the
international system to understand how and when individuals “learn,” as might be expected in
both the “neorealist” or “purely rational” perspectives (this latter perspective will be discussed
below). Instead, the cognitive psychological perspective sees learning as occurring when the set
of lenses that one uses to view some simplified form of reality changes in some way for some

11

reason. As a result, the world begins to be viewed differently than it appeared beforehand. The
cognitive psychological perspective is that used in this project, and as such, will be discussed in
greater detail later.
2.2.4 The Cognitive Structuralist Approach
The third perspective is the cognitive structuralist approach. This form of learning
evaluates whether the perceiver can “learn” to see the world as more or less complex, as well as
to better perceive the nature and role of the self. Tetlock (1991) breaks this category down into
four “structural dimensions” that are of particular relevance for the study of foreign policy:
(1) The cognitive complexity of the idea elements within a belief system, (2) the
evaluative complexity [defined as “the degree of inconsistency or tension that exists
among the considerations that a policy maker uses to judge events or make choices” (33)]
of the idea elements, (3) the degree of interrelatedness or integration among idea
elements, and (4) the capacity for self-reflection or metacognition (32).
From another “cognitive structuralist” perspective, Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock (2003)
note that leaders’ degree of “complexity” can be viewed as either a state- (integrative
complexity) or trait- (conceptual complexity) level phenomenon, suggesting that evaluations
here look not only at the degree of “differentiation” that leaders engage in when perceiving the
outside world (or being able to perceive alternative viewpoints and “shades of gray”), but also
“integration,” which deals with making connections between occurrences and ideas, and
“situates them in an overarching contextual structure” (247).
Tetlock and others have made some noteworthy observations regarding when and how
learning is likely to take place from this perspective. First, Tetlock (1991) argues that “we
should expect most learning in foreign policy to take the form of increases in cognitive, but not
evaluative complexity” (34). He also argues that increased evaluative complexity can be
dangerous, because “reality is sometimes simple” (35), and in the absence of cognitive
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integration (by definition, possessing the ability to cope with evaluative tensions), evaluative
complexity “can induce confusion, even paralysis, within a decision-making system (the Hamlet
syndrome)” (34).
Suedfeld et. al (2003) further note that research evaluating state (in the sense of the
“state/trait” debate) complexity shows that lower degrees of “value pluralism” and exposure to
stressful situations (such as a limited time horizon, perception of threat, fatigue, and uncertainty)
have a negative impact on “integrative complexity” (253-255). This can have a noticeable
impact on outcomes, since leaders who demonstrate lower degrees of integrative complexity are
more likely to attempt to resolve conflicts in a conflictual manner (255). In other words, crises
tend to play a role in reducing leaders’ “integrative complexity,” which leads to an increased
tendency to escalate conflicts, which further decreases in state-level complexity—a troubling
spiral toward violence. From this perspective, however, it is unclear if leaders are truly
“learning” to see the world as more or less complex at the “state” level, or whether this is an
“automatic” response as could be extrapolated from the neorealist conception.
2.2.5 The Efficiency/Accuracy Definition
The efficiency definition of learning evaluates “whether governments are becoming more
adroit or adept at achieving the goals they value” (Tetlock 1991, 35). Levy (1994) notes that
there are three elements that are “individually necessary and jointly sufficient for efficiency
learning: (1) a change in the content of one’s beliefs that (2) is in the direction of greater
accuracy about the world and that (3) facilitates the ability to achieve one’s goals” (291). Levy
refers to this form of learning as the “accuracy criterion.” This is the approach that most closely
approximates learning in its “common usage” as evaluated by political scientists. If one were to
ask the person on the street “when or how do presidents learn?” their responses would probably
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reflect the matching of behavior to the responder’s normative evaluation of the type of behavior
that should take place. In other words, this is the suggestion that leaders learn the “correct” or
“incorrect” lessons from some experience or series of experiences, where the concepts of
“correctness,” or the “goals [that one] value[s]” would have to be inferred by the observer
(Tetlock 1991, 35). That is to say, there is an assumption that some lesson exists, which is
typically seen as being useful or adaptive to one’s situation/goals,1 and that “learning” takes
place when this lesson “comes to be known.” Note that even if a leader attempts to “learn” from
his or her environment, and witnesses a change in beliefs as a result, this is not seen as “learning”
if some “incorrect” lesson is learned, whereby inefficiency in his or her interpretation of reality
remains.
From this perspective, learning occurs when means and ends match more efficiently or
more effectively/accurately. Toward this end, “learning . . . can take two very distinct forms—
one can discover more effective strategies for pursuing one’s original goals, or one can redefine
one’s goals in more realistic ways” (Tetlock 1991, 35; emphasis in original). Obviously,
determining when learning has occurred can be very difficult in this context, because it requires
the creation of historical counterfactuals of some kind (that is to say, what would have happened
if factor X had occurred differently), which can always be brought into question as inappropriate
or implausible by critics.
Etheridge (1981) defines learning “not by behavior change or attitude change but by the
dual criteria of increased intelligence and sophistication of thought and increased effectiveness of
behavior” (6, emphasis in original), demonstrating a clear focus on increased “efficiency”
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This is noteworthy as there are exceptions when one may learn “non-adaptive” lessons—such
as one learning to fear the outdoors because of a negative formative experience that is not
representative of typical experiences.
14

alongside increased cognitive complexity (as such, Etheridge’s form of “learning” is a hybrid of
these two forms). Larson (1991) also defines learning as “change in the cognitive content of
policy makers’ beliefs that enables them to match ends to means more efficiently. Examples of
learning might include abstraction of a new concept, or change in the image of the opponent”
(350, emphasis in original).2
Stern (1997) also discusses “experience based” learning, and notably includes a category
not explicitly discussed by Breslauer and Tetlock: “moral learning,” or the further attainment of
“wisdom” by a decision maker (82). This is a component of learning discussed at length by
Etheridge (1981), but may be encapsulated by a form of the “efficiency” definition.
2.2.6 Learning by Institutions
Another area of political science work evaluating learning does so at the level of the
organization. This, as with the focus on state learning, does not evaluate individual learning, but
rather learning at the level of an aggregation of individuals. Schön (1978) discusses this
phenomenon in the following manner:
Organizations are not merely collections of individuals, yet there is not organization
without such collections. Similarly, organizational learning is not merely individual
learning, yet organizations learn only through the experience and actions of individuals
(cited in Stern 1997, 70).3
Jervis (1976) evaluates this form of “organizational learning,” and states that the lessons learned
by organizations can become “institutionalized in textbooks, rules, and even language itself”
(238).

2

Note that though Larson’s definition of “learning” differs from that used here, her evaluation of
“attitude” and “belief” change provides a number of useful and informative observations that
have strongly contributed to the understanding of learning in political science broadly, and in this
project specifically.
3
Note: the Schön article/book from which this was taken is not included in Stern’s bibliography.
As such, I do not provide a direct reference to it in my bibliography.
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Spiegel (1991) also evaluates organizational learning, and argues that learning in this
conceptualization “is rare and occurs primarily via personnel shifts,” nothing that “otherwise,
change may involve a gradual revision of policy beliefs and preferences (a slow, cumulative
process)” (264). Levy (1994) takes exception to the notion that learning can occur following a
turn-over of personnel, a position adopted in this study’s “cognitive psychological” perspective.
The typically gradual nature of individual belief change will be further discussed later, but it is
noteworthy that Spiegel observes that “government” learning occurs most notably when no
actual “individual learning” takes place at all.
2.3 Learning as Psychological Change—The Definition Used in This Project
Ultimately, I depart from many of the above conceptualizations of learning, by evaluating
learning as a change in a political leader’s beliefs regarding the nature of the international
political environment, following from his or her experiences in office (this falls under the
“cognitive psychological” learning category described by Breslauer and Tetlock). My definition
of learning follows directly from that developed by Levy (1994), whose theoretical assessment of
such, alongside the work of Robert Jervis, provides the impetus for much of the work here. Levy
defines “experiential learning” as “a change of beliefs (or the degree of confidence in one’s
beliefs) or the development of new beliefs, skills, or procedures as a result of the observation and
interpretation of experience” (p. 283). Though this definition also accounts for “historical”
learning, and learning that occurs prior to one’s time in office, for this project I only examine
learning as it occurs during one’s time as political leader.
This project does not, then, examine the initial development of elites’ beliefs and
attitudes in childhood or adolescence. While a rich assortment of existing psycho-biographical
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works examine factors related to the upbringing and formative experiences of politicians, the
specific foci and implementation proposed in this study is fairly novel.
Levy’s above definition clearly sets his conceptualization of learning apart from many of
the others who evaluate learning in its assorted forms. For instance, for Levy, learning is a
phenomenon that cannot be understood as a passive process that impacts individuals as if they
were automatons within some mechanistic world of simple cause and effect. This is the
conceptualization espoused by some neorealist scholars and many social psychological learning
theorists. Instead, as Jervis (1976) discusses at length, prior beliefs and predispositions, the
environmental context, and individuals’ subjective interpretations of this context contribute to
learning.
Further, in this analysis, actors are treated as “active learners” in that they search for
evidence that they believe is relevant to interpreting the situation at hand, and act as “naïve
scientists” in that they conduct “experiments” to test their expectations, and engage in trial and
error actions that will affect learning (Levy 1994, 283-84). Breslauer and Tetlock (1991) note
that this focus on learning as “belief system change” is a narrow one, focusing on a “very
specific subset of change” (10). Specifically, they argue that:
That subset is restricted in three senses: to the level of the individual; to change in
cognition (beliefs and preferences), not changes in behavior; and to changes that do not
require a judgment about correspondence with reality or improvements of performance
(i.e. to believing that, not knowing that or knowing how) (10, emphasis in original).
At this point, it is useful to define the boundaries of this study. First, this project is not
concerned with the “efficiency” definition of learning as examined earlier. Second, it is not
concerned with “organizational” or “collective” learning, or the notion that groups, such as a
bureaucratic organization can somehow “learn” from their experiences in the way that an
individual does. Third, this study is not interested in learning defined as behavior. Following
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from this, it does not treat as learning situations in which government turnover, following an
election or coup for instance, leads to a change in government policy. Nor does it evaluate
situations in which a change in governmental institutions, by solely altering the “rules of the
game,” leads to salient political changes. These processes in and of themselves are not learning
in the cognitive psychological sense, as it is evaluated here.
Groups and institutions do not learn in the literal sense of the word, of course, as only
individuals possess thoughts and perceptions that may change. Though governments or
governmental organizations may change in response to the learning of individuals within it, these
groups do not actually “learn.” Further, policy change is not necessarily an outcome resulting
from learning (though policy change may eventually occur as the result of learning). It may be
that voters learn, leading to a turnover in government control that in turn leads to a sequence of
changes in policy. But in this sense, the imposition of new individuals into the decision-making
framework, and not actual, cognitive “learning,” is the cause of change in policy.4
Levy (1994) takes issue with the view that states (rather than the individuals within
states), can somehow learn, as well as with the “structural adjustment” expectation of some
theories of realism, which anticipate “well-defined and predictable relationships between
structural antecedents and actor perceptions and between perceptions and behavioral responses”
(297). From this perspective, Levy argues, “learning is epiphenomenal,” and thus is not worthy
of serious analysis. Levy’s definition treats any change in beliefs following experience or the
observation and processing of occurrences as learning. However, he understands learning as part
of a larger process; learning, for Levy, is not solely equivalent to environmental change.

4

For more on this see Levy (1994), pages 287-289.
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To reiterate the boundaries of this dissertation: it does not study attempts to more
efficiently meet means with ends (as in Tetlock’s “efficiency” criterion), as I do not make
subjective evaluations of the “correct” or “incorrect” lessons that one might learn. I am looking
at learning as belief change, and not necessarily behavioral change (except in terms of change in
speech—the source of my “belief” data) or policy change. Thus, this study does not examine
changes in military, political, or economic strategy (grand or otherwise), crisis management
techniques, or attempts to sway or manipulate public and international opinion one way or the
other. Instead, I evaluate changes in strategic preferences, perceptions of the world outside U.S.
territorial boundaries, feelings of control over world affairs, and other broad “beliefs,” as
evaluated by the operational code (a concept that will be discussed in detail further below).
Etheridge (1981) precludes maturation from his definition of learning (6, referencing
Hilgard and Bower 1975), along with fatigue and the influence of drugs. I, however, argue that
maturation—conceptualized as the accumulated impact of one’s experiences and perceptions
over time on beliefs—is an important component of learning, and this is one component that I
will explicitly examine.
Levy (1994), citing Jervis, conceptualizes the “political learning model” as part of a
“two-stage process or causal change in which (1) the observation and interpretation of
experience lead to a change in individual beliefs and (2) belief change influences subsequent
behavior” (291). Though the purpose of evaluating learning is ultimately to understand the
second component of this model, this project is primarily focused on the first. I agree with Levy
that it is crucial to understand what learning is and how it manifests itself, as well as when it will
or will not occur before we can take the larger step of mapping out the influence of learning on
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policy change.5
Following from this, I am explicitly evaluating when leaders come to “believe that” the
world works or exists in a certain manner (typically some changed understanding of cause-effect
relationships) rather than “learning how” (defined as evaluating “improved performance”—this
is a distinction made by Breslauer and Tetlock 1991, 13). As Breslauer and Tetlock note, “to see
whether leaders have learned how, we must specify the goals by which performance is to be
evaluated, determine that changes in belief drove the enactment of new policies, and evaluate the
greater or lesser effectiveness of those policies” (13-14). In this sense, coming to believe that
may be a prerequisite to understanding learning how, but evaluating the latter is far more
complex, entailing evaluation of long- and short-term consequences of belief change, as well as
the complex, “reciprocal” relationship between policy and the context within which policy is
made.6
The final empirical chapter, in which I evaluate the impact of beliefs on policy change, is
meant to be a very preliminary look at this relationship. I do not make judgments as to whether
or not U.S. behavior “improved” as a result of belief change; rather, I evaluate whether the type
and strength of presidential beliefs have a predictable, systematic influence on U.S. policy. A
more comprehensive evaluation of the impact of presidential beliefs (and belief change) on
policy is something that, I am interested in pursuing in later projects. First, however, I seek to
establish some clear, empirically supported determinants of belief change.

5

Levy (1994) argues that those evaluating learning as “structural adjustment,” or “adaptation,”
assume that the first component of this model does not have an impact on the second component.
As such, theorists evaluating such will ignore that first step (297).
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It is possible that belief change itself may be an “active” attempt to strategically influence the
beliefs that others hold of the “self’s” beliefs. However, this possibility is not explored or
examined in depth here.
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Though the “cognitive structuralist” perspective seems similar to the “cognitive
psychological” perspective discussed by Tetlock, Levy (1994) notes that there are issues that
make the structuralist view problematic. First, he notes that this perspective “sneaks the
accuracy [or efficiency] criterion through the back door” through the assumption that a more
complex view of the world equates with a more efficient view of the world (this is particularly
evident in Etheridge’s analysis of “learning”). Levy notes that increasingly complex views of
the world may actually hinder “desirable” decision-making processes, and that the degree of
complexity or simplicity that an individual evinces is a function of one’s environment and issue
domain, making evaluation of this phenomenon both theoretically and methodologically
problematic (294-296).
2.4 Views and Theories of Cognitive Psychological Learning
Starting from the perspective that learning in international relations (of the “experiential,”
belief change variety) is a change in a leader’s “beliefs” following from experience or the
observation of outside events, I ask, how and when does learning occur, or fail to occur? The
existing literature provides a well-spring of ideas from which hypotheses may be drawn.
2.4.1 The Rational Actor Model
The most well known theory of how ideas, attitudes, and beliefs are developed (as well as
of how decisions are made) is likely the “rational actor model.” This theory is, in a manner, a
theory of “experiential” learning. Though ultimately focused on how decisions are made, in the
process, the rational actor model suggests that individuals will develop or change their
preferences and ideas based upon the information that they encounter. That is to say, an
individual’s beliefs will change to reflect the impact of external stimuli. This is an extremely
simplified view that is not expected to realistically represent human behavior. However, the
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assumptions behind this model have been useful toward advancing other, more complex theories
(including game theoretic/formal models) of voter behavior as well as foreign policy decision
making and behavior.
Robert Jervis (1976) evaluates rationality as a generally accepted manner of “good”
decision making.7 Specifically, he defines this as “those ways of interpreting evidence that
conform to the generally accepted rules of drawing inferences. Conversely, irrational methods
and influences violate these rules of the ‘scientific method’ and would be rejected by the person
if he were aware of employing them” (119). Jervis notes that separate, contradictory inferences
can both be equally rational, since there is no “absolutely” rational standard to judge something
by, and thus there is some leeway in the details of how a more or less “rational” decision comes
to be made (based on such factors as the type of information one might expect to gather, the
amount of time and effort one can expect to devote to a given decision, or the different ordering
of preferences based upon individual or organizational differences). Ostrom (1991) further
argues that a theory of rational choice is normative, in that it prescribes ways in which
individuals should act. However, this theory is not normative in the sense that the actions that
individuals might make, or the motivations driving the decision-making process, may be “good”
or “bad.”
The “efficiency” model discussed earlier does, in some ways, approximate the degree to
which “rational” belief and behavior change takes place in the real world. Further, works by
Simon (1984), Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and others have made theories of rationality more
useful by assuming that individuals may attempt to behave rationally, but are hampered by real-
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Note that engaging in “good” decision making and realizing “good” outcomes following from a
given decision are two independent phenomena that may, but need not be, correlated with one
another.
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world influences, including the cognitive limitations of individuals.
Despite the popularity of “rational” evaluations of decision-making,8 however, much
work in political psychology exists to demonstrate how and why truly “rational” thought and
decisions are impossible, given that all humans possess cognitive “deficiencies” that ultimately
prohibit such. For this project, I do not postulate “rationally” based assumptions. Instead, I
approach the evaluation of learning from the “cognitive psychological” perspective as espoused
by George (1969, 197-198). I assume that humans must make decisions in the context of
imperfect information, where certain influences will be more or less influential than they would
be to an automaton without pre-existing beliefs, preferences, and biases generally. Below I
evaluate a number of theoretical perspectives that take as their starting point this assumption.
2.4.2 Social Psychological Theories of “Experiential” Learning
Through an assessment of work in the field of social psychology, Deborah Larson (1985)
presents an overview of the literature on “attitude change” as it relates to foreign policy, breaking
this work down into five general categories.9 Larson’s categorization is useful in evaluating non“rational” theories of learning, as most contemporary studies of learning in international relations
use social psychological concepts (either explicitly or otherwise) as their starting points, and
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I would include here evaluations such as those of Raser (1965), who evaluate learning as a
function of rewards, punishment, and the potential manipulation of these factors by other actors
in the international environment.
9
Larson seems to be treating “attitudes” as a concept equivalent to “beliefs” as they are
evaluated here. She does not seem to clearly define or identify what an “attitude” is, as she uses
the term. However, she treats both concepts as comparable when she uses the term “beliefs” to
describe her phenomenon of interest on pages 16 (“beliefs change only in response to an
onslaught of inconsistent data”), 32 (“ . . . U.S. policymakers adopted Cold War beliefs . . . ” ),
21 (“ . . . the Cold War beliefs identified in this study are idiosynchratic . . . ”—note that she
treats beliefs as sub-units comprising “ideologies”), and 60 (“. . .each man changed his beliefs
regarding the Soviet Union,” and “. . .efforts to discover his ‘true’ beliefs, attitudes, or
opinions”). Similarly, Jervis (1976) and Feldman (2003) interchangeably refer to both as the
same concept at various points.
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nearly all of these perspectives tend to fall within one or more of Larson’s categories of
evaluating such. I will note at the outset that though these are often competing theories, not all
of them are mutually exclusive. In fact, the manner of learning evaluated in this dissertation
borrows from a number of the theories that Larson evaluates.
2.4.2.1 Cognitive Dissonance
One of the major theoretical frameworks used here to interpret when learning is or is not
likely to occur is cognitive dissonance. Larson labels cognitive dissonance a “formal theory”
versus the informal, research-question-oriented nature of some other approaches (such as that of
Carl Hovland, which will be discussed later). Cognitive dissonance was developed by Leon
Festinger (1957), who suggests that inconsistencies within the cognitive system, stemming from
incoming evidence that conflicts with one’s pre-existing beliefs, cause an “uncomfortable state
of tension that people are then motivated to reduce or eliminate” (Larson, 1985: 29). In this
framework, one’s beliefs are interconnected and in harmony, and dissonance occurs as the mind
forces us, with the least amount of possible disturbance, to achieve a level of balance when
something occurs that might disrupt this harmony.
Larson argues that the “magnitude of dissonance experienced at any time is a function of
the discrepant cognitions and the ratio of dissonant to consonant elements” (p. 30). As
individuals view dissonance as a “noxious drive,” they are motivated to eliminate such,
particularly when higher levels of dissonance occur. Dissonance is actively reduced by one of
the following manners: “changing behavior associated with one of the dissonant cognitive
elements; altering the psychological or physical environment; [or] adding consistent cognitive
elements to change the ratio of consonant to dissonant cognitions” (Larson, 1985: 30).
Regarding belief change in the Cold War as a result of cognitive dissonance, Larson (1985)
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argues that:
U.S. policymakers adopted Cold War beliefs after being forced by situational pressures to
act contrary to strongly held, consistent beliefs in favor of Soviet-American cooperation,
without adequate justification and in spite of their fear of negative consequences (32).
The notion that beliefs (particularly “core” beliefs) are largely “stable” and are only
prone to change in certain situations is also echoed in many other works. Jervis (1976), for
instance, realizes that individuals have a “tendency to maintain their images and beliefs in the
face of discrepant information” (288). In Chapter 4 of Perception and Misperception in
International Politics, he discusses at length the concept of “cognitive consistency,” or
“cognitive balance,” and the notion that individuals are driven to maintain a consistency in their
beliefs so that they are able to maintain pre-existing conceptions of reality, even in the face of
information that runs counter to these existing beliefs. He notes that the need to maintain this
balance is very strong, and that in order to maintain it, individuals will often “ignore information
that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least not contradict, our beliefs, and deny its
validity” (143). Thus, notable learning is not likely to occur in many situations, given the human
need to maintain existing ways of thinking.
Following from this, Jervis (1976) does not expect an individual’s beliefs to change in a
predictable, purely “rational” sense, as automata might, to specific “inputs.” In fact, when a
person’s expectations “mirror the stimuli he is presented with,” he suggests that luck applies
more often than many would like to think (180). He also argues that there are a number of
psychological “defense mechanisms” by which attitudes are likely to change or remain stable
(291-296). These include: 1) the tendency to ignore, or to fail to process, information that runs
counter to one’s existing beliefs (through active defense mechanisms); 2) the tendency to
acknowledge discrepant information, but to simply dismiss its “validity”; 3) the tendency to
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discredit the source of discrepant information; 4) the tendency to acknowledge and understand
discrepant information, but to fail to understand how such information would be possible, and
thus failing to update new beliefs (i.e. by “admitting puzzlement”); 5) the tendency to “bolster”
one’s existing beliefs by seeking out new information that supports these beliefs, despite the
recognition that powerful discrepant evidence exists; 6) the tendency to seek out new
information that weakens some discrepant argument, despite the fact that it is acknowledged and
seen as potentially “valid”; and in extreme cases where discrepant information cannot be
countered, 7) “differentiation,” whereby some aspects of a previously held belief are retained,
and those that cannot be made to fit in with discrepant information are removed from one’s
beliefs—note that this can include “creating exceptions to a generalization” (296).
So if learning is not likely to occur most of the time, when is learning likely to take place
in the context of cognitive dissonance? Later in his book, Jervis (1976) poses the following
questions: “how do people treat discrepant information? When do they change their beliefs?
How do they change? What do they change? What beliefs are especially resistant to discrepant
information?” (289). Drawing on the social psychological literature and his own observations,
Jervis comes up with a number of premises and predictions regarding how and when belief
change is likely to occur. I will relay a large portion of his text here, as it is key to his overall
evaluation of learning, and is key to the way in which learning is conceptualized and evaluated in
this dissertation:
. . . people change as little of their attitude structure as possible. If they must change
something, they will first alter those beliefs that are least important, that are supported by
the least information, and that are tied to fewest other beliefs. If the discrepant
information is ambiguous, slight, or unimportant it will be dismissed, assimilated, or put
to one side. Thus the first mechanisms to be invoked preserve all of the person’s original
attitudes. If the amount and quality of the discrepant information renders these
mechanisms inadequate, processes that involve minor or peripheral changes will have to
be invoked. If these cannot cope with the contradictions, mechanisms that necessitate
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more far-reaching changes will be called into play. Because many of these beliefs are
interconnected, large-scale changes can be avoided only if the person treats new
information in a way that limits the implication of his initial response. These
interconnections partly explain both the prevalence of incremental decision-making and
the far-reaching changes that occur when central beliefs are finally altered (291).
Thus, when viewed in a foreign policy decision-making perspective, we get a clear
picture here of a decision-maker who is quite stubborn. He has pre-existing beliefs that he dearly
holds on to, and only in extreme cases are major changes to his beliefs or attitudes likely to
occur.
Of course, as noted above, individuals are able to overcome all of these potential hurdles
to learning, but Jervis notes that this is the exception rather than the rule. If individuals do allow
themselves to truly acknowledge some understanding of other situations and perspectives, to
treat them as valid, and if they can resist resorting to one of the above methods of discounting
this information, then a whole-scale change in beliefs should still fail to occur. Instead,
individuals will typically attempt to “fit” this information into their existing ways of thinking
about things (or into their existing “frames” or “schemas”—I will more explicitly discuss
“schemas” below).10 As existing schemas are still maintained, this is a relatively minor form of
learning, and is likely to occur far more frequently than is the replacement of existing schemas
by new ones.
Larson (1991) argues that “people are more likely to learn a new concept through
repeated, successive exposures to a phenomenon,” (353) relating this to schema theory, as people
have difficulties “rationally” interpreting and dealing with new information that runs counter to
their existing ways of thinking. This again shows that cognitive dissonance suggests that beliefs
10

Jervis (1976) suggests that incoming information is more likely to be assimilated into preexisting “images” when: 1) the information is more ambiguous; 2) when the actor is more
confident of the validity of his existing image; and 3) when he holds a strong commitment to his
existing image (195).
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tend to be fairly stable due to one’s adherence to a given set of beliefs and values, but that they
can change in certain instances.
Given the human tendency to engage in a habitual, often predictable set of behaviors, it is
unsurprising that past behavior is amongst the single best predictors of future behavior (Budd,
North, and Spencer 1984; Mittal 1988). But what is the impact of behavior on beliefs?
Cognitive dissonance theory, as discussed above, suggests that humans do not like to encounter
information that runs counter to our existing interpretations of the world. However, this is also a
factor when evaluating one’s own behaviors. Festinger (1957) and Festinger and Carlsmith
(1959) argue that when individuals voluntarily perform a behavior running counter to a
previously formed attitude, these individuals will engage in a process that may ultimately lead to
a change in attitudes so that they coincide with this earlier behavior. Albarracin and Wyer, Jr.
(2000) describe the process as such:
[Individuals] attempt to rationalize their counterattitudinal behavior by convincing
themselves that they had good reasons for engaging in it. This rationalization is likely to
produce a change in their estimations of both the likelihood and desirability of the
behavior’s specific consequences and, therefore, a revision of the attitude for which these
estimates have implications. The new attitude, in turn, may provide the basis for their
future behavioral decisions (6).
This gives us another example of how the theory of cognitive dissonance can help to
explain situations in which beliefs are more likely to change, as the human need to maintain a
“cognitively consistent” view of the self thus helps to explain attitudinal change following a
change in behavior.
2.4.2.2 Schema Theory and Historical Learning
Another theory of attitude change evaluated by Larson and important in the context of
this project is that of Schema theory, which expects that individuals will not engage in a truly
“pseudo-scientific” search as some forms of the rational actor model and attribution theory
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(discussed later) might expect, but instead will act as a “categorizer” and “labeler” in order to
interpret information, and to function within an incredibly complex world (Larson 1985, 50-51).
Larson defines a “schema” as a:
. . . generic concept stored in memory, referring to objects, situations, events, or people.
It is a collection of knowledge related to a concept, not a dictionary definition; a schema
describes what is usually the case, not necessarily true. Thus, the schema for bird
includes variables for color, size, beak shape, and nesting patterns. As stored in memory,
a schema has default values for all these variables, providing a prototype against which
specific examples can be compared (51).
Regarding learning, schema theory takes this initial assumption that individuals are
“cognitive misers” who create these “schemas” in order to interpret reality, and assumes that
changes in attitudes/beliefs have to be understood in this context. Specifically, this theory argues
that once schemas are developed, individual experiences are always “filtered” through these
schemas, and people “assimilate” new information to fit into existing ways of thinking.
Larson suggests that schemas serve three important functions, which will be briefly
discussed in turn. First, she argues that “schemas allow us to select what is important out of the
flux of experience (51). The world is too complex to understand in its entirety, and as such,
schemas tell us what is and isn’t worthy of our attention, which makes functional existence
possible. Secondly, “a schema is a means of storing memories of objects and events,” or more
specifically, a “partial copy of the schema,” which helps to facilitate “recall because a simple,
nonredundant memory structure is less susceptible to decay over time” (52). Third, “schemas
enable a person to go beyond the information given and make inferences about an object or
situation.” This helps to determine our expectations in any given (potentially ambiguous)
environment or situation, while also alerting us when something is “wrong.” Finally, “schemas
enable a person to envision and carry out a sequence of actions to achieve a particular goal,” (52)
such as how to make coffee, drive a car, behave diplomatically, etc.
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Larson argues that there are three types of schemas. One type of which is the
“metaphor,” which includes the study of historical learning (I will examine historical learning
separately following this overview). Larson labels her second type “cognitive scripts,” which are
“stereotyped sequence[s] of events characterizing a well-known situation” (54). Larson likens
this to a set of scenes in a cartoon strip, where certain types of scenes lead to certain types of
outcomes. Referencing Robert Abelson, she says that these scripts can be either “episodic,”
dealing with a single experience (e.g. the “Munich” script says that appeasing Hitler led to World
War II), or “categorical,” which are broader and more abstract extensions of the episodic forms
of schemas (e.g. “appeasement only encourages aggressors to make more extreme demands”—
54.11
Larson’s third type of schema is related to judgments about other individuals, and is
called the “persona.” These are “cognitive structures representing the personality characteristics
and typical behaviors of certain ‘stock characters’” (55). For example, presidents may have
specific conceptions of “terrorists” or of “leaders of democracies,” or they may liken a specific
individual to another specific individual that they had known in some way.
To give an example of how schemas manifest themselves, Larson tells the story of
Truman mistakenly recalling having sent an ultimatum to the Soviets that they withdraw from
Iranian soil following their incursion in 1946. Larson argues that sending this ultimatum
matched up with Truman’s “schematic” interpretation of how the U.S. should respond to
potential Soviet threats (52). A more recent example is offered by the public response to U.S.
preparations for war in Iraq. In 2002 and 2003 (and even afterward), the U.S. public largely
believed that many, if not all of the 9/11 hijackers were of Iraqi descent
11

Though examples of “historical learning” are probably the best demonstration of scripts, note
that scripts do not have to be taken from politically or militarily historical examples.
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(http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=544). This belief remained firm-despite the fact that it was publicly revealed as false (all but one hijacker were from Saudi
Arabia, and the remaining hijacker was from the United Arab Emirates)--because the U.S.
targeting of Iraq soon after the 9/11 attacks developed and reinforced the widespread notion that
Iraq was, in part, behind the attacks. Hence, much of the public’s schematic interpretation of the
9/11 hijackers was that of a group of Iraqi extremists.
Of particular relevance to this project are the works of noted political psychologists who
evaluate “beliefs” as a set of schemas, which essentially act as a prism through which reality is
interpreted and acted upon. Jervis (1976) for instance suggests that individuals tend to accept
“theories” of the way that the world works, and then evaluate the world through these theories.
Changing these ways of thinking, as noted in the discussion on cognitive dissonance, is a
difficult task, and this often occurs accidentally, in response to attempts to preserve one’s
existing beliefs (165-166).
In a later work, Larson (1991) makes an interesting observation regarding how learning
might occur in the context of schemas, based upon the complexity of, and integration between
the various schemas that one holds. She states that:
Whether decision makers actually absorb new information requires attention and the
ability to fit this data into their cognitive structures. People who have a complex,
integrated set of schemas can better accommodate contradictory information without
changing their beliefs, because they can formulate conditional generalizations or
qualifications. By contrast, the nonexpert with a simple set of schemas is apt to change
his mind readily, but these changes may not endure because there is little structure on
which to fasten new concepts and data. This suggests that individuals with moderate
knowledge of a policy domain are more susceptible to belief change (352-53).12

12

It is noteworthy here that Larson’s conceptualization of “belief change” is that of a fairly
stable and long-term change, which appears to represent the same phenomenon referred to by
others (Leng 2000; Levy 1994; Tetlock 1991) as “learning” (recall that Larson’s actual definition
of “learning” falls under the “efficiency” definition of such).
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Related to the discussion by George and others on beliefs, C. Hermann (1990) argues
that:
. . . learning approaches suggest that major foreign policy change can occur when key
policymakers who are confronting a problem restructure their mental models or schema
of the problem. This can lead to a redefinition of the problem or to a new understanding
of the relationship between it and their policies (11).
In this sense, C. Hermann also evaluates learning through changes in one’s schema. Of
the potential causes of this learning, he argues that while most changes in the international
environment are easy to ignore and lead to very little “learning” of any kind, “external shocks are
large events in terms of visibility and immediate impact on the recipient. They cannot be
ignored, and they can trigger major foreign policy change” (12). Though, following from the
work of Jervis, Alexander George and others, schemas might typically be expected to remain
fairly stable, they are capable of both methodical and drastic change, and the most drastic change
might be expected following major crises (as evaluated here in Chapter 7).
As the above discussion shows, cognitive dissonance and schema theory are very closely
related, and can be difficult to examine in isolation. One’s “schemas” often provide the context
within which “dissonance” must be understood.
Also within the domain of “schema theory” is the concept of “historical learning.” This
falls under the “metaphor” type of schema (though it can also be viewed as a schematic “script”
in some instances), which encompasses the notion that individuals will dictate current behavior
by creating analogies or metaphors based upon perceived past events (Larson 1985, 55). This is
likely the single most popular form of “learning” evaluated by political scientists, since
policymakers often attribute the “lessons of the past” (the “Munich” analogy, the “Vietnam”
analogy, etc.) as significant motivating forces behind contemporary action.
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Note that this form of learning is a special case, in that it is not typically learning from
one’s own experiences, but rather learning from the experiences of one’s state prior to one’s
taking office. Closely related to this is the type of learning that might occur within another
state—either from contemporary cases, or lessons of the past—as a kind of diffusion of historical
lessons of learning. However, as Jervis (1976) notes, leaders of a given state tend to be fairly
short-sighted, and if they learn any lesson from the past, lessons from one’s own past (or one’s
state’s own past) are far more likely to be learned than that which occurs to others. If something
happened to Russia for instance, then the president of the U.S. might see this as being due to the
incompetence or character of the Russian people and/or leadership, rather than the result of
specific “wrong” decisions that could also apply to a current case facing himself.13
Jervis (1976), who defines historical learning simply as the extraction of “lessons from a
given event” (218), notes that “by making accessible insights derived from previous events,
analogies provide a useful shortcut to rationality. But they also obscure aspects of the present
case that are different from the past one” (220). As a result, “better” decisions might actually be
made, in certain situations, with less knowledge/information of this type. In other words, more
“fully informed” decisions are not always the best, given that humans are prone to use historical
analogies and metaphors inappropriately as guides for behavior (227-230). Jervis also notes that
in order to predict specifically which historical lessons will be learned is a very difficult task,
given that we must take into account not simply the occurrence of interest, but also the
predispositions of the perceiver encountering this occurrence (which is always a key factor in
cognitive psychological evaluations of learning; 223-224).

13

This example of viewing others’ undesirable behavior as being due to their intrinsic faults, but
applying situational explanations for the self’s undesirable behavior is explained via attribution
theory, which will be discussed in the next section.
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Ultimately, Jervis suggests that in foreign policy decision-making, inappropriate lessons
are often learned from what are, often, inappropriate cases. Summing up his observations
regarding the prevalence of these instances, Jervis concludes:
More important [than decision-makers’ “lack of mental abilities” and “social science
training”] are the complexity of the subject matter, the small and biased sample of cases
available for study, the conditions under which learning takes place, and the decisionmakers’ failure to realize how much they are influenced by their views of the past (235).
Khong (1991), in his evaluation of learning from the Korean War, demonstrates the ways
in which historical cases may be used to hinder or facilitate belief and policy change with respect
to the international environment. For instance, he notes that the “lessons of Korea” provided the
following “diagnostic tasks” for U.S. leaders regarding Vietnam: “(1) it helped condition the
U.S. definition of the situation or problems in Vietnam; (2) it shaped the assessment of the
political and (3) moral stakes; (4) it provided a prediction about the likelihood of success; and (5)
it warned about the dangers of certain options” (303).
Regarding his methodology and justification for the importance for the Korean case as an
influence on U.S. policy toward Vietnam, Khong performed a count of the use of historical
analogies by U.S. officials by year through the 1960s, finding the biggest spike in usage prior to
Johnson’s escalation in 1965, and noticed that “the Korean analogy was by far the most
frequently invoked ‘lesson of the past’” (304). Among the more important analogies found here
was that “external aggression” reflecting “international communism at work” was to be treated
very seriously, and that early and direct “military action (on the part of the United States)” was
the best way to deal with this threat given that this method was so effective in dealing with North
Korean aggression (305-306).
Reiter (1996) defines historical learning as “the application of information derived from
past experiences to facilitate understanding of a particular policy question,” where he takes “the
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behavioral approach to the question of learning, seeking to understand what kinds of lessons get
drawn given certain experiences” (20). In his study of state alliance decisions, Reiter develops a
theory of learning with three main propositions: 1) “lessons are drawn infrequently”; 2) “they are
most often taken from high-impact, politically significant events”; and 3) “lessons reflect the
desire to repeat past successes and avoid past failures” (3). He argues that decisions to, or not to
engage in alliances is typically based upon historical experiences, arguing that “small powers
learn about alliance and neutrality from their experiences in world wars, and these lessons
determine their alliance choices in the peacetime years that follow these wars. World wars, then,
serve as crucibles within which beliefs about international relations are forged” (emphasis
added).
Dallin (1991), in his analysis of learning in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet Union,
suggests that leaders are actually “relatively impervious to historical information (accurate or
otherwise)” (404). Though history is often used by policy makers as a justification for action, he
argues that these occurrences are not always the factor that leaders make them out to be, in terms
of their impact on beliefs. Instead, Dallin argues that historical analogies are often used as a part
of a “script,”14 and are thus used selectively in order to justify one’s behavior, rather than as a
means to actually “inform.”15
However, Khong (1991) counters this by suggesting that in certain instances at least,
historical analogies are not only used in public speeches, but also in “the private deliberations of
policy makers” (307) as well as in future memoirs and recounts of why specific policy
14

Note: this is not the same as the script “schema” discussed by Larson.
Going back to Larson’s argument that one’s behavior often affects future beliefs in important
ways, we might then surmise that, on occasion, these leaders may begin to believe that these
lessons actually work in the way that they initially suggest. However, when the analogy is
initially used, it may only be in the means of justifying something that was not at all informed by
the previous historical occurrence of interest.
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preferences came to be made (308). If they are used in private discourse, Khong argues, then
one might presume that they are more than just a rhetorical means of advocating some
preconceived policy preference. Further, while he does not dispute that these examples might be
used for “justification” and “policy advocacy,” Khong suggests that it is quite possible that they
may also be used for “diagnosis,” suggesting that these three purposes may not be mutually
exclusive. Defending this point further, he argues that a critic of the usage of these examples
assumes deceitfulness and attempted manipulation by the policymaker. This is fairly difficult to
prove, and in fact, may be more difficult to argue than the suggestion that historical analogies
serve the purposes that they are claimed to by those using them. Finally, Khong brings in
research from cognitive psychology, and argues that “analogical reasoning” is a “major way” in
which humans make sense of reality. As such, it seems quite reasonable that the historical
analogies used by policy makers are quite truthful representations of how they actually perceive
the world (309).16
2.4.2.3 Attribution Theory
A third theoretical perspective evaluated by Larson (1985) lies in opposition to the
cognitive consistency model, and is called “attribution theory” (34). This framework argues that
individuals behave, not simply in an attempt to maintain cognitive “consistency,” and to
disregard dissonant information, but as “naïve scientists” (as opposed to “rationalizers” or “egodefenders”) who are “relatively open-minded in the search for truth, untrammeled by the need to
maintain a favorable self-image or preserve a favored belief.” It is “concerned with people’s
attempts to explain the events of everyday life, draw inferences about the unchanging properties
of their social milieu, and make predictions about the behavior of other people” (35). Attribution
16

For additional work on historical learning see May (1973), Ravenal (1978), Mefford (1991),
Hybel (1991), Khong (1992), and Jarosz and Nye (1993).
36

theory differs from the pure, rational actor theory discussed earlier, in that it views individuals as
limited in their abilities and imperfect, necessarily acting within a context of incomplete
information and limited resources.
This perspective assumes that individuals actively seek out and causally evaluate
information, as opposed to having communicated information passively influence their beliefs
(as is the case in the “Hovland school”—40). Further, individuals espousing the attribution
perspective explain the apparent stability of individuals’ beliefs not as a “motivated”
unwillingness or inability to change, but rather as the result of “errors in handling information,”
leading to a “cognitive” unwillingness or inability to change (41). For instance, individuals may
confirm pre-existing beliefs by looking for consistent evidence as cognitive consistency theory
suggests, or they may do so because it is simply less difficult to assume that one is already
correct, than it is to critically evaluate this belief, which is the stance taken by attribution
theorists. Other research programs that might be lumped in to the category of “attribution
theory” include Stern’s (1997) conception of “Explanation Based Learning.”
One model of the attribution theoretical process states that individuals believe co-varying
occurrences demonstrate causality (Larson 1985, 36). That is to say, if one event co-varies with
another, then one of these two events may well cause the other. Another is the idea that
individuals believe situational factors dictate the “self’s” behavior, whereas dispositional factors
dictate the “other’s” behavior (37-38—this is often referred to as the “fundamental attribution
error”). This is not due to the need to maintain one’s self image from this perspective, but rather
a natural strategy of simplistically understanding a complex world without applying too much
critical thought to such. We know more about ourselves than others, and thus it is easier to
understand the issues that limit our autonomy than it is to understand those of others, who it is
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easier to view as solely acting “as they wish to.” Larson conveys that research from this
perspective has found that vivid and firsthand information will have more of an effect on
people’s “judgments and explanations,” whereas inaction and non-occurrences are often ignored
(38-39). This can be dangerous in situations where inaction should provoke concern.
Related to the earlier discussion on the impact of one’s actions on learning, Fishbein and
Ajzen (1975) have found that once a behavior occurs, individuals may engage in a type of
“biased scanning” of their memory in order to find information that legitimizes this behavior (as
Jervis notes, this is one potential response explained by cognitive dissonance). Then, this
process may contribute to new attitude formation regarding the nature of both the behavior, and
the occurrences leading up to the behavior, which impacts future behaviors and future attitudes
regarding such. This is another manner of engaging in a “cognitive shortcut,” but in the manner
of behaving as a “naïve scientist” in order to interpret and understand reality.
2.4.2.4 Self-Perception Theory
“Self-perception theory” was developed by Daryl Bem (1967) and, instead of looking at
how individuals perceive the motivations, and perceptions of others, looks specifically at how
individuals view themselves. This is particularly the case in ambiguous situations, when
individuals may strongly rely on how “I” would “typically” deal with such a situation, in order to
interpret behavior in the moment. Stern (1997) defines this as “an individual's ability to respond
differentially to his own behavior and its controlling variables” (184—note that this theory was
developed as an alternative to cognitive dissonance theory). This suggests that an individual’s
attitudes may be based upon one’s own fairly shallow evaluation of the self’s, and others,
behavior and experiences, more than upon attempts to “legitimize” one’s behavior (as could be
explained by cognitive dissonance theory).
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From this perspective external cues, thinking of the “self’s” past experiences, and trying
to imagine the self in a given situation are more important than true “internal feelings,” or
predispositions. As such, Larson (1985) suggests that “self-perception theory radically revises
the traditional concept of attitude” (43). She goes on to present numerous instances of empirical
evidence for self-perception theory showing, amongst other things, that it is more likely to be
realized when one’s opinions are not fully formed. She later notes that “decision makers are
rationalizing, rather than rational animals. They use their behavior as a guide to what they
believe. Thus, policy change may precede and cause a change in policy makers’ attitudes or
beliefs” (Larson 1991, 353, emphasis in original). Note that this is different from the notion
from cognitive dissonance that behavior may impact leaders’ beliefs following psychological
stress due to mismatching behavior and beliefs. From the perspective of self-perception theory,
again, beliefs are shallow, and behavior often impacts beliefs because beliefs are ill-formed or
indifferent as to the behavior/belief of interest.
Again evaluating the impact of one’s own beliefs on attitude/belief change, individuals
may behave in a much less complex manner when attempting to justify their actions than is
suggested by “biased scanning” theory discussed in the “attribution” section. In this theory,
many attitudes are fairly arbitrary, and small external cues may cause drastically different
attitudes to develop (Bem 1967, 185-186). Bem shows that in a number of studies, “an
individual's belief and attitude statements can be manipulated by inducing him to role-play,
deliver a persuasive communication, or engage in any behavior that would characteristically
imply his endorsement of a particular set of beliefs” (185). To reiterate, the argument here is that
this results from the observation of the self by the self, which impacts attitudes/beliefs because
the perceiver is cognitively lazy, and possesses ill-formed or shallow existing attitudes.
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2.4.2.5 The Hovland School
Carl Hovland developed the notion that attitudes will change as part of an “affective
reaction” based on exposure to a persuasive argument, with the degree of influence being based
on “who said what to whom with what effect” (Larson 1985, 26—emphasis in original). Larson
states that this is related to “learning” in the “efficiency” sense, since a message may be accepted
based upon the incentives provided in the communication. She states that several hypotheses
were derived from this theory by the “Hovland group,” based upon the level of the
communicator’s credibility, the degree of the message’s acceptability, and the personality of the
perceiver (which may predispose him/her to being more or less susceptible to persuasion by the
message: 27). As an example of a persuasive argument leading to foreign policy “attitude”
change in this conceptualization, Larson points to George Kennan’s “long telegram,” which is
considered by many to have had a critical influence on the development of the “containment”
policy of the U.S.
However, Larson also notes that the impact of communication here is often in large
measure mediated by the environment. Kennan’s telegram would not have been nearly as
effective had it not been written and disseminated at the precise point in time that it was. As
such, if we are interested in understanding true causality in terms of influences on learning, we
must take into consideration the context within which hypothesized influences on learning are
experienced (as has been alluded to earlier, the “self in situation” is a key concept in much
political psychological work).
In opposition to some of the other theories discussed here, learning from the Hovland
perspective is a fairly passive process. Though individuals certainly may make calculations
based upon the information transmitted to them, they do not actively seek out new or competing
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evidence to challenge or support the information that they receive. As such, they do not act as
“naïve scientists,” as they do from the attribution perspective. Instead, learning is strongly
affected by the degree and types of information to which individuals are exposed.17
2.5 Jervis’s Speculations Regarding Influences on Learning
Now that I have covered the major “cognitive psychological” perspectives regarding how
learning may occur, I want to address some of the other major findings regarding learning
defined as belief change that cross some of the categories previously listed. Perhaps the best
starting place here is Jervis, who in his work Perception and Misperception in International
Politics (1976) provides many (if not most) of the ideas that have framed analyses of learning by
political elites defined as belief/attitude change since its publication. To begin, Jervis argued
that there are four variables that “influence the degree to which an event affects later perceptual
predispositions.” These will be discussed here in turn.
2.5.1 Firsthand Experiences
Jervis argues that first-hand experiences tend to contribute to “learning” to a greater
extent than do second-hand observations of others’ experiences. He uses the analogy that “a
person who has been bitten by a snake will be predisposed to see ambiguous figures as snakes.
He will be quicker to see snakes when they are present . . . His behavior will also be changed—
he will take detours around snake-infested areas” (240). In other words, knowing something is
one thing, but experiencing something is entirely different. Jervis describes experimental and
case study evidence supporting this notion, but perhaps the strongest evidence is included in his
statement, “we have found no instances of the reverse of our proposition—cases in which an

17

Note: Though Larson discusses the Hovland School as the most basic school of thought
regarding attitude change, I discuss it last amongst forms of learning as this is perhaps the least
relevant manner of “learning” for this study.
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event made more of an impression on bystanders than on the actor” (241, emphasis in original).
Regarding consequences of this finding, Jervis argues that when an individual meets
someone else in person, a strong image is formed that would not exist otherwise. This image
development can be problematic in that, as noted earlier, it is likely to be “maintained in the face
of large amounts of discrepant information,” and will therefore lead to a decreased ability to
update one’s beliefs based upon this “met” actor’s current and future behavior. When President
Bush first met Vladimir Putin and “was able to get a sense of his soul,” for instance, a certain
image may have been created in Bush’s mind that inhibited any semblance of a rational
evaluation of Putin’s behavior after this point.
Further, Jervis notes that the predispositions created and lessons learned by a certain
firsthand experience will often be applied to other situations and actors in the future.
Additionally, he suggests that the desire for leaders to “learn for themselves” will “often be a
mistake if the problem is complex and the visit short” (245). Thus, though learning
disproportionately from one’s experiences can be a good thing, in that the tendency to take
inappropriate lessons from inappropriate cases may be reduced (as often occurs in instances of
“historical learning”), the above demonstrates that there are certainly drawbacks to this
phenomenon as well.
Finally, Jervis suggests that “an actor will learn most fruitfully from events that he knows
well enough to analyze in some detail, but that are not so close that they dominate his future
perceptions” (246). In this sense, he prescribes that leaders should read more about history and
spend more time actively observing others, despite the fact that the knowledge gained is
expected to be minor in relation to that experienced first-hand.
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2.5.2 Early Experiences and Generational Effects
Early experiences and generational effects are sub-sets of the “first-hand experiences”
that one encounters, but Jervis suggests that these have “an especially great impact on [a
person’s] perceptual predispositions” (249). Regarding early experiences, one’s childhood often
provides the foundations for how this person will perceive the world and behave for the rest of
his life (249-251). Though these beliefs and ideas might not directly predict specific future
beliefs about world politics, early perceptions regarding the nature of power and control, right
and wrong behavior, and the essential “nature of man” may well have a critically important
influence on one’s future beliefs regarding world politics, and his place in it. Perhaps more
important than this, however, are one’s early experiences that help to establish “the person as an
autonomous and valued individual” (250), and those that lead to early successes as a youth or
young adult in problem solving.
Regarding generational effects (also known as cohort effects), Jervis notes that these are
“the values and beliefs that dominate the climate of opinion at the time when [individuals] first
begin to think about politics” (253). These are ideas that permeate society, and affect all
individuals who grow up in a certain time under certain circumstances. Jervis argues that these
are often “the source of the basic political ideas that a person holds.” He suggests that these
events can happen either early in one’s life, or early in one’s adulthood (though he suggests that
the latter are more influential), and can help to explain “generational differences” between the
beliefs and attitudes of younger and older policymakers (even controlling for the impact of age).
2.5.3 Events Important to the Person’s State or Organization
Additional occurrences of particular salience to individuals’ beliefs regarding
international politics are revolutions (due to their overwhelming influence on society), and the
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“last” war, (which may be as, if not more influential than some revolution occurring in the
distant past, because they are still so salient in leaders’ minds). Regarding the last war, Jervis
notes, “what was believed to have caused the last war will be considered likely to cause the next
one” (267). He then notes that the last “major” war is the most influential of all, and gives the
example of the first and second World Wars. The first World War was followed by the creation
of the League of Nations, and an attempt to “cool off” international politics with the idea that
war could have been avoided by “intelligent and conciliatory diplomacy” (267). However, once
this period failed to prevent the onset of World War II, the “status quo” states of the world
became much more cautious, and placed much less stock in the feasibility or utility of removing
conflict from the world through the means of diplomacy alone. Thus, Russian behavior was
generally viewed as far more hostile following World War II than it might have been had it
occurred in the post-World War I time period.
I should note that much of the work by Russell Leng (1983, 1988, 2000) evaluating
learning from “crisis bargaining” follows from Jervis’s hypotheses regarding the “last war.”
Leng expands this by suggesting that repeated crisis confrontations between two states will
further reinforce the lessons that are learned from the previous engagement between these states.
In his research along these lines, Leng (1983, 1988) initially uses empirical observations and the
framework of “A Theory of Moves” to demonstrate this. However, he expands on Jervis’s
speculations by demonstrating how the lessons learned by states tend to occur following the last
“loss,” since there is little incentive to change behavior if a state comes out on the winning side
of a conflict. Further, the type of change that will occur following losses, Leng argues, will
typically be in the manner of increased belligerence, following expectations derived from realist
theorizing where the use of “threats and commitments to demonstrate resolve” are key
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components of coercive diplomacy (Leng 1983, 381).
In his later work, Leng (2000) goes on to suggest that though all actors evaluated in his
work (the U.S., the Soviet Union, India, Pakistan, Israel, and Egypt) learned following
expectations derived from “realpolitik” theorizing. However, he finds that this learning did not
necessarily lead to more effective crisis management. Instead, he specifically states that the
factors that led leaders to follow the tenets of realpolitik, along with “misapplied analogies . . .
led to learning that was dysfunctional in all but a few instances” (279).
2.5.4 Range of Available Alternative Analogies
The final “variable” that helps to account for when individuals learn is “the presence or
absence of alternative analogies (i.e. the extent of knowledge of different kinds of actors and
situations)” (Jervis, 1976: 270). In other words, how simplified or complex is one’s view of the
world? This factor helps to mediate the impact of other factors. For instance, if a leader
perceives reality in a fairly simplified way, then he or she is likely to fit events (both historical
and contemporary) into a few, basic categories, which will affect the interpretation of these
events. Jervis likens this to academics who, when encountering something outside of one’s
conception of how things work, are likely to “adjust the data to the theory” (270).
2.5.5 Lessons and Types of Learning
Regarding the four variables outlined above (first-hand experiences, early experiences
and generational effects, important events, and the range of alternative analogies), Jervis notes
that when more than one variable appears to be “positive,” then “the event will have especially
great salience” (239). However, he notes that when this occurs, it is often very difficult to tease
out the relative influences of one factor over another.
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Having discussed the primary ways that he believes policy-makers might learn important
lessons regarding world politics, Jervis then evaluates the lessons that people learn following
from these events. The most common “lessons” that he found will be discussed here in turn.
The first category he evaluates is that of the lessons learned following the impact of “constant
factors.” This is related to the earlier discussion of the need for “cognitive balance” by
individuals, and concerns the fact that individuals’ “perceptual readiness” to see things in a
particular way can often make adjustment and learning from new and different circumstances
difficult (271). In other words, current events tend to be filtered through a “constant” historical
context, and the lessons learned from these events will thus tend to be mediated by the lessons
learned from earlier events. Further, current occurrences will be perceived as following earlier
patterns experienced. Of course, this may prohibit “rational” or “pseudo-rational” decisionmaking processes.
The second category here concerns lessons learned about specific actors. Jervis argues,
again, that early and important experiences with others will tend to filter how future interactions
with these actors are interpreted, often through inappropriate overgeneralizations. The third
category of lessons learned stems from reactions to failure. Specifically, Jervis argues that
leaders tend to avoid policies that have failed in the immediate past (similar to Leng’s
expectations regarding learning from conflicts). He argues that “high and even medium-level
goals are not altered but tactics that are the opposite ends of these that failed are tried” (275).
Again, Jervis suggests that leaders tend to over-generalize from their past experiences here,
which will often lead to undesirable, overly irrational decisions.
The fourth category discussed by Jervis concerns former incidents of success. He
suggests that, in opposition to the 3rd lesson (learning following failure), successful policies will
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often be applied to future situations. Not surprisingly following from earlier discussions, a given
leader will tend to “overestimate the degree to which his policy was responsible for earlier
success” and “will be especially insensitive to variation in the situation” (278).
What one gathers from Jervis’s overall discussion is that because of the human need to
simplify reality, and in the process, to rely on previous experiences, expectations, and beliefs to
interpret the present, humans do not “learn” as completely rational decision-makers would (if
they learn anything at all). Human learning is imperfect, and when evaluated, should be
understood as being strongly influenced by predispositions created at earlier points in time.
In addition to Jervis’s categorization, “learning,” as it is defined here, can be of the
“causal” or “diagnostic” varieties (Levy 1994, 285), where “causal” learning “refers to changing
beliefs about the laws (hypotheses) of cause and effect, the consequences of actions, and the
optimal strategies under various conditions.” Conversely, “diagnostic” learning “refers to
changes in beliefs about the definition of the situation or the preferences, intentions, or relative
capabilities of others.” Though there is not a perfect correlation, one might say that changes in
leaders’ “instrumental” operational code beliefs reflect “causal” learning, and changes in leaders’
“philosophical” operational code beliefs reflect instances of “diagnostic” learning (these different
types of operational code beliefs will be discussed later in this chapter). Levy attributes learned
lessons that are applied to states generally as “causal,” and those applied to specific states as
“diagnostic.”
Levy also notes that learning can be evaluated in “simple” and “complex” varieties. Nye
(1987) argues that “simple learning uses information merely to adapt the means, without altering
any deeper goals in the ends-means . . . complex learning, by contrast, involves recognition of
conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities
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and trade-offs” (380). He notes that complex learning is more difficult to assess than simple
learning, due to the need to look at a larger scope of belief change.
2.6 Findings Regarding Learning from the Operational Code
In terms of empirical evidence beyond the anecdotal and qualitative, work on the
operational code has provided a number of quantitative tests regarding the dynamics of belief
change. For instance, Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), who re-evaluated the previously held
notion that operational codes were global (i.e. not object- or agent-specific) and very stable,
found that Jimmy Carter’s operational code changed significantly following exposure to the
crises of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the taking of U.S. hostages in Iran. This
project’s author (Robison 2006) similarly found that George W. Bush’s belief system was
significantly altered following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, shifting his beliefs from those of a
“dove” to those of a “hawk” (a finding replicated by Renshon 2008). The above findings
presumed, and found evidence to support the hypothesis that crises may provide a “shock”
toward one’s previously held beliefs, leading to notable changes.
Walker and Schafer (2000) examined Lyndon Johnson’s beliefs over an eight month
period (from late 1974 through 1975), ultimately leading up to Johnson’s decision to commit
ground forces in South Vietnam. Findings demonstrated notable shifts in Johnson’s “general”
operational code beliefs toward his feeling significantly less control over world events, and his
seeing chance as playing a significantly greater role as the decision to send “troops on the
ground” into Vietnam approached. Crichlow (2000) examined Shimon Peres and Yitzhak Rabin
in two time periods—during the 1970s and the 1990s, with expectations that factors and
constraints in the domestic and international landscapes over the intervening time period would
lead certain beliefs to change, and others to remain stable. He found that, regarding their
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“philosophical” beliefs, both leaders saw the world as more cooperative, felt more optimistic
regarding realization of political values, saw the world as more predictable, and felt a greater
potential to shape political events in the 1990s than they did in the 1970s. However, on the
“feelings of control” philosophical belief, Rabin did not change much (maintaining fairly high
feelings here during both periods), whereas Peres did feel greater control in the 1990s than he did
in the 1970s. Further, these leaders differed in terms of changes in their “instrumental” beliefs,
with Rabin maintaining fairly stable beliefs of this kind over time, and Peres experiencing more
variation.
Feng (2005) examined the effect of the Korean War on Mao Tse Tung, and finds that he
shifted from a “defensive realist” to an “offensive realist” over this time. She suggests that Mao
experienced a significant change in war-time so that he ultimately saw the world as more hostile,
more strongly preferred conflict over cooperation, viewed the future as more predictable, felt
greater control over historical development, and felt that chance played a lesser role. As will be
discussed further in chapter 2, these are all “philosophical” belief changes, and interestingly,
Mao’s “instrumental” views of the world held fairly constant across the time periods evaluated.
The above works generally suggest that belief change helps one to deal with the world in
what the “self” believes to be the most functional/adaptive way.
2.7 Other Findings from Social Psychology
Perhaps work in political science can also learn something from the empirical work in
psychology and social psychology on learning. For instance, Hogarth, Gibbs, McKenzie and
Marquis (1997) examine learning from feedback, evaluating the degree to which the severity of
punishment for errors made (or incentives for correct behavior) contributes to learning. They run
an experiment, and find that the degree of exactingness/leniency experienced in a given decision-
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making context interacts with the provision of incentives toward predicting how individuals will
learn. Regarding these constructs, higher exactingness means that there are more severe
penalties for errors made by subjects (Ss) on some task, whereas higher degrees of leniency
indicate that there are less severe penalties given for errors made by Ss. Generally, their study
shows that those who encounter environments with moderate penalties learn the most. Both Ss
who are exposed to highly exacting and highly lenient environments fail to learn very much.
Further, those Ss who find themselves in lenient environments learn more when also given
incentives than do those in the intermediate or exacting groups. Those in the intermediate group
do not learn more or less based upon the provision of incentives, and those in the exacting group
actually learn less when incentives are provided.
Hogarth et al. also give evidence to suggest that “positive feedback reinforces the use of
existing strategies, negative feedback encourages the search for other strategies that might work
better” (275), supporting Jervis’s and Leng’s findings. Evidence for this comes from the fact
that, generally, those Ss in highly exacting environments yield a higher degree of inconsistency
in strategic choice than do those Ss in highly lenient environments.
These findings are relevant to political decision-making in that, at certain times and in
certain situations, decision-makers might find themselves in environments where punishment for
a given type of behavior is more or less severe. Further, the incentives leaders gain from success
might also vary based upon the situation. From this, we may well be able to anticipate the
degree of “learning,” in a normative or technical sense (in terms of learning how to perform a
specific task), that might take place.
Hogarth and Kunreuther (1997) evaluate decision making “under ignorance,” or instances
when a decision maker does not have complete information. Their general argument is that,
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since individuals cannot make “economically rational” decisions, they will “determine choices
by using arguments that do not quantify the economic risks and may reflect concerns that are not
part of standard choice theory” (482). For instance, individuals will likely rely on the reputation
of others that are associated with their decision (e.g. if you are buying a car, do you trust the
company?), the desire for peace of mind, a fear of being taken advantage, or other such factors.
Thus, individual differences and predispositions may influence decision-making in such
situations. Further, these authors find that though one might expect individuals in situations of
ignorance to take great care in making their decisions, they actually may be swayed by “the
availability of simple arguments that serve to resolve the conflicts of choice” (503). This manner
of learning might be understood under the “biased scanning” theory of learning.
2.8 Other Findings from Political Science
Larson (1991) evaluates the degree of learning (defined as a change in cognitive content
to more efficiently match ends to means) that occurs in the minds of Kissinger and Nixon during
the “détente” period from 1969-1973. Larson’s ultimate conclusion here is that these leaders’
“fundamental beliefs about the Soviet Union [and] world order” (388) did not change in any
significant way over time. However, in the process of examining these leaders, she does come to
realize that “learning cannot be explained without focusing on individuals. People differ—in
their receptivity to new information and ability to incorporate new data into their belief systems”
(388). Kissinger’s beliefs remained stable because he was able to integrate new information into
his existing, deeply held belief structure. Nixon, on the other hand, is viewed by Larson as a
“chameleon” with very few enduring beliefs. As a result, she states that “his beliefs changed
readily, but the changes did not last” (389). Thus, each policy-maker’s respective lack of
significant change occurred for a different reason, based upon individual differences.
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Larson also notes that the foreign policy-related belief change that was experienced by
these leaders was more the result of domestic political factors than “environmental rewards and
punishments” stemming from the international system (390). This seems to fly in the face of
realist theory, which suggests that the drive for survival and power in the international system
should (and typically will) over-ride that of domestic influences (this question will be further
examined in chapter 4).
Dallin (1991) additionally evaluates learning in U.S. foreign policy toward the Soviet
Union, and finds that the reality of international politics was sufficient to shift the beliefs of
Reagan and many of his core advisors away from those of ideological opponents, and more
toward those of pragmatic peers. Given the shift in Soviet behavior toward openness and
cooperation, in conjunction with their significant decline in economic power in the 1980s, Dallin
argues that the Reagan Administration could not hold its previous view of the Soviet Union as
the “Evil Empire.” He calls this shift a “paradigm change,” and suggests that its occurrence
required “the muting of beliefs and attitudes that administration ideologues had held dear, and
was resisted by some and misunderstood by others” (420).
Reiter (1996) argues that the “representativeness heuristic” provides a hindrance to
“rational” or “naïvely rational” learning. This is the typically subconscious strategy whereby
“individuals . . . associate an event and a model based on how well one characterizes the other.
The degree of representation can emerge from physical, personal, or other types of similarities”
(25). This can lead to systematic biases, including “insensitivity to prior probability of
outcomes, insensitivity to sample size, misconceptions of chance, insensitivity to predictability,
the illusion of validity, and misconceptions of regression,” citing experimental research. Thus,
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echoing Jervis’s speculations on the matter, individuals will give more credit toward individual,
unrepresentative events than they should.
Following from findings by Jervis and Larson noted earlier, Reiter also suggests that
more vivid events will help to provide another shortcut by which individuals may learn. He
defines vividness as “the extent to which it is (a) emotionally interesting, (b) concrete and
imagery-provoking, and (c) proximate in a sensory, temporal, or spatial way” (cited on page 26).
Vivid information can be easier to recall not only because of “emotional affect and the greater
amount of sensorily interesting detail associated with vivid information but also because a vivid
experience can mean the recruitment of entirely new schemata” (for this and the above Reiter
cites Nisbett and Ross--Human Inference, 45).
Reiter states that the experimental evidence for the impact of “vividness” on recall and
perception is mixed (27), but suggests that in societies where constituents are important, this may
have a strong impact on decision-making (28). He also suggests that in some instances, the
vividness effect may be stronger than other factors. As an example here, he cites Khong’s
evaluation of the 1965 decision to escalate the Vietnam war, where the vividness experienced by
Johnson, Rusk (both related to their experiences in the Korean conflict), and Ball (who worked
with the French in Southeast Asia in the 1950s) contributed to their decisions (29).
Leng (2000) undertakes one of the most extensive evaluations available looking at
learning defined as a change in strategic preference following a crisis experience (or repeated
crises with the same actor). As noted earlier, he suggests that leaders often learned
“dysfunctional” lessons from these experiences, and attributes this largely to the intensity of the
rivalries examined in conjunction with these states’ leaders’ adherence to the “realpolitik belief
systems of key policymakers” (300). Further, he argues that “within-crisis” learning is far rarer
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than “between-crisis” learning, and that whenever either type of learning occurs, it typically
leads to “diagnostic” learning (as opposed to “causal” learning), representing “changed views of
the rival state’s intentions or capabilities” (281).18
2.9 This Project’s Contribution to the Existing Literature
What does this project contribute to the above works on elite-level learning in the foreign
policy domain? First, despite the wealth of theoretical suppositions and small-n evidence that
has accumulated regarding “experiential” learning, there has been very little in the way of a
“large-n,” quantitative analysis of such. Russell Leng’s work has examined multiple cases of
learning across countries, but these still constitute a fairly small sample of observations.
Research on the operational code (and, notably, the work of Khong) have provided a number of
quantitative analyses, but these studies are typically focused on one to a very small sample of
leaders, and have not previously examined monthly changes throughout a leader’s entire term in
office. Most others are primarily qualitative in nature, and despite the important thoughts and
observations resulting from such, may reference only a small handful cases in support of a given
hypothesis.
This study differs from those by looking at 42 years and 504 separate months worth of
quantitatively-based belief data stemming from 4,320 speeches for 9 separate presidents.
Further, I examine thousands of events, and numerous conflicts and crises encountered by these
presidents as an influence on their beliefs. As such, I am able to test existing hypotheses (along
with some new ones) with a large store of data in a way not previously attempted. Then, this is a
study that provides a level of quantitative evidence regarding belief change that has not yet been
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A more extensive summation of Leng’s findings can be found in Chapter 6 of his book.
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seen. In addition, it provides the largest-scale evaluation known of the operational code, based
on the single largest existing collection of operational code belief data.
However, the contributions of this project are not simply in terms of sample size. This
project also attempts to bridge gaps between the work of political psychology and conflict
studies in ways rarely attempted, due to either theoretical or methodological differences, or to the
fact that these two areas of study tend to ignore one another. No known work in the area of
conflict studies has included operational code data in a large-scale quantitative analysis, and only
a very few works on the operational code (Marfleet and Simpson 2006; Robison 2006) have
integrated any data at all from conflict studies, something that this work hopes to promote and
move forward.
Further, from a theoretical standpoint, this data allows me to examine widely held
assumptions regarding, notably, the nature of belief stability and interconnectedness and of the
impact of international versus domestic influences on belief change. Additionally, I provide a
number of new hypotheses and perspectives regarding learning that will help to further advance
our understanding of this phenomenon. This project makes a novel and useful contribution to
our understanding of learning by elites in the domain of foreign policy decision-making, setting
it apart from previous works and filling in important gaps in the literature, particularly from a
methodological standpoint.
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CHAPTER 3: THE OPERATIONAL CODE AND OTHER MAJOR SOURCES OF
DATA USED IN THE DISSERTATION
3.1 The Operational Code
The principle variables used in this project are the operational code beliefs of U.S.
Presidents. Though utilized at times in this project as both the independent and dependent
variables, it is of particular note that the values of these variables are primarily used, in both
instances, to delineate learning behavior—the central conceptual phenomenon explored in this
project (recall that the definition of learning used focuses on “belief change”). The operational
code was created by Nathan Leites (1951, 1953) in order to evaluate the “rules of conduct” and
“norms of behavior” of the Soviet Politburo (George 1969, 194). However, this construct was
adapted as a generalized method for systematically evaluating political leaders by Alexander
George (1969). George (1969) suggests that the operational code is “a set of general beliefs
about fundamental issues of history and central questions of politics as these bear, in turn, on the
problem of action” (191). He further argues that “the ‘operational code’ is a particularly
significant portion of the actor’s entire set of beliefs about political life,” but that it does not
included “the actor’s ethical and normative beliefs” (197).
The operational code, as it is currently conceptualized, is a framework that assesses
political leaders’ “cognitive belief systems” in terms of their “self in situation” (Walker, Schafer,
and Young 1998). This construct is a way of tapping into a leader’s schematic reasoning
process, or how an individual’s private and subjective principles order his relationship with the
social environment (George 1979). This is measured in terms of leaders’ “philosophical” and
“instrumental” beliefs. George (1969) defines “philosophical” beliefs as the “assumptions and
premises [a leader] makes regarding the fundamental nature of politics, the nature of political
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conflict, the role of the individual in history, etc.” (199), and he defines “instrumental” beliefs as
a leader’s “beliefs about ends-means relationships in the context of political action” (199).
The operational code reflects the “cognitive psychological” approach to evaluating
learning. The assumption behind the operational code is that, as no one is all knowing, actors’
“philosophical” perspectives in the form of heuristic beliefs frame their understandings of and
expectations about the world, “bounding” it to their perceptions. Additionally, an actor’s
“instrumental” beliefs reflect an actor’s chosen methods of dealing with a given situation
(George 1979). The philosophical and instrumental categories are further broken down into ten
indices (five philosophical beliefs and five instrumental beliefs) that measure: perceived
hostility/friendliness, or image perception, of the international system; conflictual or cooperative
orientations; the kinds of tactics preferred for achieving these ends; risk orientation; perception
regarding the potential realization of political values; the perceived predictability of the political
future, perceptions of control over others; and the role of chance regarding political outcomes
(Walker, Schafer and Young 1998).
Measures of these beliefs of political leaders are based on their rhetoric, assessed via verb
usage through the “Profiler Plus” program’s (Young 2001) Verbs in Context (VICS) system of
content analysis (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998). Regarding the theory and process behind
the content analysis of leaders’ speeches by the VICS system, Walker et al. (1998) note that there
are “four features that inform the scoring system as a whole and provide its substantive,
methodological, and theoretical orientation” (177). These are: 1) the “substantive focus” of the
operational code, which examines how the role and use of power is perceived (both regarding the
self and others); 2) the methodological focus on the use of verbs in political leaders’ speech,
“which indicate the balance, central tendency, and dispersion of these forms of power attributed
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to the self and others as descriptions of self-other relationships” (177); 3) the focus on “positive”
and “negative” verb attributions, indicating “the direction of affect associated with the forms of
power” (177); and 4) the theoretical “scope” of the operational code is to evaluate the “steering”
influence of political leaders’ influence over a state’s foreign policy (177).
It is important to note that here I am looking at the generalized operational code beliefs of
U.S. leaders, focusing on all types of foreign actors and phenomena. This follows convention, as
the operational code typically is viewed as structuring one’s broad, overall assessment of the
political world (George 1969), rather than one’s perception of any specific actor or set of actors.
3.1.1 The Assessment of Verbal Behavior as a Reflection of Psychology
The vast majority of psychological research on political leaders necessarily occurs “at-adistance,” as we cannot sit presidents and prime ministers down on a couch to engage in
traditional, clinical psychological probing. This “at-a-distance” process typically employs the
methods of either “psychobiographical” interpretations of historical and first-hand accounts of
individuals, or of direct evaluations of leader behavior. Included in the latter category is the use
of verbal material as a window into leader psychology. This has become a fairly conventional
means to tapping into political leader psychology, employed by those studying leadership style
including self-confidence and conceptual complexity (Hermann 2003), motives such as the need
for affiliation and power (Winter 2003), and broad leader personality traits such as shyness and
competitiveness (Weintraub 2003), in addition to the cognitive beliefs of the operational code.
The rationale behind the analysis of verbal material is that leader psychology can be
teased out from what they say, despite the often strategic use of verbal material as an impression
management technique. Weintraub (2003), for instance, looks for the relative use of qualifiers,
retractors, expressions of feeling, etc. (143-148) in order to evaluate individuals on various traits.
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For the operational code, the focus is on the use of transitive verbs in speech. Walker, Schafer,
and Young (1998) state that “the substantive focus of operational code analysis is on diagnosing
the use of power by others in the political universe and on the leader’s own propensities for
exercising political power” (177).
There are certain advantages and disadvantages to verbal analysis versus
psychobiographical research, which I will discuss briefly. Both methods must include some
level of subjective evaluation . However, analysis of life-history has an advantage over analysis
of verbal behavior in allowing for a fuller, richer evaluation of the roots and development of
psychological characteristics of interest over time than can be gathered simply from speech. On
the other hand, verbal material has the advantage of increased reliability. Many accepted
methods of verbal analysis contain clear, objective coding rules and procedures that help to
reduce the roles of intuition and subjectivity in evaluating the occurrence of psychology,
promoting the scientific virtues of replicability and reliability. The evaluation of the operational
code employs such rules and procedures, as will be discussed below. These trade-offs are
undesirable but necessary concessions, and though this author prefers and engages in operational
code analysis over psychobiographical examinations, this decision does not indicate a lack of
appreciation for psychobiographical works. Both works serve different, albeit equally important
functions in the advancement of our scientific understanding of leader psychology. And
ultimately, if we are to have a complete understanding of these phenomena of interest, then these
works should be evaluated in concert. Next, I discuss the method of evaluating and coding the
operational code.
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3.1.2 Verbal Material Examined
I examine the operational code beliefs for all presidents from John F. Kennedy (1961)
through George W. Bush (2003). Ultimately, I evaluate 4,320 speeches, all read, restricted for
appropriate content (as will be discussed below), and prepared for analysis by the author.
Speeches are the verbal material used here to assess the operational code, as has become the
convention (though other work has shown that spontaneous, interview responses are also an
effective way of assessing the “opcode”—see Schafer and Crichlow 2000). More specifically, I
only use speech-acts that are focused on foreign policy-related matters. Parts of speeches
concerning “pleasantries”19 or referencing exclusively domestic groups (such as the Congress) or
policy related issues (such as domestic educational funding) were not coded, as they do not tap
into foreign policy-related information of interest and would skew findings.20 These speeches
were taken from relevant presidential library, as well as the Public Papers of the President, web
sites. Remarks assessed include State of the Union addresses, isolated statements, radio
addresses, prepared remarks spoken prior to press conferences and photo sessions, and speeches
to foreign governing bodies, interest groups, “town hall” meetings, and the United Nations,
among others.

19

An example of such pleasantries would be the following, spoken by Bill Clinton on November
23, 1994:
It's nice to see all of you here. I want to especially welcome the fifth graders from Murch
Elementary School. I'm glad you're here and hope you're having a good time. And I'm
glad the sun is shining down at least on some of you. I want to thank Larry Fanella, the
chairman of the National Turkey Federation, and say a special word of thanks to Robert
Strickler and to Shawn Arbogast, the 10–year-old boy who raised this year's turkey in
Dayton, Virginia. Let's give him a hand.
20
Note that references to Congress were not included, as they would have been coded by Profiler
Plus as both references to the “self” as spoken by the president, and as an “other,” depending on
the context within which they were referenced. Given that the Congress is typically neither of
these things as it concerns the president’s operational code, from a foreign policy perspective, all
such references were left out.
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Note that all of the speech material examined was prepared prior to their being spoken.
“Off-the-cuff” responses were not coded. The selection criteria for the data was to collect as
many of these speeches as possible given their concern with foreign policy matters, be they in
the security, trade, diplomatic, or general policy realms. No systematic sampling was attempted
beyond this, as the largest possible “population” of speeches was desired for the purposes of
creating a rich database for this and future analyses. Such a collection of data allows for time
series analysis at various temporal levels (yearly, monthly, weekly, etc.), as well as for analysis
of speeches beginning or ending on a specific date.
The fact that I am looking at the “generalized” operational code dictates the data
gathering process described previously, where I do not focus on any specific actor, actor-type
(such as “terrorists,” “allies,” or “revisionist states”), or region. Analyses focusing on specific
actors or types of actors could be attempted by disaggregating the speeches gathered here in
some manner (see Schafer and Walker, 2006a for an example of this approach), given that the
current conceptualization of the operational code as laid out by Walker et al. (1998) allows for
evaluation of beliefs focused on specific components of the political world. However, excluding
times of crisis or certain “enduring rivals” such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, we
very rarely see the president referring to any specific actor or actor-type (in terms of anything
more specific than “allies” or “enemies”) more than a handful of times, at most, in a given
month. As such, systematic analyses of this type would likely require aggregation of speeches to
the level of the quarter, half-year, or even year in order to obtain enough speech information to
make analysis justifiable (that is, to obtain enough relevant verbs being used in speech-acts
focusing on these specific actors to appropriately develop belief measures).
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Once speeches were collected, they were converted by the Profiler Plus program into
operational code measures. The manner of this conversion will be discussed below. Refer to
Appendix A for an additional discussion regarding speech material sampling and coding
decisions
3.1.3 Are Speeches Appropriate Sources of This Data?
But the reader might ask the question: how can we say that by evaluating leaders’
speeches, we are tapping into their psychological beliefs? After all, speeches are often more
rhetoric than substance, and perhaps more importantly, they are typically written by speechwriters, rather than the president himself. Thus, the argument could be made that speeches do
not truly tap psychological phenomena, but instead assess rhetoric that may or may not have a
bearing on an individual’s “psychology” per se, given the impact of impression management
strategies.21
In response, Rosati (2002) argues that operational code beliefs are “those beliefs to which
an individual subscribes as an actual decision maker” (p.142-emphasis added), reflecting the
“self in situation” component of the operational code, in terms of the individual’s role. What this
means is that the operational code may only be in part a reflection of private, personally held
attitudes. However, it is explicitly an evaluation of overt, cognitive beliefs associated with
political decision making. Following from this, even if a speaker does not write a speech word
for word, as long as the speech reflects the gist of the subjective orientation of a given
administration from that speaker’s point of view, then this is a reflection of that speaker’s
operational code.

21

This is discussed by Tetlock (1991) on pages 50-51.
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Despite the fact that U.S. Presidents may speak with a surplus of spin, it is doubtful that a
president would speak words incompatible, broadly-speaking, with his ultimate beliefs about the
nature of the political world and his preferred policy outcomes. The most obvious reason for this
is that if a leader says that he will do something or represents another actor in a certain way, but
then acts counter to these pronouncements, then these remarks could come to haunt this leader,
as those in both the domestic and international spheres may hold him accountable. Public
support for a leader who does not “practice what he preaches” may dwindle. Similarly, if foreign
observers view a leader as someone who acts tough but does not back up his words with action,
then they may take advantage of this by acting in an undesirable manner without fear of
repercussions.
Despite the fact that speeches are not typically written by the president, the president can
have as much influence on the speech writing process as he wants, and always has the option of
choosing what to say or what not to say before actually saying it. If the president wants to place
a stronger focus on allies over adversaries or vice versa, or wishes to speak in a more or less
confrontational manner, then we can expect that his speeches will reflect this, irrespective of the
actual speech writer, and reinforcing the argument that presidents will not say what they do not
believe.
The expected correlation between rhetoric and belief may also be explained as less a
calculated political move, and more a purely psychological phenomenon. Recalling Larson’s
(1985) evaluation of self-perception theory from the previous chapter, she argues that attitude
change may occur following initial changes in leaders’ actions, as “it is easier to alter one’s
private opinions than to deny actions witnessed by others” (30). The discussion there on
“learning from previous behavior” gives further support to this notion. Given that the nature of
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the beliefs evaluated here are presidential speeches, we may thus expect that even if speeches
contain a degree of rhetorical flourish that may not actually represent leaders’ “deep seated”
views of how the world functions, we might expect that their beliefs will come to better reflect
the speeches given over time, for the reason laid out by Larson.
Thus, on the aggregate, we might expect to see a leader’s “political personality” come
through their speeches, particularly in comparison to others, even if this would not be expected
from any given speech. As I am evaluating thousands of speeches, we might expect a great deal
of rhetorical “static” from one speech or leader to another, but within this static, we might also
expect a systematic trend suggesting tendencies toward one psychological preference or another
for a given speaker. Following the above, speeches, despite their drawbacks, are seen here as an
appropriate measure of the operational code. Given that previous research has shown that coding
spontaneous remarks lead to divergent results from that from coding prepared speeches (Schafer
and Crichlow, 2000), the former were not coded here.
3.1.4 The Coding of Speeches by Profiler Plus
Regarding the methodological evaluation of the operational code from speech material,
transitive verbs are coded in a two-step process.22 First, transitive verb references in speeches
are identified as referencing either the “self,” or the “other.” There are a set of generic self and
other references that the Profiler Plus program, by default, contains a “dictionary” for, and thus
will automatically code. These generic references will include self terms such as “me,” “us,” and
“I,” and other terms such as “them,” “you,” and “they.” In addition to these generic references,
however, the program evaluates actor-specific references.

22

Note: More detailed information regarding grammatical parsing, sentence building, token
reduction, and other coding processes, can be found in Young (2001).
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Profiler Plus initially has no way to differentiate “self” versus “other” actor-specific
references of this type. As such, by default, it will treat all actor-specific references as “others.”
Thus, the user must specify which actors are a part of the self’s “in-group,” and then any others
being referenced will be treated by the program as “others.” The user can prepare Profiler Plus
in this manner by entering in frequently used self-references and associating them with a leader’s
name.23 When a speech is first entered into the program, it must be tagged with the speaker’s
name (spelled identically to its spelling in the “self-reference dictionary”) and saved as the file
type recognized by Profiler Plus. Then, when the speech is coded (if set up to do so—Profiler
can also be set up not to search for actor-specific self-references at all), Profiler will search the
dictionary of manually entered self-references, and code any self-references associated with the
appropriately labeled speaker’s name as references to the “self.” Again, all others references
(not including generic self references) will be identified and coded as references to “others.”
This identification of transitive verbs as referring to the “self” or “other” comprises the
first step of Profiler Plus’s method of coding speech material. The second step is identifying the
type of reference being applied to either the “self” or “other.” This reference can be one of six
separate types, which fall on a Likert-type, 6-point scale. The six points here range from -3 to
+3, and do not include a neutral (0) point. These values are: -3 = Punish (most extreme,
“negative” reference); -2 = Threaten; -1 = Oppose/Resist; +1 = Appeal/Support; +2 = Promise;
+3 = Reward (most extreme, “positive” reference).
Thus, Profiler first determines if a given transitive verb reference refers to the “self” vs.
the “other,” and then determines the direction and severity of the reference being made. If a
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For a U.S. President, this typically includes references such as U.S., US (note that spelling is
important to take into account, as Profiler can only judge these references based upon the
spelling of words as entered into the program), America, United States, etc.
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reference receives an “Other -2” value, then it is a reference to an action taken by an “outgroup,”
and reflects a threat that has been made. For example, “Iraq threatened to gas the the Kurds,” if
spoken by the president, would yield this value. Conversely, if a reference received a “Self +1”
value, then this would reflect a reference to an action by the “self,” demonstrating verbal support
for others, without explicitly making a serious commitment. An example here might be “the
United States stands behind the freedom fighters in Afghanistan.”
Operational code indices are all constructions of these basic, raw values. I will evaluate
each belief index in terms of what they theoretically represent, and how they are
methodologically constructed in the next section. Note that I will pay special attention to the
image of the other (P1), feelings of control (P4), and strategic orientation (I1) indices, as they are
of particular importance to the rest of the dissertation.
3.1.5 P1: The Image of the External Political Environment
This variable evaluates political leaders’ perceptions of the “nature of the political
universe.” Forecasting the methodological construction of this belief index, Walker, Schafer,
and Young (1998) argue that:
The key assumption here is that beliefs about how others approach and pursue their goals
in the political universe define the nature of politics, political conflict, and the image of
the opponent for the leader. That is, the more cooperative the leader’s diagnosis of the
nature of the political universe, the higher the net frequency of cooperative attributions to
others in the political universe (178).
Walker et al. (1998) then note that this index is specifically calculated in the following way: “%
Positive Other Attributions minus % Negative Other Attributions,” where values range from -1
(most conflictual perception) to +1 (most cooperative perception). Thus, this index examines the
balance of total negative versus positive attributions toward “the Other”—are they spoken of (in
terms of their actions) in a more positive or negative light, and to what degree is this the case?
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3.1.6 P2: Realization of Fundamental Values
The second “philosophical” indicator is really a measure of “optimism/pessimism,”
regarding the perceived short- or long-term nature of conflict in the world (Walker, Schafer, and
Young, 1998: 178). Whereas the image indicator looks at the frequency of “negative” to
“positive” references to others, this indicator looks at the “net intensity” of each president’s
rhetoric targeting “others.” In other words: are the “other” references more or less intense, and
in a negative (more pessimistic) or positive (more optimistic) direction? The assumption here,
derived from Ole Holsti’s work (Walker et al. 1998, 178), is that political leaders’ degree of
optimism/pessimism for realizing political values will be reflected in their perception of the
intensity (or duration) of international conflict. Thus, if the world is represented as being fairly
intensely hostile in nature, then leaders will have a strong, negative score on this indicator; if the
world is seen as more intensely friendly, then a more positive score will result (this scale, as with
the “P1” index, ranges from -1 to +1).
3.1.7 P3: Predictability of the Political Future
The third belief is concerned with the leader’s “tendency to assign different types of
conflict and cooperative actions to others” (Walker et al. 1998, 179). Walker et al. (1998) state
that this belief indicator—as measured by the VICS-calculated operational code—evaluates the
degree to which leaders believe that the actions of others (both cooperative and conflictual in
nature) are stable or variable. If a leader believes that others’ actions are fairly uniform (being in
the same “category” of actions), then we may infer that this leader holds the political future to be
fairly predictable. If, however, a leader believes others’ actions to be inconsistent, then we may
infer that this leader will expect the political future to be more unpredictable. This index is
calculated as “[1 minus IQV], where IQV equals the Index of Qualitative Variation” (Walker et
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al. 1998, 179). Watson and McGraw (1980, 88 as cited in Walker et al. 1998, 179) note that the
IQV is “a ratio of the number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of
cases] and the same number of variable classifications]. The mathematical calculation24 taken
place here results in a scale ranging from 0 (most diversity across the six verb categories/least
perceived predictability of the political future) to +1 (least diversity across the six verb
categories/highest perceived predictability of the political future—Schafer and Walker 2006b,
34).
3.1.8 P4: Control Over International Events
The P4 index is based on “locus of control” research, and evaluates “the extent to which
the leader can control historical developments and political outcomes” (Walker, Schafer, and
Young 1998, 179). Walker et al. (1998) state that the assumption behind the measurement of
feelings of control is that “if the leader attributes more words and deeds to others, for example,
then the locus of control is in others rather than in the self. The greater the leader’s control over
political outcomes compared to the control by others, the higher the net attributions assigned to
the self” (179). Thus, Walker et. al created this index to be evaluated in the following manner:
“Self Attributions divided by [Self Attributions plus Other Attributions]” (179). Scores fall on a
scale from 0 (control is completely held by “others”) to +1 (control is completely held by the
“self”).

24

Referring back to the construction of the operational code indices—Where D = a raw
operational code entry for “self + 3”; E = an entry for “self + 2”; F = an entry for “self +1; G =
an entry for “self – 1”; H = an entry for “self -2”; and I = and entry for “self -3”, the calculation
of this measure is as follows: 1-(((F2*E2)
+(F2*D2)+(F2*G2)+(F2*H2)+(F2*I2)+(E2*D2)+(E2*G2)+ (E2*H2)
+(E2*I2)+(D2*G2)+(D2*H2)+(D2*I2)+(G2*H2)+(G2*I2)+(H2*I2))/ (15*
((D2+E2+F2+G2+H2+I2) /6) *((D2+E2+F2+G2+H2+I2)/6)))
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3.1.9 P5: The Role of Chance
The fifth and final “philosophical” belief measure is a composite of the predictability of
the political future (P3) and feelings of control (P4) indices, and is calculated as: 1 minus [P3
value multiplied by P4 value] at a given point in time. The logic here is that “if both the
predictability of others and the leader’s control over political outcomes are relatively low, then
the role of chance is relatively high” (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 179). Conversely, if
the world is perceived to be very predictable, and if the leader feels high levels of control, then
the role of chance would be relatively low. Since the “predictability of the political future” and
“feelings of control” values both range from 0 to +1, this index also ranges from 0 (lowest role of
chance) +1 (highest role of chance).
3.1.10 I1: Strategic Orientation
The first instrumental belief is the I1 “master” belief, or the president’s strategic
orientation/preference for cooperation or conflict. This measure evaluates:
. . . a leader’s strategic approach to political goals (I-1) and assumes that the more
cooperative the leader’s strategic approach to political goals, the higher the net frequency
of cooperative attributions to the self. This reasoning does not specify how the leader
selects goals or what goals s/he selects. However, it does identify the strategic direction
the leader adopts in approaching them. (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998: 179;
emphasis in original)
This index is measured in a fashion similar to the image index, but focuses on the “self”
rather than the “other.” Specifically, it is created by subtracting the percentage of negative self
attributions from the percentage of positive self attributions, with the clear difference again being
that this index evaluates how political leaders refer to themselves (and the “in-groups” of which
they are a part), rather than to “others.” Similar to the image index, values here can theoretically
range from -1 (the self most strongly prefers conflict) to +1 (the self most strongly prefers
cooperation).
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3.1.11 I2: Tactical Orientation
Walker et al. (1998) note that “whereas strategy refers to the direction of a leader’s
approach to political goals, tactics refers first of all to the intensity with which the leader pursues
the strategy” (180, citing Snyder and Diesing 1977; and Leng 1993). This second “instrumental”
belief indicator is measured by evaluating the “net intensity of cooperative self-attributions”
(Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 180, emphasis in original), and as such is evaluated in the
same manner as the realization of political values (P2) philosophical measure, except that the I2
index evaluates whether the references to the “self,” rather than references toward the “other,”
are more or less intense. The scale ranges from -1 (strong tactical orientation toward conflict) to
+1 (strong tactical orientation toward cooperation). If self references are more intense in the
cooperative direction, then we may infer that this leader holds a more intensely cooperative
tactical orientation (thus, the leader not only more strongly prefers cooperation over conflict, but
more strongly prefers more extreme levels of cooperation over more moderate alternatives). If
this leader’s self references are more intense in the direction of conflict then we may infer that
this leader holds a more intensely conflictual tactical orientation.
3.1.12 I3: Risk Orientation
The I3 belief indicator evaluates the “diversity in the types of acts attributed to the self
across several categories” (Walker et al. 1998, 180). This index is evaluated in the same way as
its respective “philosophical” index—the predictability of the political universe (P3)—and as
such, the “IQV” index is used in its construction. The main difference between the “I3” and
“P3” indices, as with the previous index examined, is that the former focuses on the self whereas
the latter focuses on the other. Thus, if the self’s self-described actions are fairly uniform (fitting
into the same self-referenced categories of action), then we might say that this leader sees
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himself as more risk acceptant. Conversely, if the self describes himself as more variable in
terms of his references to the self, then we can say that he is more risk averse. The values here
range from 0 (extremely risk averse) to +1 (extremely risk acceptant).
3.1.13 I4a: Timing of Conflict vs. Cooperation
The I4 belief index is broken into two parts. The first of which is “I4a,” or the timing of
conflict vs. cooperation. This belief is, according to Walker et al. (1998), “the leader’s position
on the matter of the timing of action” (181, emphasis in original). This belief is measured as the
degree to which “self” transitive verb references shift between the broad conflictual and
cooperative categories. The assumption here is that when the timing of behavior “in assessing
the risk of political acts” is more important for a political leader, there will be a higher degree of
fluctuation between these beliefs. Conversely, if these beliefs are more stable, then the
assumption is that “the strategic approach to goals [as evaluated in the “I1” index] is more likely
to be the dominant strategy no matter what others in the political universe say or do” (Walker et
al. 1998, 181). In other words, this measure evaluates the degree to which the self’s strategic
preference is dictated by the self’s own pre-existing preferences, irrespective of the context,
versus the actions that take place in the external political environment, irrespective of the self’s
pre-existing preferences. This index is calculated as “1 minus Absolute Value of [% Positive
Self Attributions minus % Negative Self Attributions],” and values range from 0 (low shift
propensity; timing relatively unimportant) to +1 (high shift propensity; timing more important).
3.1.14 I4b: The Timing of Words vs. Deeds
The next instrumental belief (I4b) is similar to the previous one, in that it examines
“timing” shifts, but this belief focuses on “words vs. deeds” instead of “conflict vs. cooperation.”
This taps into “the way a leader calculates, controls, and accepts the risks of political action”
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(Walker et al. 1998, 181). The assumption is that a leader who is less likely to shift between
words and deeds will be “relatively acceptant regarding the risks associated with the direction of
the distribution” whereas those with higher shift propensities possess “a more risk-averse
orientation toward the undesirable outcomes of submission and deadlock.” This index is
calculated as “one minus the absolute value of [the percentage of word self utterances minus the
percentage of deed self utterances (Schafer and Walker 2006b, 36).
3.1.15 I5: Utility of Means (Punish, Threaten, Oppose/Resist, Appeal/Support,
Promise, Reward)
The next and final set of instrumental beliefs evaluated here are the “utility of means”
(I5) indicators. There are six of these, evaluating means for most effectively pursuing goals and
objectives, with the narrow purpose of affecting others’ behavior. These means include “Punish,
Threaten, Oppose/Resist, Appeal/Support, Promise, Reward” (Walker et al. 1998, 180),
reflecting the fact that both positive and negative sanctions (in the form of either words or deeds)
can be used as a means toward some end. As such, each “I5” belief has a suffix associated with
the specific mean to which it refers (e.g. “I5re” is the indicator for “I5 reward”). Each utility of
means belief is calculated as the percentage spoken of a certain transitive verb category.25 As
such, each belief here can possess a value ranging from 0 (the relevant category of verbs contains
0 percent of all self references) to +1 (the relevant category of verbs contains 100% of all self
references), and if you were to add up all “I5” beliefs for a given president at a given point in
time, the sum of all belief values would be 100%. In other words, an increase in the level of one
index here necessarily entails a decrease somewhere else.

25

Recalling the discussion on how the operational code is evaluated from raw indicators, the
most extreme categories deal with actions [raw “self” indicator of -3=punish; +3=reward]; the
middle categories deal with threats (-2) and promises (+2); and offers of opposition/resistance (1) or support or the use of appeals (+1) are the least extreme categories
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For the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the other major databases used in this
dissertation.
3.2 Gary King’s Events Data26
In Chapter 6, I examine events data as an influence on presidential beliefs. The events
data used come from Gary King’s 10 Million International Dyadic Events database
(http://gking.harvard.edu/events/). International dyadic “events” are actions initiated by actors in
one state toward actors in another.27 These could range from anything as innocuous as a scientist
or artist in one state congratulating a peer in another for receiving an award, to an all out
declaration of war by one government towards another.
Gary King’s specific database includes dyadic events as gathered from the first sentence
(or “lead”) of all Reuters news stories from 1990 through 2004 (thus, the data includes actions
initiated by every state in the world, as well as many non-state actors). Events are then
automatically coded from these news stories via the Virtual Research Associates (VRA) content
analysis program, through a manner described in King and Lowe’s (2003) International
Organization article. This process involves the VRA computer program content analyzing these
news leads by picking out and coding “events” as well as the target and source of these events,
then organizing this information into a format that can be used for statistical analysis.
From the above raw data, I engaged in a process of filtering out only that data that I am
interested in (the step-by-step details can be viewed in Appendix B). To summarize these steps,
I first filtered out all data to that originating in a foreign country and targeting the U.S. Then, I
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Note that specific variables and statistics used in analysis for each dataset will be covered in
relevant chapters.
27
Note: King’s database also includes domestic events [those initiated by actors within a given
state and targeting actors in this same state], but these intranational events are not of interest in
this project.
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recoded the Integrated Data for Events Analysis text data (“IDEA”—the form of data output
given in King’s database) into numerical format, and then recoded this into data falling on the
Goldstein (1992) conflict-cooperation scale.
The purpose for doing the above is that, first, I needed to evaluate quantitative data, and
the King data exists in its raw form as text (the “Event Form” column of data in his database).
Thus, these text entries had to be recoded into IDEA numerical format. Secondly, I needed to
evaluate events on a scale ranging from most conflictual to most cooperative, but the IDEA data
format (even in its numerical incarnation) is a nominal-level scale. The Goldstein (1992) scale is
a roughly interval-level conflict-cooperative scale, developed for the purpose of allowing
interval-level analysis of World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS), categorical data. IDEA data
is an extension of WEIS data, and as such, shares many categories with WEIS. I converted the
IDEA numerical data into the Goldstein scale, following Goldstein’s conversion rules. In the
Goldstein coding scheme, scores range on a scale from -10 (war; military engagement) to +10
(merging or integration of political entities), and a 0 value indicates neutral actions (explain
position; comment).28
Note that in the process of determining which “events” were actually actor-based events
and which weren’t, I discovered that many IDEA categorized phenomena were not actually
actor-initiated events at all.29 I removed these phenomena from the analysis, since they were not
“events” of interest, and thus had no associated Goldstein value.

28

For other Goldstein values, and their associated WEIS values, see “Modified WEIS Codes”
from the Kansas Events Data website—available:
http://web.ku.edu/keds/data.dir/KEDS.WEIS.Codes.html, accessed 10/15/08. For the Goldstein
association with IDEA values, see King and Lowe (2003, 622-623).
29
Examples of non-actor-initiated-events coded here include “cognitive state,” “animal attack,”
“natural disaster,” “economic status,” etc.
74

3.3 International Crisis Behavior
In chapter 6, I examine international “crises” as an impact on leaders’ beliefs. These
crises were taken from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) database. Brecher and
Wilkenfeld (2000) define a crisis as:
. . . a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in
the state’s internal or external environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest
level decision makers of the state actor concerned: a threat to one or more basic values,
along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened
probability of involvement in military hostilities. (3, emphasis in original)
They go on to emphasize that the probability of war, in the mind of the crisis actor, must
be “qualitatively higher than the norm in the specific adversarial relationship,” and that a change
in the probability of conflict, rather than the absolute level of conflict probability, is a crucial
component of crisis occurrence (3). Thus, even if the probability of war with a state is very high,
this only qualifies as a crisis if this probability is an increase from some prior point in time.30 In
chapter 6, I will spend some time differentiating this definition of “crisis” from other popular
definitions, and will discuss the rationale for using this definition and data over others.
Decisions and processes regarding the choice and coding of cases can be found in Brecher and
Wilkenfeld’s A Study of Crisis (1997), pages 39-64.
Crisis characteristics here include the actors involved in a crisis, the date and location of
the crisis, the crisis triggering event, the type of decision-making unit involved, the intensity of
violence experienced by the state experiencing the crisis, and the outcome of the crisis, among
other factors (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2009). Specific variables from this dataset used for
analysis will be discussed in chapter 6. Included in this database are 434 crises across 956 states
(http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/info/project_information.asp).
30

Note: Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1997) also develop a definition for “international crisis” (i.e.
crises which threaten the structure of international politics), but as this is not the focus of this
project, this type of crisis will not be addressed here.
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3.4 Militarized Interstate Disputes
In chapters 6 and 8, I include Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data as a means to
evaluate the influence of sub-“crisis”-level conflicts on presidential belief change. Jones,
Bremer, and Singer (1996) note that the MID database was created in order to fill a gap in the
literature on the causes of conflict and peace, by examining “sub-war interstate conflicts that are
serious enough to become militarized” (164). They argue that these events are important, as they
are the precursors to war, and are distinct from events data (which are focused “on all interstate
events” [164]), as MIDs are an intentionally narrowed “scope of inquiry,” that “provide a
manageable, operationally defined subset of state interactions [allowing] for the creation of
historically unified cases of conflict events . . . from which analysis can proceed” (165).
MIDs are operationally defined by Jones and colleagues (1996) as “united historical cases
in which the threat, display or use of force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed
towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another
state (168). As such, this database leaves out “non-militarized” disputes or conflicts that would
be included in many events databases. It also leaves out non-state actors. “Dispute” is defined
here as “the engagement in argument, the call into question, or the contestation over one or more
unresolved issues between two or more actors” (168).
Militarized “incidents” are the component parts of a “militarized disputes,” and are
explicit (i.e. non-ambiguous), “non-routine” actions occurring among two states, engaged by the
“official” government and military by one state toward another (Jones et al. 1996, 169-70).
Other notes regarding the categorization of militarized incidents and aggregation of events into
disputes can be found in the article by Jones and colleagues (1996). Cases were determined
based upon analysis of various source materials (government documents, newspapers, etc.—
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180), including documents in non-English languages, and checks were employed to help ensure
data validity inter-coder reliability (181-182).
MID characteristics included in this database are the time and place in which the MID
took place, the type of threat, display, or use of force employed in a dispute, dispute outcome,
method of settlement, number of fatalities in a dispute, and various other factors that can be
found in the “Codebook for Militarized Interstate Dispute Data” (Ghosn and Palmer 2003).
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CHAPTER 4: PRELIMINARY DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF
PRESIDENTIAL BELIEFS
In this chapter, I empirically evaluate the nature of operational code beliefs of U.S.
Presidents, in terms of their absolute and relative values, as well as change and stability,
following from analysis of the quantitative data described at the end of the previous chapter. In
the process, I will descriptively evaluate these processes both within and across presidents.
4.1 Cross-Presidential and Individual Summary Descriptive Analysis
To begin, I will examine broad, general trends for all U.S. Presidents from 1961 to 2003
on each belief index. In this section, I examine 3 month “moving averages” in order to account
for months in which there was too little speech data to acquire an acceptable sample size for
comparison (resulting, in some instances, in outliers). These moving, or “rolling” averages, are
the average belief values for the two months prior to a given “observation” month, along with the
current “observation” month. In other words, the first month that I examine is March of 1961
(instead of the first observation month, January), and the value examined is the average of all
January, February, and March operational code values on a given index. For April, I examine
the average for the months of February, March, and April, and so on. As such, I do not examine
the first two months of each presidency except as they contribute to the “moving average” value
of the third month that one is in office.
Going back to the methodological discussion of the operational code from the previous
chapter, recall that all operational code values are calculated based upon the 12 raw “self” and
“other” counts for a given speech (i.e. “self +3,” “other -2,” etc.). Typically, if one examines the
operational code at the level of the month, then he would first add up all raw “self/other” counts
across all speeches for a month, and calculate operational code measures from these
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summations.31 In essence, this treats all speeches in a month as a single “super speech,” and
controls for speech size by allowing larger speeches to more strongly influence operational code
index calculation than weaker speeches do. If each speech were coded separately for its
operational code score, then this would not be the case, as smaller speeches containing little
relevant information would be treated as equal to larger speeches with more information, and
averages across these speech calculations would thus be deceptive.
For the “moving averages” examined, I engage in this same basic process that I describe
in the previous paragraph. However, instead of treating all speech material within a given month
as if it were a single speech for the purpose of analysis, I sum up the raw indicators for each
three month period, creating a single “super speech” for each “moving,” three month period.
From this summation, I calculate operational code belief indicators.
4.1.1 “Philosophical” Beliefs
First I will examine the “philosophical” or “diagnostic” operational code beliefs. The
first “philosophical” belief is that of the “fundamental nature of politics/image of the other”
(“P1”), evaluating perceptions of friendliness or hostility in the outside world. Recall that this
index can range, theoretically, from -1 to +1, with a -1 indicating an extreme perception of
hostility and a +1 indicating an extreme perception of friendliness. Presidential “3 month,
moving average” trends on the “image” variable can be found in Figure 4.1. In these figures
examining presidential trends, each data point signifies the average operational code “belief”
value for a given president for a given 3 month period, as described earlier.

31

For example, if there were three speeches in a month, with one having a “self + 3” raw
indicator value of 3, the second with a value of 2, and the third with a value of 1, then relevant
operational code beliefs would be calculated based upon the single “self +3” measure of 6,
instead of calculating operational code indices for each speech.
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The “moving” 3 month mean P1 value for all presidents (as can be found in Table 4.1) is
.397, and the standard deviation is .111. This suggests that in general, U.S. Presidents tend to
view “the other” as more friendly than hostile in nature, as more friendly than hostile “other”
attributions account for positive values on this index. The minimum “3 month moving average”
value for any president is 0 (indicating an equal number of “other” conflictual and cooperative
action references), and the maximum value is .67.
Table 4.2 contains mean z-score comparisons for individual presidents, based upon the
mean and standard deviation values contained in Table 4.1. These z-scores are calculated in the
following manner: [presidential observation value (i.e. the mean “3 month rolling average value”
for a given president) minus the mean of all presidential observation values (i.e. the mean of the
cross-presidential mean “3 month rolling average” values)] divided by [the standard deviation of
all presidential observations values (i.e. the standard deviation of the cross-presidential mean “3
month rolling average” values)]. Z-scores greater than positive 2 or less than negative 2 are
considered “highly significant,” z-scores greater than positive 1 or less than negative 1 are
considered “moderately significant,” and z-scores in-between positive 1 and negative 1 are
considered “insignificant.”
For the image of the other (P1) index, the most positive value is held by Gerald Ford
(z=+1.844), whereas the lowest image value is held by George W. Bush (“Bush 43”; z=-1.886).
This suggests that amongst those presidents examined, Ford held the friendliest perception of
“others” in the world, whereas Bush 43 held the most hostile perception of “others.”
In addition to examining the mean differences between of presidents, I am also interested
in the standard deviation differences between presidents. If across-month belief variation is
high, then this could indicate general psychological instability, or a greater tendency to learn,
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Figure 4.1: Monthly “Image of the Other”/P1 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003*
*Note: These are technically “3 Month, Moving Averages”; vertical lines approximately
represent the termination/onset of presidential administrations. The lines refer to, in sequence
from left to right, the onset of the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush,
Clinton, and George W. Bush Administrations.
potentially resulting from a more uncertain political environment. I evaluate these differences in
the same manner that I evaluate mean differences—by constructing z-scores. Except here, I
replace the “observation means” with the “observation standard deviations,” and calculate the zscores in the following way: [presidential observation value (i.e. the standard deviation of the “3
month rolling average values” for a given president) minus the mean of all presidential
observation values (i.e. the mean of their standard deviation “3 month rolling average” values)]
divided by [the standard deviation of all presidential observations values (i.e. the standard
deviation of their standard deviation “3 month rolling average” values)]. As with the “mean
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standard deviations,” these values could be calculated solely with information contained in Table
4.1. Results here are found in Table 4.3.
Table 4.1: “Philosophical” Belief Descriptives
President
Kennedy

Johnson

Nixon

Ford

Carter

Reagan

HW Bush

Clinton

W Bush

Total

P1
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

0.3627
33
0.08588
0.15
0.53
0.4065
60
0.08728
0.24
0.63
0.3965
64
0.11032
0.05
0.67
0.5277
28
0.06483
0.38
0.66
0.4441
47
0.07382
0.3
0.59
0.3648
93
0.11131
0
0.62
0.4179
46
0.11099
0.15
0.6
0.4085
95
0.08574
0.12
0.56
0.2688
34
0.14424
0.08
0.58
0.397
500
0.11149
0
0.67

P2

P3

0.2243
33
0.0682
0.11
0.41
0.2282
60
0.07303
0.09
0.42
0.199
64
0.08336
-0.04
0.42
0.3346
28
0.05449
0.19
0.43
0.2607
47
0.05322
0.15
0.36
0.1928
93
0.09015
-0.08
0.38
0.2506
46
0.08556
0.03
0.42
0.234
95
0.07239
-0.01
0.37
0.1463
34
0.11259
0.01
0.38
0.2242
500
0.08823
-0.08
0.43
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0.0912
33
0.01732
0.07
0.15
0.1047
60
0.01911
0.08
0.19
0.1101
64
0.02553
0.06
0.18
0.126
28
0.02202
0.07
0.16
0.1022
47
0.01998
0.06
0.14
0.1002
93
0.02067
0.05
0.17
0.0997
46
0.02082
0.06
0.14
0.1062
95
0.01253
0.08
0.13
0.0847
34
0.02567
0.05
0.16
0.1031
500
0.02172
0.05
0.19

P4
0.254
33
0.02449
0.21
0.3
0.3089
60
0.04014
0.23
0.41
0.3333
64
0.04772
0.24
0.5
0.3459
28
0.03276
0.26
0.4
0.3174
47
0.03328
0.25
0.41
0.2558
93
0.0341
0.16
0.34
0.2834
46
0.03763
0.23
0.4
0.2863
95
0.02379
0.22
0.36
0.2881
34
0.03347
0.23
0.35
0.2934
500
0.04504
0.16
0.5

P5
0.9768
33
0.00537
0.96
0.98
0.9677
60
0.00706
0.94
0.98
0.9632
64
0.0103
0.94
0.98
0.9564
28
0.00883
0.94
0.98
0.9673
47
0.00805
0.95
0.98
0.9741
93
0.00753
0.95
0.99
0.9714
46
0.00852
0.95
0.98
0.9695
95
0.00499
0.95
0.98
0.9753
34
0.00896
0.95
0.99
0.9694
500
0.00916
0.94
0.99

Table 4.2: Mean Z-Scores for “Philosophical” Belief Indices
Kennedy

P1
mean
0.363

P1 zscore
-0.533

P2
mean
0.224

P2 zscore
-0.110

P3
mean
0.091

P3z zscore
-0.994

P4
mean
0.254

P4 zscore
-1.231

P5
mean
0.977

P5 zscore
1.153

Johnson

0.407

0.098

0.228

-0.036

0.105

0.165

0.309

0.484

0.968

-0.265

Nixon

0.397

-0.046

0.199

-0.596

0.110

0.629

0.333

1.247

0.963

-0.966

Ford

0.528

1.844

0.335

2.007

0.126

1.993

0.346

1.641

0.956

-2.026

Carter

0.444

0.639

0.261

0.588

0.102

-0.050

0.317

0.750

0.967

-0.327

Reagan
HW
Bush
Clinton

0.365

-0.503

0.193

-0.715

0.100

-0.221

0.256

-1.175

0.974

0.732

0.418

0.262

0.251

0.394

0.100

-0.264

0.283

-0.313

0.971

0.312

0.409

0.126

0.234

0.076

0.106

0.294

0.286

-0.222

0.970

0.016

W Bush

0.269

-1.886

0.146

-1.608

0.085

-1.552

0.288

-0.166

0.975

0.919

Total

0.400

0.230

0.103

0.293

0.969

St. Dev.

0.069

0.052

0.012

0.032

0.006

Table 4.3: Standard Deviation Z-Scores for “Philosophical” Belief Indices
Kennedy

P1 st
dev
0.086

P1 zscore
-0.464

P2 st
dev
0.068

P2 zscore
-0.475

P3 st
dev
0.017

P3z zscore
-0.765

P4 st
dev
0.024

P4 zscore
-1.309

P5 st
dev
0.005

P5 zscore
-1.376

Johnson

0.087

-0.406

0.073

-0.214

0.019

-0.321

0.040

0.811

0.007

-0.393

Nixon

0.110

0.542

0.083

0.344

0.026

1.270

0.048

1.838

0.010

1.493

Ford

0.065

-1.330

0.054

-1.216

0.022

0.400

0.033

-0.189

0.009

0.638

Carter

0.074

-0.960

0.053

-1.285

0.020

-0.105

0.033

-0.118

0.008

0.184

Reagan
HW
Bush
Clinton

0.111

0.582

0.090

0.711

0.021

0.066

0.034

-0.007

0.008

-0.119

0.111

0.569

0.086

0.463

0.021

0.103

0.038

0.471

0.009

0.457

0.086

-0.470

0.072

-0.249

0.013

-1.952

0.024

-1.404

0.005

-1.597

W Bush

0.144

1.937

0.113

1.923

0.026

1.305

0.033

-0.093

0.009

0.713

Total

0.097

0.077

0.020

0.034

0.008

St. Dev.

0.024

0.019

0.004

0.007

0.002

For the image belief, based upon the z-scores in Table 4.3, the president with the most
stable beliefs is Ford (z=-1.330), whereas the president with the most variable beliefs is Bush 43
(z=1.937). Thus, not only is Ford the president who views the rest of the world in the most
positive light, he is also the president who holds the most consistent view of the outside world.
Conversely, Bush 43 not only holds the most negative view of the world, on the aggregate, but
he also holds the most unstable views regarding it from month to month.
The second belief examined is the “prospects of realizing fundamental political values,”
(P2) and trends can be observed in Figure 4.2. The mean value across all “moving,” 3 month
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periods for all presidents is .224, with a standard deviation of .088. As with the image measure,
values on this belief range, in theory, from -1 to +1, with a -1 indicating an extremely pessimistic
appraisal of one’s likelihood of realizing fundamental values, and a +1 indicating an extremely
optimistic appraisal of such. The positive mean on this index suggests that presidential
perceptions of the “other” lean toward an optimistic appraisal. As seen in Table 4.2, the
president with the most optimistic perception on this measure is Ford (z=2.007), and the
president with the most pessimistic perception is Bush 43 (z=-1.608), similar to the findings
regarding the “image of the other.”
Regarding the variation of belief values on this index in Table 4.3, President Carter (z=1.285), who holds a modestly optimistic feeling regarding the realization of political values,
holds the most stable view, though Ford (z=-1.216) also holds a modestly significant, stable
view. Again, Bush 43 (z=1.923) not only holds the most pessimistic view on this index of all
those presidents examined, but also the most unstable.

Figure 4.2: Monthly “Prospects for Realizing Fundamental Political Values”/P2 trends for U.S.
Presidents, 1961 through 2003
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The next index evaluated is the third “philosophical” belief (P3) evaluating the
“predictability of the political future.” These monthly presidential beliefs are plotted in Figure
4.3.32 Recall from the previous chapter that this index is calculated using the “IQV” index,
which essentially captures variation across the “other attributions” used by leaders. In opposition
to the “image” and “possibility of realizing fundamental values” beliefs, values here can
theoretically range from 0 to +1, with a 0 indicating an extreme perception that the universe is
unpredictable, and a +1 indicating that the political universe is extremely predictable. The mean
value on this index is .103, with a standard deviation of .022. Though I do not have nonpresidential leaders to make a comparison with (and as such, I cannot say where they fall relative
to others), the low mean value here suggests that presidents tend to see the world as a fairly
unpredictable place.

Figure 4.3: Monthly “Predictability of the Political Future”/P3 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961
through 2003

32

Note that one outlier measure, occurring during Nixon’s last month in office (+1) was left out
of this chart, as its inclusion provided for too much empty space in the chart, and thus made the
evaluation of the trends here more difficult to see.
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The president who sees the world as the most predictable is Ford (z=1.993), and the
president who sees the world as least predictable is George W. Bush (z=-1.552). It is of note
here that the two presidents with the most extreme values on the first three “philosophical”
beliefs are Ford and Bush 43. The president with the most stable views here is Clinton (z=1.952). The president with the most unstable views are Bush 43 (z=1.305), who again
demonstrates that he is quite different in relation to his fellow presidents in many ways. He is
followed by Nixon (z=1.270).
The third belief evaluated here is P4, or feelings of control relative to others, and the
monthly scatterplot can be found in Figure 4.4. This belief can theoretically range from 0 to +1,
with a 0 indicating an extremely low feeling of control relative to others, and a +1 indicating an
extremely high feeling of control. The “feelings of control” scatterplot is striking in comparison
to that of the P1-P3 index plots due to the very clear, relatively tight trend lines across
presidencies. There is a noticeable upward trend suggesting increasing levels of control as time
goes on, from the onset of the Kennedy Presidency through the end of the Ford Administration.
Then this belief value trends downward from the Carter through the Reagan Administrations,
suggesting decreasing levels of historical control as time goes on. During the George H.W. Bush
Administration, this belief value trends upward again and then flattens out, reaching a stable
level of control that lasts throughout the Clinton Administration and the beginning of the George
W. Bush Administration. This nearly seamless trend suggests that feelings of control between
presidents may be related in some way, which is an observation that may warrant further future
attention.
The cross-presidential, mean of the “3 month moving average” values is .293, and the
standard deviation is .045. This mean suggests that U.S. presidents tend to view the “other” as
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having slightly more control over events than does the “self.” If both the “self” and the “other”
held an equal degree of control in the president’s eyes at a given point in time, then the “P4”
value would be .5 (as this would signify an equal number of self and other references). Thus,
U.S. presidents may not be as filled with hubris as they are sometimes given credit, and the
impact of international events may be of particular importance to their decision-making.

Figure 4.4: Monthly “Feelings of Control”/P4 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
The president who most strongly feels that “control” lies with the “self” is Ford
(z=1.641), though Nixon (z=1.247) also has a moderately significant, positive value on this
index. The president who most strongly feels that “control” lies with “others” is Kennedy (z=1.231), though Reagan (z=-1.175) also yields a moderately significant, negative value on this
index. The president with the most stable “control” beliefs is Clinton (z=-1.404), followed
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closely by Kennedy (z=-1.309). Conversely, the president with the least stable “control” beliefs,
again, is Nixon (z=1.838).
The fifth philosophical belief (P5) evaluating the “role of chance” is evaluated next.
Results are shown in Figure 4.5. The mean value on this index is .969, and the standard
deviation is .009. This index could theoretically range from 0 to +1, where “higher scores
indicate a higher role assigned to chance and lower scores indicat[ing] a lower role,” and the
mean value here demonstrates that presidents generally see chance as playing a very strong role.
Recalling from the previous chapter that the “role of chance” index is calculated based upon
values on the “predictability of the political future” and “feelings of control” indices, the high
“role of chance” value reflects generally low feelings of control and perceptions of a fairly
unpredictable political future across presidents. Thus, on the whole, it appears that U.S.
presidents see the world as a place in which the unpredictability of others and random
occurrences are more salient influences on the political sphere than is self-imposed order.
The president who perceives chance as playing the strongest role is Kennedy (z=1.153),
and the president who perceives chance as playing the weakest role is Ford (z=-2.026). Once
again, Clinton (z=-1.597) and Kennedy (z=-1.376) hold the most stable beliefs on the “role of
chance” indicator, whereas Nixon (z=1.493) once again holds the most variable beliefs. In the
next section, I examine “instrumental” or “choice” beliefs.
4.1.2 “Instrumental” Beliefs
The first “instrumental” belief examined is the I1 “master” belief, or presidential strategic
orientation/preference for cooperation or conflict. Similar to the image belief, values on this
index can range from -1 to +1 where higher values indicate a more cooperative orientation, and
lower values indicate a more conflictual orientation. The scatterplot with monthly values on this
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Figure 4.5: Monthly “Role of Chance”/P5 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
belief index can be observed in Figure 4.6. Table 4.4 contains individual president and aggregate
means and standard deviations for the “3 month moving average” values of the first five
“instrumental” beliefs. The mean value for the “strategic orientation” belief is .605, and the
standard deviation is .119. The slightly high value suggests that U.S. presidents tend to attribute
more cooperative than conflictual behaviors to the self.
Though it is difficult to compare changes from one belief value to another (given how
they are methodologically constructed), there may be exceptions in the case of beliefs such as the
“image” and “strategic orientation” beliefs, which are calculated in the same way, albeit based on
“other” references in the case of the “image” belief and “self” references in the case of the
“strategic orientation” belief. Based upon the mean findings across these two beliefs, it appears
that presidents see themselves and their policy preferences as being of a more cooperative nature
than are those that they attribute to “others.” This is not surprising, given Jervis’s examination of
cognitive dissonance, as well as attribution theory (both discussed in the literature review in
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Figure 4.6: Monthly “Strategic Orientation”/I1 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
Table 4.4: “Instrumental” Belief Descriptives Part I
President
Kennedy

Johnson

Nixon

Ford

Carter

I1
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

I2
0.625
33
0.090
0.444
0.765
0.590
60
0.091
0.400
0.793
0.611
64
0.129
0.341
0.873
0.611
28
0.135
0.281
0.866
0.577
47
0.127
0.373
0.808

I3
0.284
33
0.065
0.176
0.421
0.277
60
0.061
0.133
0.402
0.284
64
0.095
0.092
0.457
0.328
28
0.062
0.177
0.468
0.308
47
0.094
0.141
0.577
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I4a
0.280
33
0.079
0.106
0.444
0.213
60
0.064
0.105
0.417
0.233
64
0.076
0.050
0.446
0.185
28
0.063
0.076
0.332
0.166
47
0.048
0.085
0.256

I4b
0.375
33
0.090
0.235
0.556
0.410
60
0.091
0.207
0.600
0.389
64
0.129
0.127
0.659
0.389
28
0.135
0.134
0.719
0.423
47
0.127
0.192
0.627

0.514
33
0.136
0.222
0.790
0.578
60
0.084
0.414
0.750
0.579
64
0.131
0.379
0.946
0.607
28
0.107
0.396
0.787
0.604
47
0.120
0.383
0.892

Figure 4.4 (cont.)
Reagan

HW Bush

Clinton

W Bush

Total

Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

0.612
93
0.108
0.160
0.862
0.678
46
0.107
0.495
0.887
0.628
95
0.074
0.475
0.786
0.453
34
0.149
0.103
0.763
0.605
500
0.119
0.103
0.887

0.293
93
0.075
-0.033
0.500
0.342
46
0.051
0.184
0.424
0.302
95
0.041
0.204
0.403
0.209
34
0.101
-0.018
0.383
0.293
500
0.078
-0.033
0.577

0.227
93
0.066
0.107
0.389
0.233
46
0.080
0.106
0.452
0.237
95
0.048
0.124
0.349
0.122
34
0.054
0.044
0.250
0.217
500
0.073
0.044
0.452

0.388
93
0.108
0.138
0.840
0.322
46
0.107
0.113
0.505
0.372
95
0.074
0.214
0.525
0.547
34
0.149
0.238
0.897
0.395
500
0.119
0.113
0.897

0.527
93
0.091
0.377
0.769
0.514
46
0.096
0.282
0.771
0.558
95
0.094
0.390
0.901
0.680
34
0.144
0.311
0.919
0.566
500
0.116
0.222
0.946

chapter 2), which would suggest that the self is often perceived as a “good” person who generally
wishes for positive outcomes for both the self and others, whereas others are often seen as less
trustworthy and more exploitative, acting only out of their own, narrow self interest.
Presidential mean z-scores for the first 6 “instrumental” beliefs (I1 through I4b) can be
found in Table 4.5. The president with the strongest cooperative orientation is George H.W.
Bush (“Bush 41”: z=1.301), and the president with the strongest conflict orientation is his son,
George W. Bush (z=-2.369). Bush 43’s score here is particularly low, being more than 2
standard deviations from the mean. No other president yields a z-score less than -1 or greater
than +1. Presidential standard deviation z-scores for the first 5 “instrumental” beliefs can be
found in Table 4.6. On the strategic orientation measure, the president with the most stable
“strategic orientation” beliefs is Clinton (z=-1.551), whose mean value on this index is fairly
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average, whereas the most unstable beliefs are held by Bush 43 (z=1.503) who, as noted above,
has a very conflictual orientation overall.
Table 4.5: Mean Z-Scores for “Instrumental” Belief Indices Part I
Kennedy

I1
mean
0.625

I1 zscore
0.438

I2
mean
0.284

I2 zscore
-0.200

I3
mean
0.280

I3 zscore
1.490

I4a
mean
0.375

I4a zscore
-0.438

I4b
mean
0.514

I4b zscore
-1.112

Johnson

0.590

-0.133

0.278

-0.383

0.213

0.052

0.410

0.133

0.578

0.077

Nixon

0.611

0.208

0.284

-0.200

0.233

0.491

0.389

-0.208

0.579

0.098

Ford

0.611

0.195

0.328

0.953

0.185

-0.557

0.390

-0.195

0.607

0.632

Carter

0.577

-0.348

0.308

0.428

0.166

-0.955

0.423

0.348

0.604

0.563

Reagan

0.612

0.220

0.293

0.033

0.227

0.345

0.388

-0.220

0.527

-0.862

0.678

1.301

0.342

1.319

0.233

0.483

0.322

-1.301

0.514

-1.103

0.628

0.487

0.302

0.256

0.237

0.560

0.372

-0.487

0.558

-0.290

W Bush

0.453

-2.369

0.209

-2.207

0.122

-1.909

0.547

2.369

0.680

1.997

Total

0.599

0.292

0.211

0.401

0.573

St. Dev.

0.061

0.038

0.046

0.061

0.054

HW
Bush
Clinton

Table 4.6: Standard Deviation Z-Scores for “Instrumental” Belief Indices Part I
Kennedy

I1 st
dev
0.090

I1 zscore
-0.902

I2 st
dev
0.065

I2 zscore
-0.339

I3 st
dev
0.079

I3 zscore
1.179

I4a st
dev
0.090

I4a zscore
-0.902

I4b st
dev
0.136

I4b zscore
1.106

Johnson

0.091

-0.869

0.061

-0.491

0.064

-0.005

0.091

-0.869

0.084

-1.244

Nixon

0.129

0.675

0.095

1.117

0.076

0.940

0.129

0.675

0.131

0.885

Ford

0.135

0.924

0.062

-0.472

0.063

-0.082

0.135

0.924

0.107

-0.223

Carter

0.127

0.616

0.094

1.078

0.048

-1.294

0.127

0.616

0.120

0.395

Reagan

0.108

-0.179

0.075

0.146

0.066

0.093

0.108

-0.179

0.091

-0.935

HW
Bush

0.107

-0.215

0.051

-0.981

0.080

1.297

0.107

-0.215

0.096

-0.711

Clinton

0.074

-1.551

0.041

-1.448

0.048

-1.276

0.074

-1.551

0.094

-0.777

W Bush

0.149

1.503

0.101

1.389

0.054

-0.852

0.149

1.503

0.144

1.503

Total

0.112

0.072

0.064

0.112

0.111

St. Dev.

0.025

0.021

0.012

0.025

0.022

The second “instrumental” (I2) belief examines leaders’ tactical orientation, or “the
tactics for how goals and objectives can be pursued most effectively” (Walker, Schafer, and
Young 1998, 180, emphasis in original). These “I2” beliefs are plotted in Figure 4.7. The mean
tactical orientation score across presidents for all periods examined is .293, and the standard
deviation of these scores is .078. Given that this index ranges from -1 to +1, this mean value
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suggests that presidents generally hold a more cooperative over conflictual tactical orientation.
The president with the most cooperative orientation is Bush 41 (z=1.319) and the president with
the most conflictual orientation is Bush 43 (z=-2.207), similar to the findings for the strategic
orientation belief index. The most stable “tactical orientation” beliefs are held by Clinton (z=1.448), whereas the most unstable beliefs are held by Bush 43 (z=1.389), Nixon (z=1.117), and
Carter (z=1.078).

Figure 4.7: Monthly “Tactical Orientation”/I2 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
The third “instrumental” index (I3) is a leader’s risk orientation. This belief index is
calculated similar to the P3 index using the IQV score, but again, is based on self versus other
references. Values here fall on a scale theoretically ranging from 0—indicating a fairly
unpredictable set of self behavioral references and thus an extremely “risk averse” president—to
+1—representing a fairly predictable set of self references and thus an extremely “risk
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acceptant” president. These beliefs are plotted on Figure 4.8. The mean “3 month rolling
average” value across presidents is .217, and the standard deviation is .073. The fairly low mean
score suggests that presidents tend to be more risk averse than risk acceptant through their
demonstration of a fairly inconsistent, unpredictable range of self references.

Figure 4.8: Monthly “Risk Orientation”/I3 trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
The president who is most “risk acceptant” in this sense is Kennedy (z=1.490), and the
president who is more “risk averse” is Bush 43 (z=-1.909). The most stable “risk acceptant”
beliefs are held by Carter (z=-1.294) and Clinton (z=-1.276), and the most unstable beliefs are
held by Bush 43 (z=1.389) and Nixon (z=1.117).
The next “instrumental” index (I4a) examines the “timing of conflict vs. cooperation.”
Recall that belief values on this index range from 0 to +1, where lower values suggest a low
propensity to shift between cooperative and conflictual actions, and higher values indicate a
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higher shift propensity. The scatterplot for this belief index can be found in Figure 4.9. The
mean on this index is .395, and the standard deviation is .119. The president with the highest
shift propensity is Bush 43 (z=2.369) and the president with the lowest shift propensity is Bush
41 (z=-1.301). In other words, for Bush 43, “the timing of action in assessing the risk of political
acts” is relatively important, whereas for Bush 41 “the strategic approach to goals is more likely
to be the dominant strategy no matter what others in the political universe say or do” (Walker,
Schafer, and Young, 1998: 181). Clinton (z=-1.551) is most stable regarding his propensity to
shift between the use of cooperation and conflict, whereas Bush 43 (z=1.503) is, once again, the
most unstable president.

Figure 4.9: Monthly “Timing of Conflict Vs. Cooperation”/I4a trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961
through 2003
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The second “I4” belief examined is the I4b index, or the “timing of words vs. deeds.”
Similar to the “timing of conflict vs. cooperation” belief index, this index ranges from 0 to +1.
Here a 0 indicates an extremely low propensity to shift between words and deeds, whereas a +1
value would indicate the other extreme of a high shift propensity. The scatterplot can be found
in Figure 4.10. The cross-presidential mean, “3 month rolling average” value on this index is
.566, with a standard deviation of .116. Bush 43 yields the highest propensity to shift between
words and deeds (z=1.997), whereas Kennedy (z=-1.112) and Bush 41 (z=-1.103) yield the
lowest shift propensity. That is to say, Bush 43 demonstrates “a more risk-averse orientation
toward the undesirable outcomes of submission or deadlock” whereas Bush 41 and Kennedy are
“relatively acceptant regarding the risks associated with the direction of the distribution”
(regarding the use of either words or deeds: Walker et al., 1998: 181).
Johnson (z=-1.244) is the most stable amongst the presidents examined regarding his
tendency to shift between words and deeds from month to month, whereas Bush 43 (z=1.503)
and Kennedy (z=1.106)—the two leaders with most extreme, opposing mean scores on this
index—are the most unstable.
The final beliefs examined are the “I5,” or “utility of means” beliefs. Recall from the
previous chapter that these include both normatively “positive” and “negative” self-attributed
actions. Descriptive data for and across presidents regarding this second set of “instrumental”
beliefs can be found in Table 4.7. All “utility of means” belief values can theoretically range
from 0 (extremely low utility for a given belief) to +1 (extremely high utility for a given belief).
Recall from the previous chapter that these beliefs are all calculated as a percentage of all
“means” usages. That is to say, if a leader only states that he will “punish” others, then his
“punish” preference (I5pu) value would be a 1, and all other belief values will equal 0. If he uses
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“punish” verbs half the time and “reward” verbs the other half of the time, then each of these
beliefs (I5pu and I5re, respectively) will yield a value of .5, and all other belief indices will yield
a 0 value. Scatterplots for these beliefs can be found in Figures 4.11 through 4.16.

Figure 4.10: Monthly “Timing of Words Vs. Deeds”/I4b trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through
2003
Table 4.7: “Instrumental” Belief Descriptives Part II
President
Kennedy

Johnson

Nixon

I5ap
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

I5pr
0.583
33
0.069
0.417
0.720
0.526
60
0.062
0.421
0.692
0.537
64
0.077
0.333
0.714

I5re
0.052
33
0.029
0.012
0.120
0.076
60
0.028
0.000
0.135
0.076
64
0.040
0.000
0.173
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I5op
0.177
33
0.058
0.042
0.269
0.193
60
0.034
0.128
0.289
0.193
64
0.057
0.095
0.389

I5th
0.088
33
0.032
0.036
0.161
0.081
60
0.029
0.019
0.152
0.071
64
0.028
0.000
0.143

I5pu
0.019
33
0.011
0.000
0.042
0.028
60
0.019
0.000
0.091
0.026
64
0.023
0.000
0.107

0.080
33
0.037
0.016
0.181
0.096
60
0.034
0.034
0.200
0.098
64
0.054
0.020
0.268

Table 4.7 (cont.)
President
Ford

Carter

Reagan

HW Bush

Clinton

W Bush

Total

I5ap
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Mean
N
Std. Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

I5pr
0.485
28
0.071
0.328
0.621
0.466
47
0.061
0.339
0.576
0.540
93
0.064
0.400
0.678
0.539
46
0.077
0.354
0.718
0.549
95
0.051
0.376
0.650
0.418
34
0.078
0.276
0.563
0.524
500
0.077
0.276
0.720

I5re
0.092
28
0.025
0.058
0.168
0.104
47
0.035
0.033
0.219
0.079
93
0.027
0.019
0.163
0.105
46
0.036
0.024
0.172
0.069
95
0.022
0.013
0.133
0.110
34
0.029
0.073
0.194
0.082
500
0.034
0.000
0.219

I5op
0.229
28
0.034
0.158
0.289
0.218
47
0.064
0.107
0.423
0.187
93
0.046
0.060
0.338
0.195
46
0.040
0.113
0.302
0.197
95
0.035
0.131
0.307
0.199
34
0.046
0.117
0.311
0.197
500
0.047
0.042
0.423

I5th
0.094
28
0.049
0.000
0.236
0.101
47
0.033
0.046
0.204
0.084
93
0.031
0.029
0.186
0.075
46
0.041
0.010
0.160
0.082
95
0.022
0.037
0.140
0.080
34
0.022
0.038
0.131
0.083
500
0.032
0.000
0.236

I5pu
0.026
28
0.015
0.000
0.060
0.026
47
0.018
0.000
0.067
0.034
93
0.018
0.000
0.080
0.024
46
0.014
0.000
0.070
0.021
95
0.011
0.000
0.070
0.052
34
0.025
0.021
0.110
0.028
500
0.019
0.000
0.110

0.075
28
0.030
0.019
0.141
0.084
47
0.035
0.017
0.141
0.076
93
0.030
0.012
0.180
0.062
46
0.025
0.011
0.146
0.082
95
0.021
0.037
0.144
0.141
34
0.055
0.039
0.255
0.086
500
0.040
0.011
0.268

The first “utility of means” belief is “support” (I5ap)33, and the cross-presidential “3
month moving average” mean is .524, with a standard deviation of .077. Given that a high mean
value on one indicator suggests low mean values on the other “utility of means” belief indices,
this is a fairly notable finding. This suggests that, of all the possible means categories from

33

This indicator has traditionally been referred to as “I5ap,” following from its previously being
considered a measure of “appeal/support.” However, in the most recent theoretical update of the
operational code, Schafer and Walker (2006b 32, 37-38) simply refer to this measure as
indicating “support.” As such, I will maintain convention by referring to this indicator as “I5ap,”
but will discuss it as referring to the provision of support by the speaker to “others.”
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which a leader might choose, the means of offering verbal “support” is used, on average, more
than half of the time.
Individual presidential mean z-scores for the “utility of means” instrumental beliefs can
be found in Table 4.8. The president who uses support most frequently, and thus finds the most
utility in the offering of support, is Kennedy (z=1.338), whereas Bush 43 (z=-1.941) uses support
least frequently, and thus finds the least amount of utility in this means. Standard deviation zscores for these beliefs are found in Table 4.9. The president who maintains the most stable use
of support over time is Clinton (z=-1.857), whose mean value is fairly average compared to other
presidents. The presidents with the most unpredictable usage of support are Bush 43 (z=1.124),
Nixon (z=1.010), and Bush 41 (z=1.001). Monthly I5ap values are plotted out over time in
Figure 4.11.

Figure 4.11: Monthly “Appeal”/I5ap trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
Note: All “I5” indices evaluate the utility of various specific means “in the exercise of power”
(Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998).
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Table 4.8: Mean Z-Scores for “Instrumental” Belief Indices Part II
Kennedy
Johnson

I5ap
mean
0.583
0.526

I5ap zscore
1.338
0.203

I5pr
mean
0.052
0.076

I5pr zscore
-1.685
-0.437

I5re
mean
0.177
0.193

I5re zscore
-1.379
-0.379

I5op
mean
0.088
0.081

I5op zscore
0.451
-0.344

I5th
mean
0.019
0.028

I5th zscore
-0.938
-0.053

I5pu
mean
0.080
0.096

I5pu zscore
-0.373
0.345

Nixon

0.537

0.414

0.076

-0.478

0.194

-0.334

0.071

-1.374

0.026

-0.297

0.098

0.416

Ford

0.485

-0.621

0.092

0.380

0.229

1.923

0.094

1.031

0.026

-0.236

0.075

-0.585

Carter

0.466

-0.987

0.104

1.021

0.218

1.243

0.101

1.868

0.026

-0.226

0.084

-0.204

Reagan

0.540

0.473

0.079

-0.301

0.187

-0.725

0.084

0.011

0.034

0.517

0.076

-0.528

HW
Bush
Clinton

0.539

0.465

0.105

1.047

0.195

-0.238

0.075

-0.998

0.024

-0.460

0.062

-1.152

0.549

0.656

0.069

-0.837

0.197

-0.129

0.082

-0.193

0.021

-0.735

0.082

-0.266

W Bush

0.418

-1.941

0.110

1.291

0.199

0.019

0.080

-0.451

0.052

2.430

0.141

2.347

Total

0.516

0.085

0.199

0.084

0.029

0.088

St. Dev.

0.050

0.019

0.016

0.009

0.010

0.023

Table 4.9: Standard Deviation Z-Scores for “Instrumental” Belief Indices Part II
Kennedy
Johnson
Nixon
Ford
Carter
Reagan
HW
Bush
Clinton
W Bush
Total
St. Dev.

I5ap st
dev
0.069
0.062
0.077
0.071
0.061
0.064
0.077

I5ap zscore
0.137
-0.673
1.010
0.372
-0.688
-0.425
1.001

I5pr st
dev
0.029
0.028
0.040
0.025
0.035
0.027
0.036

I5pr zscore
-0.262
-0.368
1.761
-0.868
0.822
-0.492
0.963

I5re st
dev
0.058
0.034
0.057
0.034
0.064
0.046
0.040

I5re zscore
1.084
-1.031
0.964
-1.044
1.592
-0.027
-0.547

I5op st
dev
0.032
0.029
0.028
0.049
0.033
0.031
0.041

I5op zscore
0.053
-0.339
-0.412
1.978
0.167
-0.140
1.021

I5th st
dev
0.011
0.019
0.023
0.015
0.018
0.018
0.014

I5th zscore
-1.306
0.381
1.159
-0.394
0.098
0.182
-0.629

I5pu st
dev
0.037
0.034
0.054
0.030
0.035
0.030
0.025

I5pu zscore
0.114
-0.134
1.597
-0.489
-0.098
-0.515
-0.882

0.051
0.078
0.068
0.009

-1.857
1.124

0.022
0.029
0.030
0.006

-1.444
-0.111

0.035
0.046
0.046
0.012

-0.953
-0.038

0.022
0.022
0.032
0.009

-1.119
-1.208

0.011
0.025
0.017
0.005

-1.174
1.683

0.021
0.055
0.036
0.012

-1.219
1.626
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The second “utility of means” belief is that of “promise” (I5pr). The scatterplot
of monthly values on this belief are found in Figure 4.12, and cross-presidential mean
value is .082, with a standard deviation of .034. Note the discrepancy between the high
mean value for the “appeal” belief and the low mean value for the “promise” belief,
where the latter is not used nearly as much by presidents as the former. The presidents
who find the most utility in making promises are Bush 43 (z=1.297), Bush 41 (z=1.047),
and Carter (z=1.021), whereas the president who finds the least amount of utility in
promising is Kennedy (z=-1.685). The president with the most stable “promise”
preference from month to month is Clinton (-1.444), and the president with the most
unstable “promise” preference is Nixon (z=1.761).

Figure 4.12: Monthly “Promise”/I5pr trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003

101

The third “means” belief examines the use of rewards (I5re), and the crosspresidential mean value is .197, with a standard deviation of .047. The scatterplot of
monthly I5re beliefs can be found in Figure 4.13.

Figure 4.13: Monthly “Reward”/I5re trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
The presidents who most prefer the use of rewards are Ford (z=1.923) and his
successor Carter (1.243), whereas the president who least frequently used rewards in his
self-attributions is Kennedy (z=-1.397). The most stable reward beliefs are held by Ford
(z=-1.044) and Johnson (z=-1.031), whereas the most variable reward beliefs are held by
Carter (z=1.592) and Kennedy (z=1.084).
Fourth is the “oppose” (I5op) belief. The monthly scatterplot can be found in
Figure 4.14. The mean I5op belief value is .083, with a standard deviation of .032. The
presidents who most strongly prefer the use of the “oppose” attribution are Carter
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(z=1.868) and Ford (z=1.031), and the president who finds the least amount of utility in
the “oppose” belief is Nixon (z=-1.374). Though it may seem strange that Carter and
Ford are listed as having the highest values across presidents on “conflictual” measure,
keep in mind that this belief taps into the least aggressive form of a normatively
“negative” statement made to others. As such, the use of an “oppose” attribution, as
opposed to the use of a “threat” or referencing actual “punish” acts might be perceived as
a leader taking a relatively dovish approach. The most stable “oppose” beliefs are held
by Bush 43 (z=-1.208) and Clinton (z=-1.119), and the most unstable “oppose” beliefs
are held by Ford (z=1.987) followed by Bush 41 (z=1.021). Note that this is the only
belief in which Bush 43 yields a significantly stable monthly belief value.

Figure 4.14: Monthly “Oppose”/I5op trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
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Fifth is the “threat” (I5th) belief, which has a mean value of .028, with a standard
deviation of .019. This belief is notable for holding the lowest mean of all “utility of
beliefs” means, and thus being the least used reference amongst those examined for these
presidents. The president who most strongly prefers the use of threats is Bush 43
(z=2.430), and though no president yields a “significantly” negative mean z-score (less
than -1), Kennedy comes closest, demonstrating the lowest utility in the use of threats
(z=-.938). The most stable threat beliefs are held by Kennedy (z=-1.306) and Clinton
(z=-1.174), and the most unstable threat beliefs are held by Bush 43 (z=1.683) and Nixon
(z=1.159). The monthly scatterplot of I5th belief values can be found in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15: Monthly “threat”/I5th trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
The final “utility of means” belief is the “punish” belief (I5pu). The scatterplot
can be found in Figure 4.16. The mean value on this index across presidents is .086, and
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the standard deviation is .040. The president viewing the most utility in punishing is
Bush 43 (z=2.347), whereas the president viewing the least utility in punishing is Bush
41 (z=-1.152). The most stable punish beliefs are held by Clinton (z=-1.219), and the
most unstable beliefs are held by Bush 43 (z=1.626) and Nixon (z=1.597).

Figure 4.16: Monthly “punish”/I5pu trends for U.S. Presidents, 1961 through 2003
4.2 Discussion
On the whole, there are a few notable findings in the above analyses. In terms of
cross-presidential mean values, as mentioned earlier, it is difficult to make cross-belief
comparisons for methodological reasons. However, it is notable that presidents tend to
view themselves in a more positive light than they do others. This follows Jervis’s
expectations regarding self- versus other-perceptions via the lens of cognitive dissonance.
Further, the extremely high role of chance held by presidents is striking, suggesting that
in general, presidents believe that the self has a fairly limited role in world affairs, given
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the unpredictability of others and the self’s fairly low level of control. Given feelings of
control specifically, it is also notable that presidents tend to pick up where their
predecessors leave off, which is not something that I test statistically here, but is fairly
evident from the plot in Figure 4.4. Why this happens and what this means for
expectations regarding presidential beliefs is something that may require additional future
attention.
Regarding instrumental beliefs, presidents tend to be fairly risk averse, behaving
in a stable and predictable manner at a given point in time. Further, as discussed
previously, presidents tend to place far more emphasis on the use of “support” versus any
other “means” category examined, employing these means the majority of the time.
Support is the weakest form of a “cooperative” gesture examined via the operational
code, suggesting that the “default” approach that presidents will take in a given situation
is to present oneself as cooperative with others, but only as modestly cooperative, not
going so far as to make promises or to actually provide reward incentives to others’
behavior.
Regarding individual presidential differences, George W. Bush seems to be a true
outlier. Not only does he demonstrate one of the most extreme mean values on 12 of the
16 indicators examined, but he also demonstrates the most monthly variation in beliefs on
10 indicators. Bush 43’s mean belief values suggest a reflection of a hostile world, where
conflict is a fairly permanent phenomena and unpredictability is the norm. He also
strongly prefers conflict over cooperation, and to respond to international unpredictability
with in-kind unpredictability. Taken together, these beliefs seem to color Bush 43 as a
hard-line “realist” president.
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In terms of mean “philosophical” belief values, at the other end of the spectrum
from George W. Bush is Gerald Ford. Ford’s scores reflect a perception of the “other”
as friendly, a belief in the temporary nature of conflict, and a perception of the “other” as
being predictable, all while feeling high levels of control over events and seeing chance
as only playing a relatively minor role in international outcomes. Further, Ford yields
significant mean values on the “reward” and “oppose” utility of means “instrumental”
indices, suggesting a leader who prefers the use of the tastiest carrots, and the least
painful sticks. Thus, based upon their belief scores, Ford appears to be more of a
“cooperative internationalist” in relation to the “militant internationalist” George W.
Bush (Wittkopf 1994).
Regarding instrumental beliefs, Bush 43’s opposite appears, interestingly, to be
his own father. George H.W. Bush yields significant “instrumental” belief values
indicating a preference for cooperation over conflict, and a tendency to maintain a fairly
stable “shift propensity” regarding the use of conflict vs. cooperation and words vs.
deeds. In contrast to Bush 43 in terms of belief variability is Clinton, who for 12 of the
16 belief indicators yields extremely stable beliefs from month to month.

107

CHAPTER 5: HIERARCHICAL BELIEF CHANGE AND THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL BELIEFS
In addition to the broad trends evaluated in chapter 4, existing works on political
attitude and belief change have generated a number of testable hypotheses regarding how
and why beliefs behave the way that they do. However, as discussed in chapter 2, these
works have provided little in the way of large-scale, empirical support for these
hypotheses. Starting here, and throughout the remained of the dissertation, I will focus
on testing these types of hypotheses using, amongst other things, the tool of the
quantitatively developed operational code measures outlined previously.
5.1 Hypotheses
5.1.1 The Nature of Learning for Central Versus Peripheral Beliefs
Jervis (1976) notes that the centrality of one’s beliefs plays an important role in
terms of learning. He argues that if a given belief is central to one’s identity, then despite
exposure to potentially disconfirming information, this belief will be much more likely to
remain stable than will a belief that holds a more marginal level of importance to the
self’s identity (297). He likens this to the way in which science works, where small,
marginal changes in a prevailing hypothesis are the most likely changes to occur. Only
when “large amounts of intractable data” exist do we completely replace “important
hypotheses” and theories (297-298). Treating “core beliefs” as analogous with
“important hypotheses,” more peripheral beliefs may shift and change far more easily,
akin to lesser hypotheses that have not been fully established, while the more crucial
hypotheses remain unaltered. He further argues that this fact does not reflect a
“pathological attempt to protect a psychologically satisfying view of the world,” so much
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as a rational means of understanding and interpreting changes in reality, given that we
behave as “naïve scientists” in this process.
To provide an example, Jervis notes that “a person’s view of himself is usually
highly central and will be maintained at the cost of altering several other elements.
People usually believe that they are just and fair. If evil has been done, they cannot have
done it. And if they did it, it cannot be evil” (299). Jervis argues that this tendency
“helps explain why people often fail to see the basic causes of undesired events and
instead focus on the supposedly idiosyncratic acts of a few individuals,” and also explains
the prevalence of conspiracy theories amongst policymakers (300). Following from this,
people may come up with very strange justifications for perceived occurrences, yet still
be acting somewhat “rationally.”
Tetlock (1991) sums up much of the work on “belief systems,” and similarly
suggests that some beliefs are more central than others, and that these central beliefs
serve different purposes from, and behave differently than do less important beliefs. He
argues that “foreign policy belief systems are organized hierarchically with fundamental
assumptions and policy objectives at the apex of the system, strategic policy beliefs and
preferences at an intermediate level, and tactical beliefs and preferences at the base of the
system” (28).34 Regarding learning, following from Jervis’s discussion, Tetlock suggests
that “most learning takes place at the level of tinkering with tactics. Policy makers rarely
have the time or the inclination to start questioning the fundamental premises of policy;
34

Though Tetlock refers to strategic beliefs as “second order” beliefs on the belief
hierarchy, they are certainly more important than the tactical beliefs that Tetlock refers
to, or any number of other potential beliefs that are examined by the operational code. As
such, I include them here as relatively “central,” following from Walker and Schafer’s
(2006) discussion, though perhaps as somewhat less central than one’s fundamental view
of the outside world.
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they are, however, willing to make frequent tactical adjustments to cope with unforeseen
events.”
From the above, I expect that core, or central beliefs of political leaders will be
more stable than will other types of beliefs, and from this, the first hypothesis that I test is
the following:
H1: Beliefs more central to policy-makers (image of the other [P1], strategic orientation
[I1], and Feelings of Control [P4] beliefs) are more stable than are less central beliefs.
The current re-formulation of the operational code does not treat this construct as
an intrinsically “hierarchical and internally consistent belief system” as George (1969)
and Holsti (1977) had originally theorized (Walker, Schafer, and Young 1998, 177).35
However, it does hold that these beliefs “are related in a hierarchical order.” At the top of
this hierarchy, according to Walker et al., are one’s strategic orientation (I1) and one’s
view regarding the fundamental nature of politics, or the “image of the other” (P1). As
such, in the automated content analyzed version of the operational code, all other indices
are “disaggregations of these two indices into different measures of central tendency,
balance, and dispersion” (Walker et al. 1998, 177).
Beyond these two indices, the feelings of control (P4) measure is additionally
seen to be of key importance, as this belief evaluates the self’s perceptions concerning the
“locus of control” in international politics (does control lie with the self [ego] or with the
other [alter]?), which is of critical importance in determining one’s preference ordering of
potential conflict outcomes, as evaluated, for instance, through game theoretic models

35

Note that I assume, and later in this chapter will test the idea that one’s operational
code belief system may be more or less “internally consistent” depending on the
psychological pre-dispositions of the individual and one’s specific experiences in office.
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(see Marfleet and Walker 2006). Walker and Schafer (2006) conceptualize these three
indices (P1, I1, and P4) as the “master beliefs” (12). Following from this convention,
here I also treat: 1) the fundamental nature of politics/image of the external political
environment (P1); 2) strategic orientation (I1), and 3) feelings of control (P4) as
policymakers’ “central” or “master” beliefs. I do this as these beliefs are, amongst the 17
operational code indices, hypothesized to be the most central and important to political
leaders’ overall belief systems, and thus best reflect the “central beliefs” as discussed by
Jervis, Tetlock, Levy, and others.
A problem in evaluating learning, Tetlock (1991) notes, is deciphering when
“fundamental learning” occurs, versus more secondary forms of learning. He states that
“debates over levels of learning are unresolvable,” and that “there is ultimately no welldefined evidential standard for distinguishing among levels of learning” (31). However,
for the purposes of analysis here, we will treat notable changes in “central” operational
code indices from month to month as more an indication of “fundamental learning” than
that of similar changes in other indices. I will thus use this distinction in order to
interpret the types of learning that are being evaluated in hypothesis H1. If noticeable
changes occur in leaders’ “master,” or “central” beliefs, then I will say here that
“fundamental” learning has occurred. Conversely, if we see notable learning evident in
more peripheral beliefs, then I will say that “secondary” learning has resulted.
5.1.2 The Relationship (or Lack Thereof) between Leaders’ Beliefs
Jervis also notes that “if a person’s attitude structure is to be consistent, then
incremental changes among interconnected elements cannot be made. Change will be
inhibited, but once it occurs it will come in large batches. Several elements will change
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almost simultaneously” (170). Thus, for those with “consistent attitude structures”
(which might be expected to include most people, given the powerful drive of the mind to
maintain consistent beliefs), there appears to be a kind of “tipping point,” either reached
due to a particular experience, or due to the culmination of a number of experiences,
which initiates a comprehensive shift in one’s belief system. Individual beliefs are not
likely to change by themselves then, but concurrently with other, related beliefs. One
analogy here might be a “religious awakening,” whereby a fundamental shift in many
areas of an individual’s secondary beliefs (such as beliefs on specific “social” and moral
issues) may be altered following the shift of a single, significant, core belief (one’s belief
in a supreme being, or in some other underlying order guiding existence).
Following the theorized importance of “central” beliefs to one’s overall belief
system, it makes sense to expect that changes in one’s more “marginal” beliefs will
require a change in at least one of one’s “central” beliefs alongside these more peripheral
beliefs. Though it is possible that there are instances in which only peripheral beliefs will
change while core beliefs remain stable, these more secondary beliefs are hypothesized to
be less independent, more variable and less permanent than more central beliefs (partly
following from the expectations in hypothesis H1). And thus, I expect that:
H2: When notable changes occur in “central” beliefs, it will concurrently occur for
secondary beliefs.36
Following from his observations, Jervis (1976) additionally argues that
“compromises involving central beliefs are likely to be unstable” (304)—that is to say,
36

Note that hypotheses H1 and H2 are not competing, or mutually exclusive. It might be
that we see more stability for central beliefs than more “secondary” ones, while at the
same time seeing a correlative relationship between fundamental and secondary change
when central beliefs do change.
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previously held central beliefs may not hold if they run counter to changes in other
central beliefs, as the newly changed beliefs may require the dismissal or change of
previous beliefs in order for one’s overall belief system to remain “consistent” or
“balanced.”37 Thus:
H3: The central “fundamental nature of politics” (P1) and “strategic orientation” (I1)
beliefs evaluated in hypothesis H1 are more likely to remain stable when they do not run
counter to one another.
Note that these two “master” beliefs, and not the “control” belief, are evaluated
because they have a similar directional “affective valence” relationship. An increase in
one of these two measures is similar in type to an increase in the other (leading to similar
types of “positive affective valence shifts” in both). Further, both are expected to be
related, as stronger perceptions of friendliness should tend to coincide with stronger
preferences for cooperation, and stronger perceptions of hostility should coincide with
higher levels of conflict.
5.2 Methods for Hypotheses Tests
Here, I will describe the methods used to evaluate each hypothesis in turn. Before
discussing specific methods, however, it is important to make a general comment
regarding cross-belief analysis via the operational code. Recall the previous discussion
regarding the image (P1) and strategic orientation (I1) “master” beliefs, and the idea that
these beliefs “summarize the balance between the leader’s attribution of cooperative and
conflictual properties to self and others,” (Walker, Schafer, and Young, 1998: 177)

37

Jervis notes that the subsequent change of the central belief or beliefs may be an
unexpected consequence of developing new beliefs that occurs much later than the initial
belief change (304), but I will not test this possibility here.
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whereas the other indices are disaggregations of those indices. Given this, and the fact
that all operational code beliefs are based on the same 12 raw self/other values (as
discussed in chapter 3), there is a methodological consequence to the theoretical
assumption that the operational code operates in a particular way.
Note that though many of the “philosophical” and “instrumental” beliefs are
related to one another in that they are constructed from the same “raw” indicators, each
belief is calculated as a different mathematical function of a different constellation of
indicators. As such, these indices will not necessarily change in a given way in relation
to another based upon their methodological construction. That is to say, it is possible for
certain beliefs to be more or less closely related to one another based upon the words
spoken and coded by a given speaker, and not simply based upon their mathematical
calculation. In this sense, whether the operational code indices as evaluated by Profiler
Plus are in fact independent of one another is, to some extent, an empirical question—one
which is addressed here in a fashion, in hypothesis H2.
Further, all hypotheses here are primary concerned with cross-presidential
correlations or change on similar constellations of beliefs, or of the degree of cross-belief
change, rather than comparisons of raw, cross-belief values. As such, I am not making a
direct comparison of certain raw belief values against others, which would be a more
questionable means of evaluating the nature of operational code beliefs, but rather, I am
making comparisons that generally control for issues regarding the nature of raw belief
calculations.
Thus, it is appropriate to test the hypotheses outlined here as if these were at least
partially independent belief constructs, most of which (with the notable exception of the
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“role of chance” belief, which is based directly on the values of two other belief indices)
could theoretically vary quite a bit from others in terms of their degree of interconnectivity. However, some beliefs are intrinsically more inter-related than are others
based upon their mathematical calculations, which should be taken into account. These
are: 1) the “image” (P1) and “realization of political values” beliefs (P2); and 2)
“strategic orientation” (I1) and “tactical orientation” (I2) beliefs.
H1: Beliefs more central to policy-makers (image of the other [P1], strategic orientation
[I1], and feelings of control [P4] beliefs) are more stable than are less central beliefs.
For this hypothesis, I look at monthly change in each belief index of interest.
However, in a trend that will continue throughout this chapter, I do not look at change
defined simply as the belief value at time t minus the change at time t-1. If I were, this
would be an evaluation of “directional change,” which would be useful for analyses
evaluating whether or not the values on a given belief index, in their raw calculated state,
increase or decrease. In other words, this would be an evaluation of change in a
directional sense, and of the magnitude of this directional change from one time to
another (for instance, discretely toward seeing the world as more friendly or as less
friendly)—this is a manner of change that will be used in later parts of this dissertation.
Instead, for this hypothesis, I first calculate out this “directional change” value,
but then evaluate the absolute value of this measure. By looking at “absolute change,”
though we lose some information regarding the direction of change being evaluated, we
gain an understanding of the general robustness, or magnitude of change that occurs at a
given time. For this and other hypotheses in this chapter, I am most interested in this
form of change. To give an example, with the “strategic orientation” variable, a
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“directional change” model would examine whether belief changes led to increased
preferences for conflict or toward increased preferences for cooperation. Conversely, an
“absolute change model” would evaluate whether a leader experienced greater or lesser
change in his strategic orientation beliefs, broadly defined, from one point in time to
another. In other words, “absolute change” models allow for an examination of “belief
stability.” Given that I am interested here in the relative “robustness” of belief change,
and not in the direction of this change, I evaluate “absolute” belief change.
Note here that rather than looking at the simple, monthly belief value for each
month, for each monthly period I employ the use of the “3 month, moving averages” as
described in the previous chapter, so that I can control for months in which there is not
enough data to adequately evaluate operational code values (I use these “3 month,
moving average” values as the basis for all analyses in this chapter).
Specifically for hypothesis H1, I first calculate the “directional” belief change
from one month to the next on each belief index (value at time t minus the value at time t1). My second step is then to determine the average “absolute belief change” value for
each belief. Recall from the previous chapter that the image (P1), realization of
fundamental values (P2), strategic orientation (I1), and tactical orientation (I2) beliefs
have larger scales—ranging from -1 to +1—than do the other operational code beliefs.
All other measures range from 0 to +1. As such, a .1 change on the indices ranging from
0 to +1 would be equivalent to a .2 change on the four beliefs with broader value ranges.
Thus, I re-calculate those four beliefs with broader ranges by dividing their “absolute
change” values by 2. In this sense, I standardize these values to make them comparable
when evaluating “change” in belief indices from one point in time to another.
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For the third step, I construct z-score values for each belief, in order to determine
the degree of “absolute” monthly belief change experienced for each respective belief
relative to others. I determined z-scores for “philosophical” beliefs in relation to other
“philosophical” belief values only, and determined z-scores for “instrumental” beliefs in
relation to other “instrumental” belief values only. In this sense, I am testing belief
stability or variability of each “philosophical” belief relative to all other “philosophical”
beliefs only, and am testing belief change levels of each “instrumental” belief relative to
all other “instrumental” beliefs only. Given that I am examining the relative change of
more versus less “central” beliefs, I believe that this calculation gives me a better
measure than that using all belief values (philosophical and instrumental) as the basis for
these z-score indicators. By comparing beliefs in this way, I test “peripheral”
philosophical beliefs versus the “core” philosophical beliefs of the “image of the other”
and “feelings of control,” and “peripheral” instrumental beliefs versus the “core”
instrumental belief of “strategic orientation.”
Z-scores are calculated as: [(observed value – mean value) / (standard deviation
value)]. The “observed” value here is the average monthly absolute belief change value
on a given belief index. The “mean” value is the mean of all “observed” values for each
belief category (i.e. philosophical and instrumental). The “standard deviation” value is
the standard deviation of all “observed” values for each belief category. I operationally
define as a “notable” difference those that are 1 standard deviation (i.e. 1 z-score) above
or below the across-belief mean variability value.
H2: When notable changes occur in “central” beliefs, it will concurrently occur for
secondary beliefs.
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I expect that other “philosophical” beliefs will be most likely to change when
one’s image of the external environment (P1) and feelings of control (P4) beliefs change,
and that other “instrumental” beliefs will be most likely to change when one’s strategic
orientation (I1) beliefs change. However, it may be that there is a relationship between
philosophical and instrumental beliefs of some kind, which I also evaluate.
I test hypothesis H2 by determining months in which a “notable change” occurs
for central beliefs from their previous months’ values (note that I am again treating the “3
month, moving average” values here as monthly values). Then, I test whether or not
notable changes also occur for more “secondary” beliefs during the same time periods.38
“Notable changes” are determined by first subtracting each month’s belief value from the
prior month’s belief value for each month on each belief index, and then taking the
absolute value for each observation. This yields a measure of “absolute belief change” in
the same way that it was done for hypothesis H1, for similar purposes (i.e. I am interested
in the magnitude of belief change, not in directional changes).
For the second step, I determine the mean and standard deviation of these
“absolute change” values for each belief across all months. Then, based on this
information and each month’s mean belief value, a “z-score” is calculated for each belief
index value for each month. Thus, I create a standardized measure of the distance of each
monthly mean “absolute change” belief observation value from the overall mean for all
months on each belief index.39 For all months in which this change yields a z-score value

38

Given that Jervis seems to treat this as an almost instantaneous (rather than
“incremental”) change process, these dynamics are expected to be evident in a one-month
observation period.
39
Though for hypothesis H1, I create a single z-score for each belief index, here I create
a z-score for each month on each index.
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greater than +1 (or one positive standard deviation shift from the mean degree of
“absolute” belief change), I categorize this as an instance of notable belief change. I
examine z-scores in this manner for all belief indices.
Following this, I restrict out data to only those months in which each of the “core”
beliefs witnesses a mean “absolute change” of +1 z-score or greater (again, a 1 z-score
shift = a 1 standard deviation shift), and create a separate data file for each “core” belief
for months where only “notable belief change” occurs for the image (P1), strategic
orientation (I1), and feelings of control (P4) values, respectively.40 Also included in
these files are associated belief information for all other beliefs during these same
monthly time periods, including “absolute belief change” z-score values across these
other beliefs, and a dichotomous measure signifying if the z-score for this month on these
other indicators was a +1 or greater.
Finally, for each of these files (again, there is one for each “core” belief), I run a
frequencies test, evaluating the percentage of time that each belief (apart from that used
to restrict out files)41 yields a “notable” z-score “absolute change value” of +1 or greater.
This value is an indication of the correlation between the months of highest “absolute”
belief change for each “core” belief of interest and months of high “absolute” belief
change for each other belief. For the purposes of hypothesis testing, I operationally
define correlations (frequency percentages) of greater than .50—when one of the
“master” beliefs of interest and a corresponding belief being compared with it both yield

40

For instance, there are only 61 months out of a 40+ year period where the strategic
orientation “absolute belief change” values yield a z-score of +1 or greater, and only the
data for these months are evaluated as a separate file for analysis.
41
I do this as 100% of these months are identified as yielding a “significant” absolute
belief shift on this index.
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a “notable” absolute change of a greater than a one standard deviation shift from the
mean during the same month in over 50% of the months in which the “central” belief of
interest yields a notable belief shift—as notable correlations.
To give an example, assume that the “feelings of control” variable yields a
notable “absolute change” value (in relation to the mean value) only in January,
February, and March of one given year, and does not yield a notable change at any other
time. Further, assume that this belief is being compared with the less central
“predictability of the political future” (P3) belief. If the “predictability of the political
future” belief also yields a notable “absolute change” value (in relation to the mean
“predictability of the political future” absolute belief change value) in January and
February of this same year, but not in March, then the frequency percentage of interest
here would be 2/3, or 66.66%. That is to say, for all of those months where the “feelings
of control” variable yields notable change, the “predictability of the political future”
measure also yields a similar change level 66.66% of the time. If the degree of
“predictability of the political future” belief change was notable in all other months of the
year (April through December), but not in 1 of the 3 months in which the “feelings of
control” measure yields a notable change, then the percentage result here would still be
66.66%, because I am only interested in those months in which the “master” belief of the
“feelings of control” yields a notable change, and the corresponding percentage of time
that other beliefs yield a similarly strong degree of belief change. To reiterate, I engage
in this process for all three “master” beliefs—the “image of the other” (P1), “strategic
preferences” (I1), and “feelings of control” (P4) beliefs, across all months for all
presidents examined.
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H3: The central “fundamental nature of politics” (P1) and “strategic orientation” (I1)
beliefs evaluated in hypothesis H1 are more likely to remain stable when they do not run
counter to one another.
For hypothesis H3, I first evaluate, in a given month, the degree to which the
“image of the other” (P1) and “strategic orientation (I1) beliefs find themselves in a
greater or lesser “affective spatial distance” from one another (i.e. do they “run counter”
to one another or don’t they, in relation to what might be expected by chance?). When
these beliefs are highly different from one another for a given month, I expect that one or
both of these two beliefs will be more likely to change in the following month so that the
individual will view the world in a more “cognitively consistent” manner across these
beliefs (e.g. at least one of these beliefs will shift so that the individual will: a) both place
more utility in the use of conflict and view the world as a more hostile place; b) both
place more utility in the use of cooperation and view the world as more friendly; or c)
both prefer a moderate strategic approach, and see others as possessing a similarly
moderate disposition). If the belief experiencing the “notable shift” is indicative of a new
overall shift in beliefs, then I expect that the previously stable beliefs will follow suit. If,
however, this shift was a fluke, or was indicative of a temporary shift that did not last
over a month long, then I expect the belief that initially shifted to shift back toward that
of the more stable “central” belief.
In order to test this, here I look only at the two “central,” or “master” beliefs of
interest—the image and strategic preference beliefs. Recall from the earlier discussion of
this hypothesis that it is derived from the expectation that “central” beliefs will tend to
match up—existing and behaving similarly—and that when they don’t, belief systems
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will adapt themselves so that they do.
Methodologically, I first determine instances in which these beliefs run “counter”
to one another by looking at the difference between the values on these two indicators
during a given (“3 month moving average”) month (“image” value – “strategic
orientation” value). This is the only instance in this chapter when I am concerned with
“directional” belief change values. As both of these beliefs operate in a similar
“directional” manner (positive value increases=more positive “affective valence” shifts,
and negative value increases=more negative “affective valence” shifts), and since both
indicators fall on a -1 to +1 scale (where a “one unit” change in one belief value is
equivalent to a “one unit” change on the other), no standardization of values is required.
Even though leaders’ “strategic orientation” values tend to be higher, on the aggregate,
than are their “image” values (as discussed in the previous chapter), the relative
difference is of most interest here, which is not influenced by this fact.
These beliefs are said to “run counter” to one another when the magnitude of the
difference between them for a given month is “high.” I identify this, following the
convention used for the rest of this chapter, as a one standard deviation shift away from
the mean difference between these beliefs for a given month (note that it does not matter
if this is a negative or positive standard deviation shift, as either indicates that they are
notably different from one another). Once these months of “high belief difference” are
identified, I create a dummy variable, where a 1=months of high belief difference (either
a z-score greater than +1, or less than -1), and a 0=months of less extreme belief
differences.
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The second component evaluated in this hypothesis is the dependent variable of
the “stability” of these beliefs. Stability is calculated here as the magnitude of the
absolute change, for each belief, from month t to month t+1, or from “this” month to
“next” month. This is similar to the values used previously in this chapter. However, it
is important to note here that I am interested in the change from this to next month, as I
expect the notable change in one of these beliefs reflecting an attempt to maintain or
achieve “cognitive consistency” to happen in the month following instances in which the
P1 and I1 beliefs “run counter” to one another. Months yielding a lower absolute,
monthly shift are considered to be more “stable” months than are those months in which
higher absolute, monthly shifts occur.
Then, I run two ANOVAs, one examining change on each belief index of interest
(image and strategic orientation), with the dichotomous “belief difference” values (high
or not high) as the factors of interest, and the “absolute monthly belief change” level
(from time t to time t+1) on each belief as the dependent variable. Thus, the first
ANOVA tests the stability of “image” beliefs for the months in which these two beliefs
run counter to one another versus when they don’t run counter to one another, and the
second tests the stability of the “strategic orientation” beliefs for the months when these
beliefs run counter to one another versus when they don’t run counter to one another.
5.3 Results
Here, as will become convention throughout the rest of this project, I will re-state
each hypothesis of interest, and will test each in turn. Thus:
H1: Beliefs more central to policy-makers (image of the other [P1], strategic orientation
[I1], and Feelings of Control [P4] beliefs) are more stable than are less central beliefs.
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Results are shown in Table 5.1. Recall from the methods section my expectations
here—each of the “core” beliefs (image, strategic orientation, and control) are expected
to hold notably greater monthly “absolute belief change” values than will the other, more
“peripheral” beliefs (where significance is determined by a belief falling one z-score
[standard deviation] above or below the across-belief mean belief change score). Notable
values (as defined by a z-score of greater than +1 one or less than -1) are in bold in the
table, and again, are calculated based upon comparison only with relevant beliefs
(philosophical z-scores are based upon mean values across philosophical beliefs only,
etc.). Note that presidential mean absolute belief change values are included in this table,
but are not used for data analysis. They are only included for the reader’s benefit, should
he or she have an interest in these values, and to demonstrate how mean and standard
deviation values of interest are calculated.
To begin, I look at the “philosophical” beliefs. Expectations are that belief
change z -score values on each of the “master” belief indices will be notable and
negative, but in direct opposition to expectations, the image belief (P1: mean absolute
change value = .028, z-score = +1.147) yields notably more monthly belief change, on
the average, than does other “philosophical” beliefs.
This suggests that presidential perceptions of the “fundamental nature of politics” or the
“image of the opponent” are quite variable. The belief change values for the “master”
belief of feelings of control (P4: mean absolute change value = .019, z-score = +.191), on
the other hand, are fairly average here. Neither of these values are even negative, and
thus are far from approaching the expected z-score value threshold of -1.
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Table 5.1: Variability of Belief Z-Scores; Based on “Absolute Belief Change” Values (monthly level of analysis)a, b
a
Note that the basis for these values, and all other analyses in this chapter are the monthly “3 month, moving average” values
discussed in the previous chapter, employed in order to account for months in which insufficient data would lead to outlier values.
b
Bold and italicized beliefs are the “core” beliefs of most interest here, and in other tables.
c
Note that these standard deviation values are based off of the above “Overall Mean” scores alone, and are not an average of the
average standard deviation scores in this column.
Presidential Absolute Change Means
Belief

Kennedy

Johnson

Nixon

Ford

Carter

Reagan HW Bush
Philosophical
0.028
0.030

P1*

0.025

0.033

0.035

0.021

0.023

0.024

0.026

0.028

0.005

1.147

P2
P3

0.022
0.011

0.026
0.013

0.029
0.015

0.020
0.016

0.017
0.014

0.022
0.012

0.024
0.012

0.020
0.009

0.021
0.010

0.023
0.012

0.004
0.002

0.616
-0.552

P4
P5

0.018
0.004

0.024
0.005

0.027
0.006

0.025
0.007

0.014
0.005

0.019
0.004

0.021
0.004

0.013
0.003

0.017
0.003

0.019
0.004

0.005
0.001

0.191
-1.402

I1

0.032

0.030

0.042

0.041

0.026

Instrumental
0.033
0.029

0.026

0.032

0.032

0.006

0.071

I2
I3

0.018
0.064

0.021
0.034

0.029
0.057

0.021
0.037

0.022
0.022

0.022
0.038

0.017
0.045

0.016
0.028

0.024
0.025

0.021
0.038

0.004
0.014

-0.532
0.494

I4a

0.064

0.060

0.084

0.083

0.052

0.066

0.057

0.052

0.064

0.063

0.012

1.941

I4b

0.095

0.058

0.083

0.061

0.055

0.054

0.065

0.042

0.066

0.061

0.016

1.519

I5ap

0.056

0.034

0.056

0.042

0.027

0.036

0.042

0.027

0.038

0.038

0.011

0.313

I5pr

0.020

0.016

0.026

0.017

0.017

0.018

0.022

0.013

0.018

0.018

0.004

-0.834

I5re

0.032

0.025

0.035

0.017

0.029

0.027

0.029

0.016

0.031

0.026

0.006

-0.351

I5op

0.015

0.019

0.018

0.027

0.020

0.021

0.018

0.014

0.013

0.018

0.004

-0.834

I5th

0.008

0.009

0.012

0.012

0.011

0.013

0.008

0.007

0.014

0.010

0.003

-1.196

I5pu

0.026

0.022

0.029

0.020

0.019

0.018

0.018

0.013

0.023

0.020

0.005

-0.592

0.017

c

Overall Philos.
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Clinton

W Bush

Overall Mean

Overall St.Dev.

0.009

Z-Scores

Table 5.1 (cont.)
Overall
Instrum.
Overall
All
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Overall Mean

Overall St.Dev.

0.031

0.017

0.027

0.016

The only “philosophical” belief that yields an extremely stable value in relation to other
philosophical beliefs is the perception of the “role of chance,” (P5) which is based solely on
values for the “predictability of the political future” and “feelings of control” beliefs. Recall
from the previous chapter that the average raw value on this indicator is extremely high. As
such, presidents tend to consistently see the world as a place in which chance plays a significant
role.
Next, I examine instrumental beliefs. The instrumental “master” belief of strategic
orientation yields an unremarkable, positive z-score (I1: mean absolute change value = .032, zscore = +.071). As such, as with the image and feelings of control beliefs, I fail to find support
for hypothesis H1 with the strategic orientation belief. There are two instrumental beliefs that
yield notably more variable belief values than the average instrumental belief, and these are the
two “shift propensity” beliefs—the timing of conflict versus cooperation (I4a: mean absolute
change value = .063, z-score = +1.941) and the timing of words versus deeds (I4b: mean absolute
change value = .061, z-score = +1.519). This suggests that, from month to month, leaders are
prone to yielding either more or less variability in terms of the types of self-references used
(across the categories of conflict versus cooperation and word versus deed references) in a fairly
inconsistent manner. In other words, in some months presidents appear much more consistent in
preferring one strategy over the other (be it a focus on conflict or a focus on cooperation, and of
the use of words or the use of deeds), and in other months they are much less consistent.
In terms of instrumental belief stability, the perceived utility in the use of threats (I5th:
mean absolute change value = .010, z-score = -1.196) is very stable in relation to other
instrumental beliefs. Recall from the previous chapter that presidents tend to place fairly low
utility in this means generally (in relation to others), and this lack of utility appears to be fairly
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stable over time.
Again, this evidence does not support the expectation that “central” beliefs are more
stable than others. In fact, in the case of the “image of the other” belief, it demonstrates quite the
opposite. Thus, I fail to find support for Hypothesis H1, as the data seems to call into question
the notion that more “central” beliefs are more stable than more “peripheral” beliefs, as
hypothesized by Jervis, in terms of operational code beliefs.
Further, if presidents are constantly re-evaluating and adapting their core perceptions of
others, this would seem to fit into a “realist” interpretation of how foreign policy decisionmaking should occur. This is in opposition of the idea that presidents might hold relatively
stable beliefs toward the world, irrespective of changes in the international context. In this sense,
this finding suggests that presidents are at least willing to “learn,” in a fundamental sense, as it is
operationally defined in this project (a change in beliefs following the observation and
interpretation of experiences).
H2: When notable changes occur in “central” beliefs, it will concurrently occur for secondary
beliefs.
Results for the data used to test this hypothesis can be found in Table 5.2. Recall from
the methods section that here I determine instances of “notable, absolute” monthly changes in
beliefs on the “master” or “central” belief indices (image/P1; strategic orientation/I1; feelings of
control/P4), and the corresponding notable changes for other beliefs. The first column here
(“Percentage of all notably high months”) gives the percentage of months examined where each
belief yields a “notable, absolute” shift from one month to the next.
The columns in Table 5.2 with the “belief models” titles (e.g. “Strategic Preference
models”) give the percentage of months in which a notable change (i.e. a z-score greater than +1)
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Table 5.2: High Monthly Absolute Change Correlations (as Percentages)
Percentage
of all
Strategic
Strategic
Image Image
notably
preference Preference
models
- all
high
models
- all
months
Instrumental Beliefs
I1
12.8
----39.7
26.9
I2
12.2
51.7
29.3
17.1
63.9
I3
12
45.9
33.9
39.7
27.7
I4a
12.8
87.2
39.7
26.9
100
I4b
19.5
29.5
10
20.7
1.2
I5ap
17.3
44.3
27
39.7
22.4
I5pr
16.3
27.9
11.6
25.9
9.6
I5re
13.2
24.6
11.4
15.5
2.3
I5op
16.5
47.5
31
31
14.5
I5th
11.4
37.7
26.3
34.5
23.1
I5pu
10.4
47.5
37.1
19
8.6
Philosophical Beliefs
P1
11.8
37.7
25.9
----P2
13.4
37.7
24.3
74.5
87.9
P3
13.2
34.4
21.2
40.2
53.4
P4
18.3
26.2
7.9
22.4
4.1
P5
13
31.1
18.1
41.4
28.4
n
348
61
58

Control Control
models
- all

25.8
25.8
19.4
25.8
27.4
22.6
17.7
19.4
24.2
22.6
25.8

13
13.6
7.4
13
7.9
5.3
1.4
6.2
7.7
11.2
15.4

21
19.4
22.6
--33.9
62

9.2
6
9.4
--20.9

on each relevant “core” belief of interest coincides with a notable change on each additional
belief. The columns titled “belief– all” are a measure of the value in the belief columns minus
the value in the “Percentage of all notably high months” column. A positive value in these
columns indicates that when the core belief of interest yields a notable, absolute change in beliefs
from one month to the next, the belief of interest, as indicated by row labels, yields a higher
percentage of months in which similar, notable changes occur than is the case generally. A
negative value would indicate the opposite.
First, I look at the strategic orientation (I1) index. Again, following from the process
described in the methods section, my expectation for the “Strategic preference models” is that
there will be multiple “peripheral” beliefs, particularly of the “instrumental” variety, that yield a
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notable absolute change in over 50% of the sample of months where the strategic orientation
measure also yields a notable, absolute change. The correlation of 50% was chosen as it would
be a strong, though not insurmountably high threshold.
This threshold is met, in relation to the strategic orientation belief, for the tactical
orientation (I2; 63.9%) and timing of conflict vs. cooperation (I4a; 100%) beliefs. However,
there is a correlation of over 40% for four other instrumental beliefs. Thus, for the strategic
orientation belief, I find a very modest degree of support for hypothesis H2, but this must be
tempered with the knowledge that the strategic and tactical orientation beliefs are similarly
constructed. As such, this correlation is not as notable as that with other beliefs would be. No
philosophical belief yields a notable, monthly shift in beliefs in the strategic orientation model.
For the image (P1) index, I find a notable frequency correlation for the realization of
political values (P2; 87.9%) and predictability of the political future (P3; 53.4%) beliefs. For the
feelings of control variable, I do not find any notable correlations. As such, I find modest
support for the strategic preference and image beliefs on hypothesis H2, but I find no support
regarding feelings of control, given the criteria that I use to evaluate such.
Further, recall that I also include columns here evaluating correlative belief percentages
for notable, absolute changes in relation to months in which “core” beliefs experience a notable
shift in relation to what is seen in the general sample. Though I do not attempt to engage in
hypothesis testing using these numbers, it is notable that there is not a single instance, across any
of the beliefs examined, where the “overall” percentage of months yielding an absolute belief
change is higher than that of the percentage following similar shifts on the “core” beliefs (since
every value here is positive in each “belief – all” entry). Thus, though less important beliefs may
not always yield a “notable” shift following similar “notable” shifts by more central beliefs,
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these shifts do occur here more frequently than they do generally. In fact, the difference here is
typically much greater than 10%, and is frequently greater than 20%. Thus, this finding suggests
that changes in core beliefs do tend to have an impact on “notable” changes in other beliefs,
supporting the general expectations behind hypothesis H2.
H3: The central “fundamental nature of politics” (P1) and “strategic orientation” (I1) beliefs
evaluated in hypothesis H1 are more likely to remain stable when they do not run counter to one
another.
Recall from the hypothesis section that I first determine when beliefs “run counter” to
one another by evaluating the difference between the image and strategic orientation values for a
given month. When they do, I test whether these “core” beliefs experience more belief
variability from month t to month t+1 than would be expected by chance on both belief indices.
Results are shown in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: ANOVA for Absolute, Monthly Belief Change by Degree of Similarity of Image and
Strategic Preference Beliefs

Similar
Beliefs

Mean
Std. Dev.
N

.055
.057
364

Strategic Preference
Change
.061
.059
364

Dissimilar
Beliefs
(counter)

Mean
Std. Dev.
N

.060
.056
135

.071
.074
135

F-Score

.558

2.387

Image Change

**prob<.05
***prob<.001
The first model here examines the “philosophical, master belief” of the “image of the
external political environment.” Findings show that in those months when these beliefs and
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those of one’s strategic orientation are dissimilar to one another, presidential “philosophical”
beliefs do experience a greater shift from this month to the following month (mean=.055) than is
the case in those months when the “P1” and “I1” beliefs are more similar (mean=.060).
However, this difference is not statistically significant at the .05, two-tailed level. As such, I do
not find much support to the idea by Jervis, whereby beliefs cannot stand to run counter to one
another, and will change in instances of disparity so that cognitive balance can be maintained.
The same is also observed for the “strategic orientation” belief, where greater absolute
shifts in this belief occur following months when the disparity between the “P1” and “I1” belief
values are larger (mean=.071), than when they are more moderate (mean=.061). However, this
difference is not statistically significant (F=2.387). Thus, I do not find support for hypothesis
H3.
5.4 Discussion
To summarize the findings of this chapter, first, I do not find support for hypothesis H1,
as the “image” and “strategic orientation” beliefs are not more stable, on the average, than are
more “peripheral” operational code beliefs. On hypothesis H2, I find modest support, as two
more “peripheral” beliefs yield a noticeable change alongside changes in both the “master,”
“instrumental” belief of one’s strategic orientation, and “master,” “philosophical” belief of one’s
“image of the external political environment.” However, I find no support for this hypothesis
regarding “feelings of control,” and the findings for the other measures have to be tempered by
the recognition that the I2 and P2 beliefs are more closely inter-related with their respective
“master” beliefs of interest, from a methodological standpoint, than are others.
And finally, on hypothesis H3, I do not find support for the notion that presidents’ “core”
“image” and “strategic orientation” beliefs are more likely to experience change when they “run
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counter” to one another than when they are more similar.
Ultimately, these results bring into question some fairly accepted ideas, and find support
for others that previously were only argued on the merits of a handful of case studies, largely
driven by subjective analysis. The rest of this dissertation will also be concerned with questions
of this type, and will be addressed in a similar means, and I will begin in the next chapter to
evaluate factors outside of beliefs themselves as a potential influence on beliefs and belief
change.

133

CHAPTER 6: FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INFLUENCES ON U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
LEARNING IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DOMAIN
We have established that U.S. Presidents’ beliefs are malleable and prone to change. But
what is it, beyond predispositions and general psychological tendencies, that accounts for
systematic change in leaders’ beliefs? What roles do factors external to the individual play
toward influencing presidential learning? As discussed in the introductory chapter, this question
is at the core of much research on learning. Here and for the following two chapters, I
empirically address this broad and challenging question. To start off, I will look at the
“everyday” influences on leaders—such as the mood of the public and Congress, the state of the
economy, and the degree of conflict in the international system at a given time—as potential
influences on belief change. In the process, I will evaluate some ways in which leaders might
conceptualize the international environment at a given point in time, and how perceptions
regarding these different “domains” might play a role in influencing beliefs.
6.1 Toward a Multi-Dimensional Approach to Foreign Policy Analysis
We have seen a fair amount of scholarly work explicitly evaluating the impact of
international and domestic factors on foreign policy decision-making and outcomes. For
instance, conventional international relations research is often based on the assumption that state
behavior is determined primarily by one’s own capabilities relative to others, in concert with
other influences stemming from the international system. Included here are debates over
whether states constantly expand and maximize their relative position in an always dangerous
international system (Mearsheimer 2001), or whether they do so only in certain instances and
generally act more cautiously, given that the international context may be one that promotes
“defense” over “offense” at a given point in time (Van Evera 1998; Taliaferro 2000/2001).
Additionally, there are the debates over whether states tend to “balance” against, versus
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“bandwagon” with powerful states or state alliances over the causes of alignment, and over the
instances in which these processes are likely to take place (Duncan and Siverson 1982; Walt
1985).
Conversely, from the “Innenpolitik” (or “domestic policy”) school, we see a focus on the
impact of the domestic factors and characteristics of states on political behavior and outcomes in
the foreign policy sphere. Included here are works evaluating the democratic peace (Ray 1998;
Russett and Oneal 2001), and public (Risse-Kappen 1991; Downs and Rocke 1994; Collier and
Sullivan 1995; Page and Barabas 2000; Sobel 2001) and Congressional (Olson 1976;
McCormick and Wittkopf 1990; Meernik 1993; Schraufnagel and Shellman 2001; Marshall
2003) support levels for the president.
The above works have, in each of these respective areas of interest, helped to promote a
rich understanding of the various “external” influences on foreign policy-decision making and
the results of such. However, no one perspective is enough to fully explain the process by which
the perceptions, decisions, and outcomes broadly associated with the foreign policy process and
foreign policy outcomes develop and change. When an interest group has a disproportionate
influence on a given piece of foreign-policy-related legislation, or when a state’s interests are
unambiguously threatened by a foreign military force, then the aforementioned, singular foci
may well be appropriate to evaluating foreign policy. However, if we wish to evaluate this from
a broader, more comprehensive perspective (for instance, toward evaluating broad policy trends,
and the overall impact of external factors on foreign policy at a given point in time), then such a
narrow perspective may be insufficient.
These narrow foci are understandable. After all, many (perhaps most) political scientists
are interested not in describing reality in all its complexity and nuance, but rather in explaining
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and/or predicting important political phenomena in an intentionally simplified, albeit useful,
realistic, and systematic manner. That is to say, given all the complexities of our political world,
how can we systematically tease out and evaluate important phenomena, as well as the most
relevant causes and effects associated with these phenomena? As such, it makes some sense to
focus on only one factor or level of analysis in the process of providing a simple story regarding
foreign policy processes and outcomes.
However, perhaps we go too far when we attempt to explain foreign policy decisions as
primarily being the function of one given factor, without systematically taking into account
additional potential causal factors (including those from other relevant “levels of analysis”).
This project attempts to address this situation, in part, by looking at the influences of a number of
potentially relevant influences from different “levels of analysis” on one critically important
component of the foreign policy process—the beliefs of key political leaders.
6.2 The Potential Importance of Psychology
In addition to the above, one other, often significant drawback to many analyses of
foreign policy is that they are often rooted in international relations and political science theory
that downplay or ignore psychology. This type of scholarship either by-passes psychology
altogether (“assuming” it away), and/or treats psychological factors principally as a function of a
powerful, mechanistic process whereby exogenous factors have a fairly direct impact on policy
decisions and outcomes. To give an example, the argument for ignoring psychology, from many
evaluating “systemic” phenomena, is that foreign policy occurs within the international system,
within which leaders have to behave as the international system dictates, or risk suffering the
consequences of non-compliance to some expected range of behavior given their position in the
international order. Therefore, leaders are expected, on the aggregate, to behave in a very

136

circumscribed, predictable way. Kenneth Waltz’s (1979) Theory of International Politics
actively claims not to be a theory of foreign policy, but its strict focus on relative state
capabilities and broad shifts in the distribution of power in the international system provides the
theoretical basis for much of the work in this area.
On the other hand, the argument from the “Innenpolitik” view is that foreign policy
influences from domestic interests are powerful, because they largely determine a leader’s ability
to effectively lead his or her country. If leaders act against the will of the public and important
interest groups, then their ability to remain in power may be threatened, as may their likelihood
of retaining the policy support of other viable, domestic social and political groups (such as the
public broadly, as well as the legislature and the military). Of particular interest are certain
prominent interest groups, media outlets, and even individuals who are able to influence leaders
by framing debates, and by making certain interests and ideas much more salient to leaders than
they would otherwise be. The often implicit argument against psychology here is that, similar to
the above argument, leaders are so constrained by the various forces threatening to reduce or
remove their power and influence, that subjective perceptions and preferences are relegated to
having an influence only in those policy areas where the public and interest groups do not hold a
clear interest, or in areas where competing groups may hold opposing interests.
As such, many of the above works tend to by-pass evaluation of leaders and their beliefs,
attitudes, and general biases and predispositions. Political psychologists, however, argue that
this is problematic in the evaluation of foreign policy, as leaders’ psychological characteristics
are critically important. Even if they don’t actively dictate state (or even individual) behavior at
all times, these perceptions and tendencies are argued to act as a kind of buffer between
externally-occurring events and resulting state behavior. This argument states that leaders’
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perceptions provide a kind of filter, or lens, through which “external” phenomena are viewed.
This filter then restricts leaders’ policy preferences and behavior to those phenomena seen as
more important in their subjective, “schematic” interpretations of reality. Certainly, these filters
may be strongly influenced by external factors from both the international and domestic political
realms, but political psychologists would argue that these psychological factors certainly play an
important intervening role between the outside world, and policy behavior.
One perspective that has recognized this issue in the broader international relations
literature is based out of a school of realism called “neoclassical realism.” As noted earlier, it is
assumed by many “structural” realists that the beliefs and perceptions of key decision makers
provide a type of “smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt” between relative material
capabilities and U.S. policy (Rose 1998, 158). But neoclassical realists argue that this is not
necessarily the case. This line of thought starts out similar to that of most other realists: relative
power capabilities and the makeup of the international system are the primary driving forces
behind international outcomes, and more narrowly, states’ foreign policies. From here, however,
neoclassical realists diverge from others in that they dismiss the “smooth transmission belt”
concept, instead arguing that flesh-and-bone humans often misread, ignore, or pay selective and
potentially “irrational” attention to factors that might be expected to impact foreign policy
decisions (Ibid., 156-61). Neoclassical realists argue that over the long-term, foreign policy
behavior will lead to relatively predictable patterns and outcomes. However, in the short- to
middle-term (and specifically in the day-to-day decisions of decision-makers and interactions
between states), the smooth, universal patterns espoused by systemic theories of international
politics may be far from evident.

138

6.3 The Impact of Domestic and Political Factors on Foreign Policy Learning
From this perspective, learning can be viewed as a change in one’s filter, or lens, through
which they view the world and, as already suggested, external events may well lead to changes in
one’s perceptual filter. But what kinds of events lead to this change, and what do these changes
look like? This chapter attempts to address both of the broad issues discussed above, in that I am
attempting to evaluate both international and domestic influences on one critical component of
foreign policy—the evaluation of U.S. presidents’ psychological beliefs toward the international
political world. As such, I hope to provide some systematic, preliminary evidence of how
foreign policy preferences develop and change while one is in office. Though I do not here
address the impact of these various domestic and international factors on actual policy behavior,
this chapter assumes that the evaluation of presidential learning may be an essential precondition to providing more fully specified models that might do so. As such, work in this area
might help to provide the foundations for improved work evaluating the impact of factors on
foreign policy decision making, and foreign policy outcomes.
But what does political psychological scholarship have to say about these questions?
Some early elite-level political psychological works laid out “maps” for understanding the
relationship between factors at these different analytical levels, belief change, and policy
decisions and outcomes (illustrative of this type of work is that of Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein
1969). Further, as discussed at length in the literature review chapter, there are works that focus
on the influence of domestic factors alone, foreign factors alone, or a mix of these factors on
leader psychology (e.g. Jervis 1976; Breslauer and Tetlock 1991; Walker, Schafer, and Young
1998). What is somewhat surprising, however, is that we have not seen much at all in the way of
a systematic, theoretical or empirical assessment of the relative influences of factors in the
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international and domestic domains on changes in leaders’ psychology. Instead, the broad
concept of psychological change itself has only been studied sporadically, often implicitly, and
almost always without systematically focusing on the relative impact of domestic and foreign
factors.
This chapter attempts to provide a preliminary answer to the question of what causes
belief change, by examining factors emanating from both the domestic and international spheres,
through various “policy contexts” or “domains,” which tap into the way that U.S. leaders may
organize and interpret their conception of international politics. Here, as with the rest of this
dissertation, I focus on U.S. Presidents. Due to data constraints, however, I only evaluate
Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush in this chapter.
6.4 Hypotheses/Variables Examined
I evaluate learning here as a directional change in beliefs. That is to say, does some
specified change in values on the independent variables tested lead to a directional change in
leaders’ beliefs.42 An example of this kind of analysis would be examining whether or not
leaders in more hostile international environment are more conflict-oriented regarding the
international political world. Conversely, an evaluation of “absolute” change (not tested in this
chapter) could test whether exposure to a hostile international environment would contribute to a
leader shifting his beliefs toward either an increased preference for conflict or cooperation rather
than maintaining his pre-existing beliefs, irrespective of the directionality of this shift. Thus, I
expect a specific, directional change in presidential beliefs following from the directional
influence of the explanatory variables of interest.
42

This is in opposition to an evaluation of “absolute” changes in beliefs, or changes in belief
values irrespective of the directionality of this change, as I have examined elsewhere (Robison,
Forthcoming) and in the fourth and fifth chapters here (when I examine belief “variation,”
narrowly).
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6.4.1 International Determinants of Belief Change Hypotheses:
The first set of hypotheses is concerned with foreign-based factors. As suggested earlier,
realists and many other types of international relations scholars who study foreign policy might
argue that internationally-based factors more strongly impact leaders’ beliefs than do their
domestically-based counterparts. If we find that this is the case, it would give some credence to
the idea that in the modern political age, politics still “stop at the water’s edge” to a large extent,
and that domestic factors are not allowed to trump foreign influences. Conversely, finding that
domestic factors impact leaders’ beliefs to a greater extent than do their foreign counterparts
would bring into question the degree to which the international political realm is still the
principal influence on U.S. presidential beliefs (assuming that this was ever completely the case).
6.4.1.1: Overall Level of World Conflict (MIDCount)
The first international-level factor that I examine is the amount of conflict existing in the
world at a given point in time. For this, I evaluate the number of militarized interstate disputes
(MIDs) that occur in a given year. For years in which there are more disputes, I infer that there
will be more international conflict perceived by the president. In years in which there are fewer
MIDs, I infer that the president will perceive lower levels of international conflict.
Expectations for this variable are that the president will “learn” to see the world as more
hostile, to be more strongly oriented toward conflict, and to feel lower levels of control over
events in a more hostile, conflictual world. The “hostile image” expectation assumes that change
on this belief is a direct function of changes in the international landscape, and the “conflictual
strategic orientation” expectation is a reflection of the “realist” expectation that leaders are likely
to view conflict elsewhere as a potential threat to both the security of the state, and to the self’s
ability to achieve or maintain control over others. Within this context, “realists” might argue that
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a failure to respond to conflict with a readiness to engage in in-kind conflict (due either to
passivity or due to an “idealist” philosophy that peace can be used to reduce conflict) could be
dangerous. As such, a preference for conflict would be the most likely response to existing
conflict.
Regarding feelings of control, I expect that the president will feel decreased levels on this
indicator when conflict in the world is higher. High levels of conflict should suggest to the self
that he was unable to prevent the onset of conflict through the use of persuasion/diplomacy, or
through the implicit or explicit threat of the use of sanctions. As such, the self’s feelings of
control might change to reflect this “reality.” This expectation is specific to the United States
and other powerful states, as leaders of weaker, or less internationally active states might not
presume to have enough influence to single-handedly prevent the onset of conflicts.
Hypothesis H1: Periods of higher conflict in the world will result in the president shifting his
beliefs toward seeing the world as more hostile, as more strongly preferring conflict, and as
feeling less control over events than is the case in periods of lower conflict.
6.4.1.2: Relative Power Capabilities
To reiterate, the tenets of realism state that relative power capabilities largely dictate state
action. Further, the more “structural” strands of realism suggest that leaders’ beliefs will
necessarily be a “smooth transmission belt” between important external phenomena such as this
and state action. The “relative power capabilities” variable is examined in order to test this
expectation.43 Though I am not testing the notion that there is a direct relationship between U.S.
relative power and U.S. behavior, I am testing the impact of U.S. relative power on changes in
presidential beliefs, in order to provide some preliminary evidence of the impact of levels of
43

However, the inclusion of additional foreign and domestically-based variables reflects my
expectation that this is not the sole influence on presidential belief change.
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relative power on changed perceptions of “the other,” strategic preferences, and feelings of
control over events.44 I evaluate relative “power” by looking at U.S. GDP as a proportion of the
total world GDP (both measured in billions of dollars—this is a yearly measure). This measure
was chosen as GDP seems a good, overall reflection of a state’s potential power as reflected in
its economic strength.
Regarding hypothetical expectations, “offensive realism” suggests that states will seek to
exploit and dominate others as the best means for ensuring security. From this perspective, if a
state fails to act aggressively, then this is typically the result of this state’s inability to act
aggressively. As such, an orientation toward conflict might be viewed as a direct function of
one’s relative power. Expectations for the strategic preference belief follow from this, as in the
“offensive realist” conception, higher levels of relative power will lead to an increased
preference for conflict over cooperation in one’s dealings with the outside world. Additionally,
lower levels of relative power should result in decreased feelings of control, and higher levels of
power should result in increased levels of control. This expectation follows the assumption that
one’s ability to control others is a function of the self’s perceived level of power (which may
typically be a function of one’s actual level of power).
Finally, I expect that lower levels of relative power will result in an increased perception
of the outside world as hostile. This follows from the fact that human beings tend to scapegoat,
and to displace blame when things do not go our way—following the psychological concepts of
the “fundamental attribution error” and “cognitive dissonance” as discussed in chapter 2. For
example, leaders may attribute economic weakness on unfair trade practices by opposing
44

In fact, though this is not tested here, we may find that U.S. relative power impacts
presidential beliefs and U.S. behavior in different ways. If so, then this would give further
impetus to the idea that political psychology is important to take into account beyond the
evaluation of U.S. policy behavior.
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countries that are “jealous” of U.S. power and influence, and their beliefs might turn to anger or
even hatred toward these states. Conversely, when others are weak, given that they would be in
less of a position to act aggressively, the president may expect and perceive these others as
acting in a friendlier manner toward the self.
Thus, I expect that higher levels of relative power operationally defined as the U.S.
proportion of world GDP should be associated with increased perceptions of others as more
friendly, and that lower levels of relative power will be associated with increased perceptions of
others as hostile. This assumption suggests that U.S. presidents are really not so different from
anyone else. If a child performs badly on a test, he tends to blame the unfair question being
asked. When a corporation goes bankrupt, the CEO tends to blame government tax policies, a
fickle public, and unfair behavior by rival firms. I expect that presidents, though different from
the average person in many ways, may not be so different in this manner.
Hypothesis H2: Higher levels of U.S. power capabilities will lead to increased perceptions of the
world as friendly, an increased orientation toward conflict over cooperation, and increased
feelings of control over international political events. Conversely, decreased levels of U.S.
power capabilities will lead to increased perceptions of the world as hostile, an increased
orientation toward cooperation over conflict, and decreased feelings of control over events.
6.4.1.3: Level of Cooperation or Conflict Experienced by the U.S.
The next international factor evaluated is one of the most important, as it structures the
way that the statistical models are evaluated in this chapter, and is the reason why analyses are
restricted to Presidents George Herbert Walker Bush, Bill Clinton, and George Walker Bush
alone. This measure evaluates the overall level of cooperation or conflict experienced by the
U.S. at a given point in time (this data is evaluated at the level of the month). Taken from Gary
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King’s 10 Million International Dyadic Events database, this variable is an aggregation of
“events” targeting the United States—taken from Reuter’s news leads—from 1990 through 2003.
Hypothesized expectations are that presidential beliefs will be impacted by actions
directed toward the U.S. in precisely the same manner that they were in the hypothesis
evaluating the level of overall conflict in the world. That is to say, when the U.S. experiences
higher levels of conflict, the president should begin to see the world as more hostile, and should
“learn” to more strongly advocate conflict as a strategy. This follows from “realist” expectations
that, in order to maintain credibility, to demonstrate strength/resolve, and to help ensure national
security, the U.S. should respond to conflict with an “in-kind” response. Finally, when the U.S.
experiences higher levels of conflict, the president should begin to feel less control over events
as a result of his inability to prevent the onset of conflict.
H3: As the U.S. experiences higher levels of conflict, the president will begin to see the world as
more hostile, will display a stronger orientation toward conflict, and will feel less control over
events than is the case when the U.S. experiences lower levels of conflict.
However, I expect more belief change to occur here than I do from the earlier “overall
level of world conflict” measure, given that those events targeting the U.S. are much more salient
to U.S. leaders than is the general level of conflict in the world at a given time. Thus:
H4: The change in beliefs expected resulting from the level of conflict or cooperation directed
toward the U.S. (Hypothesis H3) will be more pronounced than that resulting from changes in
the overall level of conflict in the world (Hypothesis H1).
6.4.2 Domestic Determinants of Belief Change Hypotheses:
One of the key influences on presidential beliefs in the domestic sphere derives from the
fact that he is an elected servant of the people, and interacts on a daily basis with other elected
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servants. As such, if the president does not effectively fulfill the expectations of the electorate,
then: a) he will not be re-elected if he is in his first term, and/or b) he will have difficulties
getting his preferred policies enacted, because of governmental (particularly, legislative)
constraints. I expect the latter as the Congress is also made up of elected officials, who are held
accountable by their electorate, and who will be less willing to support the policies of an
unpopular president than they will be toward one with the public on his side. Thus, a critical
component of the impact of domestic factors on the president is accountability. Though a
president may get “passes” on certain issues, and at certain times, he is ultimately held
accountable for his actions. Following from this, there is an expectation that presidential beliefs
and behavior will be impacted by the degree of public and Congressional support for his policies.
However, realism suggests that influences from the domestic sphere take a back seat to
international factors. A realist such as Hans Morgenthau (1978) would argue that the public
could have some influence on domestic policy decisions, but is neither informed nor trained to
handle decisions regarding international relations, and should stay out of discussions regarding
such. Some realists might add that, given the weight of foreign policy decisions, leaders realize
this and typically downplay public opinion when making decisions in the foreign policy sphere.
But is this the case or isn’t it, particularly in the post-Cold War world (as evaluated here),
where the “Cold War Consensus,” and fear of nuclear annihilation no longer constrains leaders
in the way that they once did? I address this by testing the impact of domestic factors on
presidential belief change in relation to the impact of international factors.
6.4.2.1: Public Support for the President
As previously mentioned, many hypothesize that public opinion plays a key role in
influencing U.S. policy in the foreign sphere, and there is evidence to support this, particularly in
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the post-Cold War world (Sobel 2001). However, what has received far less attention is the
potential impact of public opinion on the preferences, attitudes, and beliefs of political leaders
such as the president. After all, just because politicians behave in a particular way does not
necessarily indicate that their beliefs and attitudes reflect their behavior. Here I examine the
possibility that public opinion does impact presidential beliefs regarding foreign affairs and the
international political environment. In this sense, I am evaluating whether beliefs regarding
international relations, broadly speaking, can be influenced by explicitly domestically-based
factors that may have little to do with activities taking place in the international political
environment.
Though some have hypothesized that differential levels of public support tend to lead to
increased levels of hostility or peace by states (see Ostrom and Job 1986), the empirical evidence
here is mixed (James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992). Regarding beliefs, I am
unfamiliar with any works suggesting that levels of public support (not types of political
preferences, such as support for or against a specific policy or set of policies) should have an
impact on the type of belief or attitude change that occurs for a political leader. However, it is
possible that a kind of “diversionary” phenomenon occurs for political leaders’ beliefs, in that
leaders may shift their beliefs toward seeing others as more threatening and more strongly
advocate an aggressive stance when public opinion is low, in a conscious or subconscious
attempt to sway public opinion in their favor. If this is the case, then it is possible that lower
levels of public support might result in an increased preference for conflict, and that a coinciding
increase in perceptions of international hostility would also result. Conversely, if leaders tend to
prefer conflict generally (as some “offensive” realists might predict, given that military
exploitation is a potential means to expanding national power), then higher levels of public
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support might result in increased preferences for conflict and perceptions of hostility. Here I
will test these competing explanations.
H5a (“diversionary theory of conflict” hypothesis): When public support levels for the president
are low, the president will begin to see the world as more hostile, and will more strongly prefer
conflict.
H5b (“offensive realist” hypothesis): When public support levels for the president are high, the
president will begin to see the world as more hostile, and will more strongly prefer conflict.
Regarding feelings of control, theorists from the Innenpolitik perspective may expect that
higher levels of public support would equate to greater feelings of control over events than
would be the case when public support levels are lower. This expectation derives from the idea
that the president’s feelings of control abroad may be, in part, a function of the levels of political
capital one possesses at “home.” In other words, do feelings of increased control and confidence
domestically translate into similar feelings abroad, irrespective of the actual international
landscape?
H6: When public support levels for the president are high, the president will feel greater control
over the international political environment than is the case when public support levels are low.
6.4.2.2: House of Representatives Presidential Support/3: Senate Presidential
Support
Expectations for the influence of support levels in the U.S. House of Representatives and
Senate are similar to that of public support, as support from the Congress could either lead the
president to become more or less aggressive depending on whether the “diversionary theory of
conflict” or “offensive realist” expectations are realized. Thus, again there are competing
hypotheses regarding how Congressional support might impact belief change.
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H7a (“diversionary theory of conflict” hypothesis): When Congressional support levels for the
president are lower, the president will begin to see the world as more hostile, and will more
strongly prefer conflict.
H7b (“offensive realist” hypothesis): When Congressional support levels for the president are
higher, the president will begin to see the world as more hostile, and will more strongly prefer
conflict.
6.4.3 Mixed Domestic/International Factors:
Beyond the factors already discussed, there are some potential influences on presidential
beliefs that are more explicitly a mix between international and domestic than are the others
examined here. These are the economic considerations of levels of inflation and domestic
unemployment. The degree to which these factors are perceived as existing in one of the two
“domains” of interest here over the other (i.e. international vs. domestic) are likely to be affected
by the perceptions of the president in office, as well as the specific situation in which these
factors are perceived.45 As such, I will classify these variables as being both internationally- and
domestically-based.
I do not have any expectations regarding the impact of these “mixed” factors relative to
international or domestic ones, as they might be expected by both “realists” and scholars of the
“domestic policy” school to impact beliefs. However, I do have specific expectations for the
type of impact of the economic situation on belief change.
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Initially, given that these factors exist, narrowly, in the domestic sphere, one might be inclined
to classify them as domestic-level influences. However, given the increasingly globalized nature
of international trade and finance, it would be too simplistic to view almost any “domestic”
economic factor as being exclusively domestic in nature. The foreign imposition of barriers to
trade, “dumping” of cheaply made products into the U.S., the buying and selling of U.S.
currencies abroad, and other factors play critical roles toward impacting “domestically”
experienced factors such as U.S. employment rates.
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6.4.3.1: U.S. Inflation Rate
Given the often critical importance of the domestic U.S. economy to local, state, and
national politicians, I was interested in including measures of economic well-being in my models
as an influence on belief change/learning. I ultimately chose two measures, each tapping into
different conceptions of economic well-being. The first is price inflation, a measure of overall
national economic health that reflects the price of goods and services at a given point in time, or
in other words, a measure of how expensive or cheap things are (McMahon 2008). Higher
inflation can cause reductions in investment and savings (as the value of currency goes down
while the cost of things goes up), and reduces the ability of the public at large to buy things.
Both of these potential changes affect economic growth, broadly defined.
The state of the U.S. economy is strongly affected by the actions of other states (due to
these states’ international trade and finance policies, as well as the behavior of these states’
central banks regarding their respective domestic economies), as well as private firms and
investors in other states. Thus, when inflation occurs for the U.S., it does not occur in a vacuum,
as it is the result of factors in both the domestic and international economic spheres. Price
inflation tends to result from monetary inflation, which is an increase in a state’s supply of
money, or from a decrease in the quantity of goods and services available in relation to the
amount of money available to spend on goods and services (McMahon 2008). To give an
example of the domestic and international influences on inflation, governments might respond to
times of economic hardship by printing extra money (a key domestically-based cause of
inflation), but the cause of crisis may stem from deficits in international trade.
I expect that inflation will affect the president both directly (in that he will likely treat the
maintenance of low inflation levels as a general policy goal) and indirectly through the demands
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of others in the state who would be more directly impacted by increases in inflation (via
decreased purchasing power, investment capacity, etc.). Following from this, and from the fact
that inflation is, in part, a function of international influences, I test the possibility that inflation
levels will affect U.S. presidential beliefs toward the international environment.
Hypothetical expectations are that the president will feel pressure to relieve public
concerns regarding inflation, and that the “buck may be passed” to the international environment
as a potential, significant cause of this problem. As such, I expect that the outside world will be
viewed, consciously or subconsciously (and fairly or unfairly), as a major cause of the U.S.
economic dismay. As such, I expect that when inflation is high, the president will “learn” to
view the outside world as increasingly antagonistic and hostile in nature. Further, I expect that
the president will feel lower levels of control when inflation levels are high, given that the
international economy is something that the president will not typically have much control over,
and that this truth will be made particularly salient in times of economic hardship.
Finally, it is possible that the president will respond to this hostility with an increased
orientation toward conflict, for reasons outlined in the descriptions of the “actions targeting the
U.S.” and “level of conflict in the international system” hypotheses discussed earlier. This
reciprocal behavior might be preferred as a means to signaling to the world that aggression, even
of an economic variety, will not be tolerated. However, it is also possible that the president will
respond to higher inflation levels with increased calls for cooperation toward the outside world.
Unlike narrow military/security matters, where presidential actions might be more constrained,
there might be room for more autonomy regarding less serious, economic issues. As such, the
president could choose to respond to potential economic aggression with “carrots” instead of
“sticks,” and this may be seen both domestically and abroad as a legitimate means for dealing
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with such issues, whereas this would likely not be viewed the same way in the security domain.
Given that there are two conflicting potential hypotheses here, I examine the strategic preference
variable here at the 2-tailed level of analysis.
H8: Higher U.S. inflation levels will contribute to increases in presidential perceptions of
hostility and decreased feelings of control toward the international political environment.
H9a (hawkish strategic orientation hypothesis): Higher U.S. inflation levels will contribute to
increases in presidential preferences for conflict.
H9b (dovish strategic orientation hypothesis): Higher U.S. inflation levels will contribute to
increases in presidential preferences for cooperation
6.4.3.2: U.S. Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rate is another measure of economic well-being reflecting the number of
individuals in a state who wish to work, and who can work, yet who are not working due to
businesses being unable or unwilling to hire them. National increases in unemployment can
occur for a number of reasons, including changes in domestic government regulation or taxation
of companies and changes in domestic monetary policy (and the inflation that could result from
this—Block 1981), as well as increased economic competition and changing economic policies
emanating from foreign states. Given that there is often a strong international component to
unemployment in what has become an increasingly economically interconnected world, I expect
that, as with inflation, the president or the U.S. domestic public may view the international
environment as at least a partial cause of the domestic economic woes here. Following from this,
I again expect that a kind of blame-displacement process will take place regarding
unemployment.
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Specific hypothetical expectations for unemployment are similar to those constructed
regarding inflation. That is, I expect that the president will view the world as more hostile and
will feel lower levels of control over international events when U.S. unemployment levels are
high. Again, I have competing, directional expectations for the “strategic orientation” variable,
and thus will examine this factor with competing hypotheses (at the 2-tailed level of analysis).
H10: Higher levels of U.S. unemployment will contribute to increases in presidential perceptions
of hostility and decreased feelings of control toward the international political environment.
H11a (hawkish strategic orientation hypothesis): Higher levels of U.S. unemployment will
contribute to increases in presidential preferences for conflict.
H11b (dovish strategic orientation hypothesis): Higher levels of U.S. unemployment will
contribute to increases in presidential preferences for cooperation.
Note that both inflation and unemployment were evaluated as these are very different
phenomena, and though the two are inter-related, they might each be expected to exhibit
independent effects on the U.S. economy (i.e. there is not always a direct, linear relationship
between the increase in one factor and the increase or decrease in the other). Regarding the
relationship between these two phenomena, Block (1981) states, “many economists believe that
increased inflation can reduce unemployment only when the inflation rate is better perceived by
employers than workers.”46 Further, Block states that inflation may fail to decrease
unemployment, or that it may actively contribute to increases in unemployment. Thus, a change
in one may not result in a direct change in the other, and certainly, different individuals might
more strongly experience the effects of one than the other, in each respective domain.
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Note: source is an online document, and no page numbers are listed.
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6.4.4 Perceptions of the Political Decision-Making Context
As noted previously, the measure examining “actions targeting the U.S.” has an
additional level of importance to this study, as it dictates several of the models examined. That
is to say, I not only evaluate presidential change from one potential policy “domain,” but from
multiple domains, and values on this variable define these “domains.” I define “policy domain”
here as one of multiple potential political environments subjectively perceived by a political
actor. As discussed in chapter 2, at any given point in time, the world can be perceived in any
variety of ways. Political leaders, as everyone else, must thus engage in a process of selectively
focusing on certain components of “reality” over others. Otherwise, the sheer amount of
information would not be psychologically navigable, and these leaders would be unable to
interpret the world or to act in any useful way.
This taps into a core assumption behind much of the work evaluating elite-level political
psychology: we all engage in simplification strategies in order to function in any useful capacity.
Political leaders are included in this group of course, and engage in “shortcuts” in the process of
determining what goes on in the world, and of whom the relevant actors are that they should pay
attention to and deal with. Certainly, as discussed in chapter 3, this lies at the basis of the
operational code concept, but is also relevant in this chapter’s discussion on “policy domains.”
By empirically evaluating the different ways in which the president may perceive the world at a
given point in time, we may gain additional insight as to how presidents “cognitively order” their
political world. That is to say, which “domains” are more salient for political leaders over
others, in terms of having a stronger impact on belief change? In an attempt to address this
question, I test a number of potentially salient “domains” here:
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1) The Domain of Like-Minded Actors: Defined as the behavior of actors who are similar to the
self. Similarity here is operationally defined as two states that hold similar alliance portfolios.
2) The Domain of Dissimilar Actors: Defined as the behavior of actors who are dissimilar to the
self. Dissimilarity here is operationally defined as two states that hold dissimilar alliance
portfolios.
3) The Domain of All Behavior: Defined as all potential “actions” initiated against a state.
4) The Domain of All Cooperative Behavior: Defined as only cooperative “actions” initiated
against a state.
5) The Domain of All Conflictual Behavior: Defined as only conflictual “actions” initiated
against a state.
At a given point in time, leaders might pay more attention to actions emanating from any
one of the domains, or from any given combination of these domains, over others. For this
project, I am interested in whether leaders generally respond in a “realist”-prescribed manner. I
assume that realists would expect leaders to most strongly recognize and respond to “dissimilar”
state actors, and to conflictual behavior initiated by others.
Realism presumes that opposing states will build and shift alliance structures in the
process of achieving a systemic “balance of power.” Though the behaviors of all states are
important to all other states in the realist view, the actions of states in opposing alliances are of
particular interest. Further, realism treats the achievement of state “security” (either narrowly or
broadly defined) as a critical goal in international affairs. As such, more conflictual behavior,
being that which can most readily threaten security, should be viewed much more closely, and
treated much more seriously, than should less conflictual behavior.

155

If the evidence suggests that this is not the case, and that similar states have as much
influence as dissimilar states, or if cooperative actions influence beliefs to the same extent as do
conflictual ones, then we might question the degree to which realism helps us to understand
changes in presidential beliefs. Thus, I will test the following “realist” hypotheses regarding the
influence of other states on U.S. Presidential belief change:
H12 (dissimilar vs. similar states hypothesis): The findings regarding the influence of others’
actions directed toward the U.S. (Hypothesis H3) are stronger when evaluated in the domain of
“dissimilar” state initiated behavior, than when evaluated in the domains of either “similar”
states, or in the general “all actions/all behavior” domain.
H13 (conflictual vs. cooperative actions hypothesis): The findings regarding the influence of
others’ actions directed toward the U.S. (Hypothesis H3) are stronger when evaluated in the
domain of conflictual behavior, than when evaluated in the domain of cooperative behavior, or in
the general “all actions/all behavior” domain (i.e. when all behavior is taken into account).
6.5 Method
6.5.1 Dependent Variable
As with all other empirical chapters in this dissertation, the psychological variables of
interest were determined via content analysis of leaders’ speeches through the Profiler Plus
program (Young 2001). As in the previous chapters and as discussed in the hypothesis section,
we focus here on what are hypothesized to be the three most “central” operational code beliefs.
These are: 1) the image of the international political environment; 2) strategic orientation
concerning the international political environment; and 3) feelings of control over the
international political environment. All operational code data in this chapter was aggregated to
the level of the month—each raw operational code indicator (e.g. Self +1, Other +3, etc.) was
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summed for all speeches in a given month, and the operational code values for each month were
determined based upon these summed values.
For this chapter, I do not use the 3 month, moving averages used in chapters 4 and 5, as I
will control for problematic months here statistically using a generalized least squares (GLS)
model (that is to say, I will account for the heteroskedasticity that will likely result from some
months having more speech information than others).
Once operational code values were determined, I calculated out the degree of belief
change from one month to the next by subtracting the belief value at time t-1 from the belief
value at time t. In other words, for February’s belief value on a given index, I subtract this
belief’s value in January from the belief value in February. By calculating change in this way,
negative values indicate a negative change from January to February, and positive values
indicate a positive change from January to February. Again, in opposition to the way that I often
examine belief change in the preceeding chapter, I do not take the “absolute” values of these
belief change levels. Instead, I am interested here in belief change of the “directional” variety.
6.5.2 International-Level Independent Variables
6.5.2.1 MIDCount
The “MIDCount” variable is an international-level measure used to evaluate the amount
of conflict in the world. This data is a simple count of the total number of militarized interstate
disputes (MIDs) that occurred in a given year. This is a yearly measure whose values I apply to
each month of a relevant year for the purposes of statistical analysis. MIDs were taken from the
Militarized Interstate Disputes V.3.10 database, which is part of the Correlates of War project47
(for more information regarding the MID database, please refer to chapter 3).
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Available: http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID310.html.
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6.5.2.2 U.S. Relative Capabilities
For the “realist” measure evaluating U.S. capabilities relative to the rest of the world, I
use a proxy measure of U.S. Gross Domestic Product (“GDP”--measured in billions of dollars)
divided by World GDP (measured in billions of dollars). As such, this measure evaluates the
percentage of GDP that the U.S. possesses out of the entire world’s GDP at a given point in time.
Though I found monthly measures here for the U.S., I only had access to yearly measures for the
rest of the world. Thus, this measure is evaluated at the level of the year.
The Bureau of Economic Analysis defines GDP as “The market value of goods and
services produced by labor and property in the United States, regardless of nationality; GDP
replaced gross national product (GNP) as the primary measure of U.S. production in 1991”
(http://www.bea.gov/glossary/glossary.cfm). Thus, as discussed in the hypothesis section, this is
a measure of overall national productivity and income, reflecting a state’s economic status. Both
U.S. GDP and World GDP measures taken from the World Development Indicators Online.48
6.5.2.3 Externally Originating Events Targeting/Impacting the U.S.
For the measure evaluating the impact of others’ actions on U.S. presidential beliefs, I
use events data, as taken from Gary King’s “10 Million Dyadic Events” database.49 Information
regarding the nature of this database and how the data are collected can be found in chapter 3.
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Available at: http://ddpext.worldbank.org.libezp.lib.lsu.edu/ext/DDPQQ/member.do?method=getMembers&userid=1&
queryId=6, accessed 9/15/08 ; Values shown are in billions of dollars, and reflect the “current”
U.S. dollar value as of July 2009.
49
Gary King; Will Lowe, 2003, "10 Million International Dyadic Events",
hdl:1902.1/FYXLAWZRIA UNF:3:dSE0bsQK2o6xXlxeaDEhcg== Murray Research Archive
[Distributor]; available:
http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/king/faces/study/StudyPage.jsp;jsessionid=a2bd6a40151a4f29a
a5890d5bc42.dvnInstance1?studyId=505, accessed 04/20/08.
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However, to briefly reiterate, I first restrict out this data to only that targeting the U.S. Secondly,
I restrict out events initiated by foreign state or non-state actors, only. Then, I transform initially
text-based data into numerical values (based largely on the values listed in King and Lowe,
2003) so that they can be interpreted statistically. Following this, I recode all data from
IDEA/WEIS, nominal format into the Goldstein conflict/cooperation, interval-level format,
which ranges from -10 (full out war) to +10 (state integration—see Goldstein 1992 for
information regarding this transformation and these values).
Finally, I aggregate this data together based upon the specific hypothesis being tested.
For instance, I aggregate all events across all actors for all months for evaluation in the “general”
models. However, prior to monthly aggregation, I further filter the data in order to evaluate
specific “policy domains” associated with hypotheses H12 and H13. The following, opposing
policy domains were evaluated: 1) the cooperative versus the conflictual international political
action domains (i.e. I examine the impact of cooperative or conflictual actions alone on the
U.S.); and 2) the similar versus dissimilar state domains (i.e. I evaluate the impact of actions
initiated by state actors from either similar or dissimilar states). I will discuss each of these
respective “policy domains” and how I filtered data to evaluate such following my discussion of
the domestic-level independent variables used. Once each “domain” was determined, I
calculated the average for a given month, and used this value for analysis.
Note that the data evaluated in this measure, as well as the other monthly independent
variables examined here, are evaluated as occurring one month prior to a given dependent
variable observation (i.e. I am examining the 1 month lag of the dependent belief change
variables against independent variable measures). This indicates that for a given month, I am
actually comparing this month’s value for these independent variables against next month’s

159

value for leaders’ change in beliefs. Thus, when I am looking at a change in presidential beliefs
(dependent variable) from November to December, I test the impact of these independent
measures as they occurred in November. Dependent variable lags are used as they help to
explicitly demonstrate the temporal relationship between the independent and dependent
variables. Leaders’ beliefs might require a small time period to adjust to the influence of the
various lagged independent variables of interest, and this lagging take this into account. Further,
some speeches (used to calculate operational code beliefs) evaluated in a given month occur
early in a month, some occur in the middle of the month, and some occur late in the month. By
lagging belief change variables, I reduce the chance that there are any instances where any factor
going into the construction of these explanatory variables occurs following one or more of the
speeches contributing to the value for the latter month of interest in the belief change dependent
variable calculation.
6.5.3 Domestic-Level Independent Variables
6.5.3.1 Public Support Lag
Public approval of the President is included here as a “domestic” determinant of U.S.
presidential operational code beliefs. This measure was taken from the Roper Center for Public
Opinion Research.50 These data reflect evaluations of public opinion polls taken over a span of
multiple days, and were evaluated at non-uniform time periods. That is to say, public opinion
would sometimes be assessed once a month, sometimes multiple times in a month, and
sometimes once for multiple months (usually not more than 2 months would go by without a
survey). As with the operational code belief change measures, I was interested in evaluating this
variable at the level of the month. Thus, when there are multiple public opinion evaluations in a
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Available: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/, accessed July 20, 2008.
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given month, I examine the average of those support numbers as the only measure for that
month. For instances where there was no public opinion evaluation made in a given month, I
treat the average of both the nearest month before and after this month in which an evaluation
had taken place as the public opinion measure for this month.
Given that these measures reflect public opinion over the span of multiple days, in some
instances, a measurement period begins in one month and ends in another. In these cases, if a
public opinion evaluation begins in the last few days out of a given month, and up to the first 3
days of the next month, then I measured this evaluation as reflecting the public opinion measure
of the first month only. If, however, 4 days or more from the second month were included in this
evaluation, then I averaged these numbers into the measures for both the preceding and
succeeding months.
Similar to the “events targeting the U.S.” indicator, values observed on this measure
occur one month prior to dependent variable observations. As such, public opinion results from
January will be examined as it impacts a change in beliefs from January to February.
6.5.3.2 Presidential Support in the U.S. House of Representatives
This measure evaluates the degree to which the president’s stated policy preferences are
shared by members of the House of Representatives in a given year. This data comes from
George C. Edwards’ work on Presidential-Congressional relations.51 I use Edwards’ “overall
support scores” from this database, which for each member of the House of Representatives in a
given year, gives the percentage of votes that match up with those policies for which the
president has openly given support. This was created as an extension and improvement upon
Congressional Quarterly House support scores. These data give the percentage of support for
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Available: http://presdata.tamu.edu/, accessed 07/10/08
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each Congressman, so the overall average evaluated here is really the “average Congressman’s”
support for the U.S. president during a given year. This is a yearly measure, so I had to use each
yearly measure 12 times in my analyses, given that I am evaluating variables at the level of the
month.
6.5.3.3 Presidential Support in the U.S. Senate
This measure is the same as that for the House of Representatives excepting, of course,
that it evaluates members of the U.S. Senate. Thus, this measure is the “average U.S. Senator’s”
support for the U.S. President in a given year.
6.5.4 Mixed International/Domestic-Level Independent Variables
6.5.4.1 Inflation
U.S. Inflation measures were taken from the historical inflation data page on the
inflationdata.com web page.52 This rate was calculated based upon the Consumer Price Index
(CPI-U), which was taken from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
6.5.4.2 Unemployment
U.S. unemployment measures were taken from the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics
web site.53 These data reflect seasonally adjusted unemployment levels for all persons in the
U.S. aged 16 and over.
6.5.5 Policy Domain Determinations
6.5.5.1 Similar versus Dissimilar States
The models evaluating the domain of “similar” versus “dissimilar” states were
determined by first calculating, for each year, every existing state’s “S-Score” in relation to the
52

Available:
http://inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_currentPage
=3, accessed 07/03/08.
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Available: http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet, accessed 07/03/08.
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U.S. The “S-Score” is a measure of the similarity of states’ alliance portfolios. In other words,
how similar, or dissimilar, are the alliance structures held by any two given states?54 Then, states
were rank ordered, so that the 20 states with alliances most similar to the U.S. in a given year
were classified as “similar,” and the 20 states with alliances least similar to the U.S. were
classified as “dissimilar.” Any model here evaluating “similar” states includes only events data
from states with alliance portfolios similar to the U.S. for a given year, and any model evaluating
“dissimilar” states includes only events data from states with alliance portfolios that differ
substantially from that of the U.S. in a given year. Once data is filtered in this way, I aggregate
all “similar” and “dissimilar” data across all relevant actors for each month of interest in the
manner employed in the description of the “events targeting the U.S.” variable.
6.5.5.2 Conflictual versus Cooperative Domains
For models evaluating events in the conflictual versus cooperative domains, I first restrict
out data to focus only on cooperative or conflictual actions directed against the U.S.,
respectively. Cooperative actions are operationally defined as those events given a Goldstein
value of greater than 0, and conflictual actions are operationally defined as those with Goldstein
value less than 0. Actions coded as neutral (0) are not evaluated in these models. Again, I then
aggregate data as described in the “events targeting the U.S.” variable description for all
“cooperative” and “conflictual” events respectively. As discussed in the theory section, this is
done in order to test whether presidential beliefs are more strongly influenced by conflictual acts
alone than they are by all acts together, or by cooperative acts alone.
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“S-Scores” were taken from Bennett and Stam’s Expected Utility Generation and data
management program (“EUGene”), available: http://www.eugenesoftware.org/. These scores
reflect Signorino and Ritter’s (1999) “rank order correlation for two states’ alliance portfolios”
(Bennet and Stam, 2007: 16).
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6.5.6 Statistical Methodology
Given that I am using time-series data where serial autocorrelation is a potential problem,
and given that I do not assume a uniform distribution of error terms across the samples
evaluated, all statistical tests in this chapter are examined using heteroskedastic generalized least
squares (GLS) regression analyses. In this model, I correct for heteroskedasticity caused by the
uneven amount of speech material available from month to month across the presidencies
examined (using the “panels(h)” command). The models run also account for potential firstorder autocorrelation. Panel-specific autocorrelation coefficients (rho) are calculated for each
presidential administration examined. Presidential dummy variables were included to evaluate
the impact of each president on overall findings. Given that the events data of interest here only
range from 1990 through 2004, George Herbert Walker Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush
are the only presidents examined. George H.W. Bush provides the excluded variable in these
analyses. For models evaluating similarity of alliance structures, only George H.W. Bush and
Bill Clinton are used, as I did not have access to alliance similarity data after the year 2000 (thus,
only the presidential dummy for Clinton is included here). Pseudo R-Squared values are
obtained by calculating predicted values on the dependent variable for each GLS model,
correlating predicted with observed values, and squaring these values.
6.6 Results
Given that all variable-specific hypotheses apply similarly to each of the models tested, I
will not re-state those hypotheses here. Results for the general, all actions models can be found
in Table 6.1.55 These are the results contained in the “All Actions” columns. In none of the
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The majority of the coefficients in this chapter are evaluated at the 1-tailed level of analysis,
and thus I will only note instances where variables will be evaluated at the 2-tailed level of
analysis. All directional expectations are noted in corresponding tables next to variable names.
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belief models examined (i.e. the image, strategic orientation, and feelings of historical control
models) are any of the independent variable coefficients examined statistically significant. That
is to say, none of the variables examined (be they foreign, domestic, or “mixed” in nature) yield
an expected impact on operational code belief change on any these indices beyond what would
be expected by chance. Further, for the “image” and “feelings of control” models, expectations
regarding the directional impact of the variables examined are not observed, though most
variables do yield at least a directionally anticipated impact on belief change in the strategic
orientation model. Ultimately, no support is given to any variable-specific hypothesis in the “all
actions” models (hypotheses H1 through H11).
Though this preliminary evidence suggests that these models might not capture some of
the systematic influences on belief change, I am still interested in testing whether actions
targeting the U.S. might be more or less important based upon the “policy domain” potentially
being perceived by presidents. Recall the two “domain-specific” hypotheses:
H12 (dissimilar vs. similar states hypothesis): The findings regarding the influence of others’
actions directed toward the U.S. (Hypothesis H3) are stronger when evaluated in the domain of
“dissimilar” state initiated behavior, than when evaluated in the domains of either “similar”
states, or in the general “all actions/all behavior” domain.
H13 (conflictual vs. cooperative actions hypothesis): The findings regarding the influence of
others’ actions directed toward the U.S. (Hypothesis H3) are stronger when evaluated in the
domain of conflictual behavior, than when evaluated in the domain of cooperative behavior, or in
the general “all actions/all behavior” domain (i.e. when all behavior is taken into account).
Results for models examining the impact of similar and dissimilar states, respectively, are
contained in Table 6.1. For the image and strategic orientation “similar states” models, again, no
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coefficient examined is a statistically significant predictor of monthly operational code belief
change. That is to say, when only the actions of states with similar alliance portfolios to the
United States are taken into account, I am unable to account for any important, systematic causes
of belief change in the models examined here. In the “feelings of control,” “similar states”
model, I find that the “actions targeting the U.S.” measure is modestly significant in the expected
direction, at the one-tailed level of analysis (t=1.51, prob<.10). What this means is that when
only states similar to the United States are examined, more cooperative actions toward the U.S.
result in belief change toward increased feelings of control. Conversely, more conflictual actions
toward the U.S. result in decreased feelings of control, when the impact of similar states alone is
examined. Thus, post-Cold War presidents seem to be notably influenced by their “friends.” If
the U.S. receives criticism from, or is the target of conflictual actions by its allies, presidents
seem to feel that they have less control over international events, broadly defined. However,
when allies are praising the U.S., or are attempting to provide her with help and support,
presidents tend to feel that they have greater control over events. No other variable is
statistically significant in the “similar states,” “feelings of control” model. Thus, some support is
found for hypotheses H3 and H4 in this model, but no support is found for any other variablespecific model in any of the “similar states” models.
The “dissimilar states” models in Table 6.2 examine the influence of only those actions
initiated by states with dissimilar alliance portfolios to the U.S. For the image, strategic
orientation, and historical control models, no variable examined yields a statistically significant
impact on presidential belief change. Based on the pseudo R-squared values, not only are
findings in the “dissimilar states” models worse predictors than the “all actions” models, but they
are worse predictors than the findings in the “similar states” models, as well. This runs against
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Table 6.1: Factors Influencing Presidential Learning 1 (All Actions and Similar/Dissimilar States Models)

All Actions
(+)
Similar
States (+)
Dissimilar
States (+)
MIDCount
(-)
U.S. Rel. GDP
P1/P4 (+); I1 (-)
Public Support
House Support
Senate Support
Inflation
(-), except I1
Unemployment
(-), except I1
Clinton
Dummy
W. Bush
Dummy
Constant
N
R-Squared

Image of the External Environment
All
Dissimilar
Similar States
-0.01
----[0.23]
----0.015
----[0.40]
-----0.023
----[0.85]
----0
0
-0.001
[0.14]
[0.01]
[0.20]
-0.124
0.07
0.063
[0.11]
[0.06]
[0.05]
0.001
0
0
[0.94]
[0.25]
[0.22]
0
0.001
0
[0.09]
[0.17]
[0.04]
-0.002
-0.002
-0.001
[0.72]
[0.59]
[0.39]
-0.005
-0.002
-0.002
[0.26]
[0.13]
[0.10]
0.01
0.004
0.01
[0.35]
[0.12]
[0.28]
0.043
0.023
0.045
[0.46]
[0.23]
[0.45]
0.047
----[0.44]
-----0.003
-0.036
-0.041
[0.01]
[0.07]
[0.08]
165
131
131
0.007
0.008
0.002

All
0.01
[0.21]

Strategic Orientation
Dissimilar
Similar States
----0.011
[0.29]

---------0.001
[0.37]
-0.724
[0.61]
0.002
[1.38]
0
[0.14]
-0.002
[0.70]
-0.004
[0.24]
0.001
[0.03]
0.053
[0.56]
0.079
[0.70]
0.152
[0.31]
165
0.014

*prob<.10
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----0
[0.15]
-0.238
[0.20]
0.002
[1.35]
-0.001
[0.22]
-0.001
[0.45]
-0.003
[0.19]
0.016
[0.45]
0.065
[0.67]

--------0
[0.02]
-0.001
[0.21]
-0.269
[0.22]
0.002
[1.36]
-0.001
[0.25]
-0.001
[0.40]
-0.004
[0.21]
0.016
[0.46]
0.066
[0.67]

-----0.087
[0.17]
131
0.021

-----0.067
[0.13]
131
0.015

Historical Control
All Actions
-0.004
[0.27]
--------0
[0.21]
0.008
[0.02]
0
[0.76]
0
[0.17]
-0.001
[0.86]
-0.001
[0.09]
0.002
[0.26]
0.001
[0.03]
0.005
[0.13]
-0.007
[0.05]
165
0.004

Similar States
----0.018
[1.51]*

Dissimilar

----0
[0.55]
0.111
[0.28]
0
[0.64]
0
[0.13]
-0.001
[1.11]
-0.001
[0.11]
0.004
[0.35]
0
[0.01]

---------0.004
[0.46]
0
[0.20]
0.064
[0.16]
0
[0.66]
0
[0.08]
-0.001
[0.75]
-0.001
[0.22]
0.006
[0.50]
0.006
[0.19]

-----0.062
[0.36]
131
0.014

-----0.037
[0.21]
131
0.005

Table 6.2: Factors Influencing Presidential Learning 2 (All, Conflictual, and Cooperative Actions)

All Actions
(+)
Cooperative
Actions (+)
Conflictual
Actions (+)
MIDCount
(-)
U.S. Rel. GDP
P1/P4 (+); I1 (-)
Public Support
House Support
Senate Support
Inflation
(-), except I1
Unemployment
(-), except I1
Clinton
Dummy
W. Bush
Dummy
Constant
N
R-Squared

Image of the External Environment
Cooperative
Conflictual
All
A-0.01
i
A --i
A --i
[0.23]
----0.001
----[0.02]
-----0.011
----[0.30]
----0
0
0
[0.14]
[0.10]
[0.11]
-0.124
-0.117
-0.072
[0.11]
[0.10]
[0.06]
0.001
0.001
0.001
[0.94]
[0.92]
[0.90]
0
0
0
[0.09]
[0.11]
[0.10]
-0.002
-0.002
-0.002
[0.72]
[0.80]
[0.74]
-0.005
-0.004
-0.004
[0.26]
[0.23]
[0.24]
0.01
0.009
0.01
[0.35]
[0.31]
[0.33]
0.043
0.04
0.042
[0.46]
[0.43]
[0.45]
0.047
0.05
0.045
[0.44]
[0.45]
[0.41]
-0.003
-0.006
-0.043
[0.01]
[0.01]
[0.09]
165
165
165
0.007
0.008
0.007

All
A0.01
i
[0.21]

Strategic Orientation
Cooperative
Conflictual
A --i
A --i
--0.065
[0.87]

---------0.001
[0.37]
-0.724
[0.61]
0.002
[1.38]
0
[0.14]
-0.002
[0.70]
-0.004
[0.24]
0.001
[0.03]
0.053
[0.56]
0.079
[0.70]
0.152
[0.31]
165
0.014

-----0.001
[0.28]
-0.751
[0.64]
0.002
[1.19]
0.001
[0.18]
-0.002
[0.67]
-0.004
[0.26]
-0.002
[0.05]
0.049
[0.52]
0.068
[0.60]
0.013
[0.03]
165
0.017
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------0.005
[0.13]
-0.001
[0.41]
-0.748
[0.63]
0.002
[1.38]
0
[0.13]
-0.002
[0.68]
-0.004
[0.26]
0.002
[0.05]
0.055
[0.59]
0.078
[0.69]
0.171
[0.34]
165
0.015

Historical Control
Cooperative
Conflictual
All Actions
A
i
A --i
-0.004
--[0.27]
----0
----[0.00]
-----0.01
----[0.78]
----0
0
0
[0.21]
[0.26]
[0.23]
0.008
0.01
0.046
[0.02]
[0.03]
[0.12]
0
0
0
[0.76]
[0.74]
[0.67]
0
0
0
[0.17]
[0.20]
[0.18]
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
[0.86]
[0.96]
[0.82]
-0.001
0
0
[0.09]
[0.06]
[0.08]
0.002
0.002
0.002
[0.26]
[0.21]
[0.26]
0.001
-0.001
0.001
[0.03]
[0.02]
[0.04]
0.005
0.005
0.001
[0.13]
[0.15]
[0.04]
-0.007
-0.007
-0.041
[0.05]
[0.04]
[0.26]
165
165
165
0.004
0.004
0.012

expectations that presidents will pay closer attention to the events initiated by rivals than they
will that of peers. Thus, I do not find any support to hypothesis H12, nor do I find support for
any of the variable-specific hypotheses examined in the “dissimilar states” models.
The final set of models examined looks at the impact of the domains of “conflict” and
“cooperation” on presidential beliefs. Again, I expect that conflictual actions will be more
salient influences on changes in presidential beliefs than will either cooperative gestures, or all
actions taken together. As such, when viewing the impact of conflict events alone, I expect to
find a stronger expected relationship between the relative tenor of these conflict acts in a given
month (ranging from extremely conflictual to only modestly conflictual) and resulting belief
change than when only cooperative actions are examined, or when all actions (conflictual,
cooperative, and neutral) are examined together. Results can be found in Table 6.2.56
In the “cooperative actions” models, there are again no significant coefficients as
influences on presidential learning in any of the three models examined. However, there
similarly are no significant coefficients in any of the “conflictual actions” models. In both sets
of models, the directionality of findings is also often contrary to expectations, as found with
previous models examined. As such, I do not find support for hypothesis H13, nor do I find any
support for the variable-specific models in any of the “cooperative” and “conflictual actions”
models.
6.7 Discussion
This chapter shows that neither the domestic- nor foreign-based factors tested have a
notable influence on presidential belief change in the manner evaluated here. Further, beyond
56

Note that I have re-entered the results from the “all actions” models in Table 6.II for easy
comparison with the new results presented here.
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the lack of findings regarding specific variables of interest, these results do not give clear support
to the expectation that any of the five “domains” evaluated have a predictable, blanket influence
on the impact of the factors examined over competing “domains.” Ultimately, none of the
hypotheses presented are given strong support, and beyond this, given the lack of statistical
significance for specific coefficients and the low pseudo R-Squared values across the models
evaluated, the data do not give us much of an indication of what might be wrong about these
hypotheses.
Based on these findings (or more appropriately, on the lack thereof), I cannot say if
beliefs are simply incredibly stable relative to the other factors examined, if they change in an
unsystematic way, or if they change in ways that would be captured by the inclusion of variables
not included in these models (as would be the case if model mis-specification is taking place
here). Thus, it may be that this chapter helps to demonstrate that elite-level psychology is truly
important to take into account, in that changes in beliefs do not logically follow from the
influence of important foreign and domestic phenomena. These types of changes would be
expected if a clear, direct impact on state actions and the beliefs of key decision-makers took
place in the “smooth, transmission belt” conceptualization of leaders, as held by structural
realists. However, it is also possible that these models simply do not include the relevant
influences on belief change that do exist in the domestic and international domains. If true, then
these findings do not tell us much at all, beyond the fact that these models need to be reconsidered, re-constructed, and re-evaluated. Whatever the case, the lack of findings is an issue
that requires additional research before a clear answer can be given as to its cause.
One further reason for the lack of findings may be that the normal, day-to-day influences
on leaders are just not enough to warrant notable belief change, but that uncommon, traumatic
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events might provide the impetus necessary for beliefs to change in a significant manner. The
next two chapters test this possibility by examining the potential impact of crisis events on belief
change.
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CHAPTER 7: THE INFLUENCE OF CRISES ON PRESIDENTIAL LEARNING
IN THE IMMEDIATE AND LONGER TERM
In the previous chapter, we evaluated a number of influences on presidential learning, but
of course, those are not the only factors that might influence learning by the president. In fact,
the most drastic changes in leaders’ beliefs regarding the international political environment may
well occur not when the public mood or broad “color” of U.S. affairs with others methodically
shifts one way or another, but rather when major “shocks” to leaders’ belief systems take place.
The events of 9/11 were clearly amongst the most influential events on U.S. foreign
policy in recent years. They fundamentally shifted our nation’s priorities, leading to what
Gaddis (2005) called “the most sweeping redesign of U.S. grand strategy since the presidency of
Franklin D. Roosevelt” (2). 9/11 provided the impetus for the White House’s initiation of the
2003 war in Iraq, and in the process, brought into the popular lexicon the notion of the “preemptive” war. Apart from the policy changes that took place following 9/11, however, these
attacks appeared to impact U.S. President George W. Bush in a particularly striking manner—
fundamentally altering his conception of the nature of the political universe, and making Bush a
much more interested and involved player in the foreign policy scene than he was previously.
Similar arguments could be made for Kennedy following the failed Bay of Pigs incident,
for Jimmy Carter following the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage ordeal,
and for Bill Clinton following the “Battle of Mogadishu.” These events each seemed to
fundamentally alter each leader’s conception of either the international environment broadly
defined, the U.S.’s role in world affairs, or a combination of these two factors. Stern (1997)
reflects this with the following:
Experiencing crisis tends to change the way people think, in important ways. Crisis
experience often entails the challenging of tacit or explicit beliefs about adversary actors,
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the character of the environment (social and physical) and the adequacy of existing
organizational and political arrangements designed to cope with that environment (73).
Further, he argues:
. . . there is good reason to believe that crisis has the potential to speed up learning and
diffusion processes due to . . . situational attributes . . . such as the focusing of political
attention and broadening of attentive publics, both of which are likely to produce political
and psychological accountability effects (74).
The questions I address in this chapter come from an understanding that crises often
appear to have a notable and sudden impact on beliefs. These questions are: is there some
systematic process by which leaders’ beliefs change following these “crisis” events? And if so,
what is this process, how enduring might these changes be, and what does this ultimately say
about presidential learning?
7.1 Foreign Policy Crisis Defined
Before I go any further, let us evaluate what a “foreign policy crisis” is specifically.
Among the most important works on foreign policy crises is Charles Hermann’s (1969)
pioneering study, appropriately titled Crises in Foreign Policy. Here, Hermann engages in a
comprehensive literature review of crisis evaluation in political science scholarship (in his
second chapter, “The Concept of Crisis”), and usefully breaks these definitions into two broad
categories. The first of which is “Crises as Turning Points.” This is the evaluation of crises as
“the critical turning or branching point in some human activity,” which is “analogous to the
[definition of crisis used] in common medical usage” (21). Here, there is uncertainty and some
form of “rapid and sudden change” that has the potential to disrupt the status quo. Hermann then
evaluates this form of crisis from the specific standpoint of international relations research, and
states that “the use of crisis as a critical turning point often refers to a specific kind of change—
sudden variations in the level of conflict or in the intensity of hostilities which could lead to
conflict” (22). An example of a crisis turning point given by Hermann is the Korean War, which
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was a “turning point” in that it led to the U.S. and its Western allies drastically increasing
defense spending, something that continued on long after the aftermath of the Korean conflict
(23-24).
Hermann suggests that this manner of crisis evaluation has pros and cons. On the
positive side, it is useful in the “systems approach” to international relations theorizing. That is
to say, the turning point perspective is useful toward addressing the “big picture” of interstate
relations, including the evaluation of “various patterns of interaction among the relevant actors in
the world” (28). However, this perspective has notable drawbacks, as well. First off, it “does
not explain what constitutes a crisis, but only where, in a temporal and spatial dimension, it takes
place” (27). Nor does it explain why the crisis occurred to begin with. As such, it is not very
useful in evaluating “internal,” foreign policy decision-making processes. An additional, related
drawback is that this form of crisis evaluation is typically only useful in hindsight, and thus
cannot predict crises very well given that until a crisis occurs and its effects have been realized,
we cannot know if it is a “critical turning point,” or something less significant.
In opposition to the turning point approach, Hermann describes the second category of
crisis research as “crises as traits or characteristics” (24). Here, crises are evaluated in terms of
either their intrinsic traits, or in terms of the traits of those that are directly impacted by such.
The advantage to evaluating crises in this way is that it may be useful in prediction, in that it
does allow for foreign policy analysis in terms of states influencing, or being influenced by
crises. Further, though this form of crisis evaluation is narrower in its scope than is the turning
point perspective, here we benefit from possibly knowing a crisis when we see it, without having
to wait for historical hindsight.
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For this project, I evaluate crises following from Hermann’s latter category, and below I
will discuss the concept of “crisis” as evaluated here, as well as how these crises might be
expected to influence U.S. Presidential beliefs when encountered. Hermann (1963)
conceptualizes a crisis as an event that: “(1) threatens high-priority values of the organization,
(2) presents a restricted amount of time in which a response can be made, and (3) is unexpected
or unanticipated by the organization” (64). Though crises had been studied prior to Hermann’s
work, most definitions ignored the second and third components of his definition, while often
including excess, symptomatic criteria (which Hermann frowned upon). Hermann’s definition
was valuable in that it was logical and intuitive, while at the same time theoretically
parsimonious, eliminating the “fat” that characterized other trait-level definitions.
Though Hermann’s definition was quite useful for researchers wishing to ground crisis
evaluation in a clear, conceptual base, not all researchers were happy with this conceptualization.
These individuals felt that the focus on purely external events and failure to take into account the
possibility of armed conflict, among other factors, led to the conceptualization of an improperly
specified phenomenon. That is to say, some events might be included here that should not,
according to these authors, be considered a true “foreign policy crisis,” whereas others that
should be included would not be. As such, in the mid-1970s, Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000)
developed an updated definition that they believed avoided the trappings of Hermann’s crisis
concept. They characterized a crisis (for a state) as:
. . . a situation with three necessary and sufficient conditions deriving from a change in
the state’s internal or external environment. All three are perceptions held by the highest
level decision makers of the state actor concerned: a threat to one or more basic values,
along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened
probability of involvement in military hostilities. (3, emphasis in original)
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This definition differs from Hermann’s in 5 distinct ways:
. . . (1) the omission of surprise as a necessary condition; (2) the replacement of “short”
time [or “restricted” time in the definition by Hermann cited above] by “finite” time for
response; (3) the recognition that a crisis might originate in the internal, as well as the
external, environment of the crisis actor; (4) the concept of “basic values,” rather than
“high-priority goals,” as the object of perceived threat; and (5) the addition of “higherthan-normal probability of involvement in military activities (hereafter, war).” (Brecher
and Wilkenfeld 2000, 3)
They go on to emphasize that the probability of war, in the mind of the crisis actor, must be
“qualitatively higher than the norm in the specific adversarial relationship,” and that a change in
the probability of conflict, rather than the absolute level of conflict probability, is a crucial
component of crisis occurrence (3). That is to say, even if the probability of war with a state is
very high, this only qualifies as a crisis if this probability is an increase from some prior point in
time.57 For this project, I evaluate this form of crisis, updated by Brecher and Wilkenfeld from
Hermann’s earlier work.
It is important to reiterate that both Hermann and Brecher and Wilkenfeld treat crises not
as some “objective” event that occurs in a vacuum, but rather as an occurrence that impacts
relevant actors’ perceptions regarding the threat to their “values.” This is important to keep in
mind when evaluating the impact of these phenomena on beliefs.
7.2 The Impact of Crises on Foreign Policy Decision-Making
But what has work on crises discovered, in terms of their impact on decision making?
Hermann’s (1963) earlier work, though primarily concerned with how crises could hinder
organizational responses to these crises, formed a number of interesting propositions concerning
the behavior of an organization’s units following crisis exposure. For instance, he suggested that
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Note: Brecher and Wilkenfeld also develop a definition for “international crisis” (i.e. crises
which threaten the structure of international politics), but as this is not the focus of this project,
this type of crisis will not be addressed here.
176

crises would tend to lead to “withdrawal” behavior (such as decreased production, increased
absenteeism, etc.—pg. 66), and that the number of information/communications channels in a
time of crisis were likely to be reduced (68). Of specific interest to this study, however, is his 4th
proposition, which states that in crises there is “a tendency toward contraction of authority” (70).
By “contraction of authority,” he meant that authority would be held in the hands of a few at the
top of the command hierarchy. Following this, Hermann suggests that the “authority units” in
control following this contraction begin to feel the bulk of the stress caused by the crisis, well
beyond that experienced by other organizational units (71). He goes on to quote Richard Meier
when he writes, “a crisis occurs when stress ‘reaches a peak in the executive level’” (Meier,
quoted in Hermann 1963, 71). Hermann also discusses stress as a response to, rather than as a
component of, crises.
Following from Hermann’s definition, a crisis is expected to have a significant effect on a
leader by increasing his stress level. However, Hermann’s work, as well as that of most others
evaluating crises, examines the impact of these occurrences on decision-making and outcomes in
the very short term—that is, the steps that individuals or members of impacted organizations take
toward managing or coping with these specific crises (Blight 1990; George 1986; Hermann
1963; Kuklan 1988). Other works are concerned with how state behavior changes following
crisis exposure (Hermann 1990). Here, I am not concerned with how a leader handles a given
crisis, or even with how individual or state behavior changes following a crisis. Instead, in this
chapter, I am interested in the impact of crises on presidential belief change.
Though not abundant, there are a few notable works that have addressed belief change, or
“learning,” from foreign policy crises. For instance, Blight and Welch (1990) argued that the
Cuban Missile Crisis actually created a “Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ of crisis management which
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accompanied the advent of mutual vulnerability,” and that this caused the superpowers to learn
“a great deal” (319). In this sense, foreign policy crises are viewed as having the same impact as
experiencing a “natural disaster” (Stern 1997, 74). Stern states:
As a result, crisis experience may have important implications for the realignment of
threat images or scenarios in the cognitive worlds of decision-makers and mass publics.
Actors or structural processes traditionally deemed benign can be perceived as malignant
or dangerous as the dust of crisis settles. Threats which had been previously considered
marginal may take-over central positions on the policy stage, for a time. (74)
Lebow (1981) similarly argues:
Crises can . . . put interstate conflicts into sharper focus by providing insights into the
state of mind and objectives of the protagonists. Acute crises also produce a kind of
collective trauma in that they confront leaders on both sides with serious threats to their
personal and national interests and are likely to leave them somewhat shaken even after
the successful mastery of such challenges. Both characteristics of crisis can act as
catalysts prompting reassessment of the basic premises of a nation’s foreign policy. (309)
Thus, crises may serve to demonstrate to leaders that existing conceptions of the political
world are incorrect, or are inappropriate for understanding and dealing with potential threats.
Other “longer-term” results of crises, as laid out by Oneal (1982), include the potential
alteration of: one’s image of the opponent (303--discussed further below); goals, policies, and
commitments (306); coalitions of policy making (310); and institutions of policy making (311).
Oneal argues that each of these is influenced in a systematic way following crisis exposure,
based upon pre-crisis and crisis-based factors. Take, as one example, the “coalitions of policy
making.” Oneal argues that one’s cabinet might be “reshuffled” following a crisis, based upon
who had better anticipated the potential for this crisis prior to its occurrence. He gives the
example that, as the Soviet Union presented itself as a real threat, Truman gave promotions to his
advisors who warned him of such a possibility early on. The same could be argued for President
Bush, and the post-9/11 favor shown toward “hawks” such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul
Wolfowitz (whose worldviews might have expected the 9/11 terrorist attacks) over “doves” such
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as Colin Powell (whose more optimistic worldview might not have meshed with Bush’s
perception of a post-9/11 world).
As a further example of how learning affects the “institutions of policy making,” Oneal
argues that “crises result in the growth and proliferation of forums for deliberation and decision
in the executive branch” (311). This follows from the fact that principal decision makers tend to
value increased “consultation and coordination” following a crisis. Again Oneal gives the
example of Truman, and again there are parallels with the Bush Administration and the
restructuring of the U.S. intelligence community following its failure to anticipate 9/11.
Many of the longer term changes in policy preferences and outcomes (in terms of the
policy-making structure, the individuals involved in policy-making, and the content of policy)
following crisis occurrence is expected to stem directly from the components of the crisis itself
(i.e. its origins, its characteristics, the crisis outcome, etc.). However, a further impetus for these
changes may be the intervening variable of public support. This is discussed to some extent in
the preceding chapter, but regarding crises specifically, Stern (1997) suggests:
Factors such as the magnitude of the stakes involved, the stage at which awareness of
accountability occurs and the presence or absence of norms promoting critical thinking
are thought to play an important role in determining to what extent heightened
accountability will lead to enhanced cognitive complexity in decision-making (75).
In other words, when the environment is ripe for such, crises may have a powerful impact on
leaders due to the role of accountability, which may facilitate more efficient decisions (defined
as an increase in the “cognitive complexity” that leaders exhibit).
Thus, crises are expected not only to impact the immediate crisis decision-making
context, but also leaders’ longer-term beliefs, the broader policy-making environment, and policy
itself in the longer term. Here, I am focusing on leaders’ beliefs, and the potential systematic
influence of crises on these beliefs.
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7.3 Evaluating Crises and Learning
For this project, I evaluate crises in the manner conceptualized by Brecher and
Wilkenfeld (2000). Recall that these authors define a crisis as “a threat to one or more basic
values, along with an awareness of finite time for response to the value threat, and a heightened
probability of involvement in military hostilities” (3).
Regarding the evaluation of beliefs, as with the rest of this larger project, I employ U.S.
Presidents’ operational code belief systems, taken from the content analysis of their speeches via
“Profiler Plus.” As with the previous two chapters, I am restricting my analysis to the more
significant operational code beliefs that are hypothesized to structure leaders’ overall
worldviews. Thus, I will test the influence of foreign policy crises on the “master” beliefs of the
image of the international environment (P1), strategic preferences for dealing with the
international environment (I1), and feelings of control in the international system (P4) for U.S.
Presidents from John F. Kennedy through George W. Bush (1961-2003).
In chapter 6, though I examined learning throughout three separate presidential
administrations, I was really examining learning from month to month. That is to say, “do the
phenomena that I encounter today influence leaders’ beliefs in the very near future, and do the
influences in the near future affect their beliefs in the following month?” One notable change in
this chapter is that I am not evaluating “learning” in this manner. Rather, I am examining
learning over long-term “chunks” of time. That is to say, “do crises affect leaders’ beliefs over
the period of several months, or even throughout presidencies, in a systematic way?” Thus, I
employ a series of statistical models that evaluate “interruptions” in longer patterns of beliefs.
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7.4 Hypotheses
7.4.1 The Isolated Influence of Crisis Exposure on U.S. Presidential Beliefs
First, I am interested in simply looking at the impact of crises on leaders’ beliefs over the
span of their presidencies, and in the process, evaluating whether crisis exposure alone will have
some systematic influence on leaders’ beliefs. My expectations here stem from the
understanding that crises are events that threaten a given state’s (in this case, the U.S.) values,
where there is time pressure, and where the probability of war increases. These are serious
incidents in which leaders may well come face to face with the worst kind of stress that a
president may experience in his role as head of state—stress that could potentially have short, or
long term effects on a given leader’s beliefs.
The kind of learning that I expect to find follows from the arguments made by Lebow,
Blight and Welch, Stern, and most explicitly, by John Oneal. Oneal (1982) states:
With regard to the impact of a crisis on the image of the opponent, the onset of a serious
confrontation is likely to affect policymakers’ estimation of both the long-term objectives
of their adversary and the means it is willing to use in pursuit of these objectives. Not
surprisingly, crisis tends to reinforce the belief that the opponent is fundamentally
opposed to the ideological values and concrete interests of the responding nation and that
it will resort to the use or threat of force if such measures seem to be expedient. The
primary, first-order effect of a crisis is, then, to make the opponent seem more hostile to
the status quo power, less trustworthy, and more aggressive. (303)
Though Oneal was referring to the image of a specific opponent (or of a specific category
of opponent), I examine the “image” of the entire international environment, as it is quite
possible that one’s general worldview will also shift following an event at traumatic as an
international crisis. But apart from this, his observations provide the explicit expectations
regarding learning, in terms of the image and strategic preferences beliefs, that I evaluate in my
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first hypothesis.58 I infer an additional expectation regarding feelings of control—that crisis
occurrence will make presidents feel that they have less control over the international political
domain than they did beforehand, since they were unable to resolve a given dispute prior to its
escalation into a crisis (via the U.S.’s status as a political and military super-power, and/or the
explicit use of persuasion or threats aimed at deterrence).
Specifically, I hypothesize that following each crisis period—instances in Brecher and
Wilkenfeld’s database where the U.S. is listed as a “crisis actor” (or an actor experiencing a
given crisis)—presidents will come to believe that the world is a more hostile place (signified by
a decrease in their image [P1] values), where they will learn to prefer conflict over cooperation
(signified by a decrease in their strategic preference [I1] values), and will feel less control over
events (signified by a decrease in their control [P4] values) than they did prior to crisis exposure.
These expectations follow from the fundamental nature of crises and their impact on the
president himself, as well as their impact on the U.S. public and government broadly defined.
The impact of crises upon these latter groups is important, as the perceptions and preferences of
these key domestic groups are likely to impact the president and his beliefs in important ways,
given the accountability effect discussed by Stern.
Here, I essentially expect a change in the overall magnitude of mean belief values, or the
establishment of a new baseline belief value, following crises. By looking at the mean
magnitude of belief levels, we are testing the assumption that the crisis interruption will have an
immediate, noticeable change in belief levels. Thus, if we were to view a scatterplot of belief
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Oneal notes that it is possible for crises to force actors to shift their “image” of the opponent in
a more positive direction. He gives the example here of the intentional demonstration of restraint
by one’s adversary as a potential cause of this form of “learning.” However, this is not expected
to be the case in crises generally, and further, is not likely a sufficient condition to generate a
change in one’s “image” (305). Thus, this possibility is not tested here.
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trends both before and after the crisis, there would be a noticeable “jump” in the data between
these two periods, as the post-crisis trend points would essentially form a new baseline belief
value, and would not appear part of a continuous trend with the pre-crisis trend data. A
simplified graphical representation of this expectation can be seen in Figure 7.1.

Figure 7.1: Expected Belief Changes following Crisis Exposure (Magnitude Change Hypothesis)
Data trends are not of explicit interest for this specific examination, but rather the simple
change in the intercept point between the two samples of interest (i.e. beliefs before crisis
exposure, and beliefs following crisis exposure). An example here would be a president who
initially sees the world as a modestly friendly place according to the “image” belief, but then
experiences the “shock” of a crisis, and quickly shifts his beliefs following this so that his mean
belief level better reflects a perception of an unfriendly world. I expect this to happen following
each crisis to which a president is exposed. The specific direction of expected belief change
follows from the above discussion of Oneal’s expectations regarding belief change following
crisis. Thus:
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H1: Crisis exposure will lead to a quickly-occurring shift in the magnitude of presidential belief
values following crisis exposure. The manner of this belief change will be a shift toward: a)
seeing the world as a more hostile place (decrease in leaders’ image [P1] operational code
values), b) preferring the use of conflict as a strategy more than he did prior to crisis exposure
(decrease in leaders’ strategic preference [I1] operational code values), and c) feeling less control
than he did prior to crisis exposure (decrease in leaders’ feelings of control [P4] operational code
values).
However, examining the short-term magnitude change in belief values is not enough to
tell us the full story of how crises might affect beliefs. Even if there is a strong, initial
downward shift in leaders’ belief values in the period following crisis exposure, does this shift
continue in a given direction, over time, in the period following crisis exposure? Or rather, does
this trend remain “flat?” And most importantly, is this trend significantly different from the
previous (pre-crisis) trend for a given belief value? Further, in successive crisis periods, is any
noticeable shift in trends a methodical continuation of earlier shifts, or might exposure to each
successive crisis yield a more or less extreme trend shift of some type than those following
previous crises? We evaluate these possibilities by testing trends in the dependent variable
following “interruptions” in a longitudinal analysis.
Recall from hypothesis H1 the expectation that crises will have a sharp, immediate
impact on leaders’ beliefs that will lead to a change in the overall magnitude of a belief’s mean
value, essentially establishing a new baseline belief level. For hypothesis H2 however, I expect
that following this initial change, the impact of a given crisis will decay over time, and belief
values will tend to move back toward their initial states held prior to this crisis event. This
follows from the idea that there is a tendency toward cognitive balance as discussed in chapter 2,
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even following traumatic experiences. Though presidents should change their beliefs in order to
facilitate interpretation of a world colored by the last crisis experienced, I expect that they will
maintain a tendency to revert to some previously established equilibrium belief level. Given that
a new baseline belief value is expected to be established following a crisis event, I expect that
this previous equilibrium point is not likely to be reached again, but I do expect movement in
that direction. This hypothesized phenomenon is expressed in Figure 7.2.

Figure 7.2: Expected Belief Changes following Crisis Exposure (Trend Change Hypothesis)
Given that I expect significant downward shifts in mean image, strategic orientation, and
feelings of control values following crisis exposure, the reversion in belief trends towards the
previous baseline belief values are expected to be positive shifts. As with hypothesis H1, I
expect that this phenomenon will occur for each successive crisis to which a president is
exposed. Hypothesized expectations are the following:
H2: The initial impact of crises on leaders’ beliefs will be fairly strong (in the manner described
in hypothesis H1), but this impact will decay over time in the period following crisis exposure, as
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the initial impact of the crisis fades somewhat. Thus, when evaluating the trends in belief values,
a slight increase in leaders’ P1, I1, and P4 values (toward increased perceptions of friendliness,
preferences for cooperation, and increased feelings of control, respectively) will occur in the
period following a given crisis.
I will examine the above hypotheses both for each leader separately, and for all leaders
together in pooled models. I test both hypotheses H1 and H2 using a multiple interrupted time
series (MITS) analysis (see Lewis-Beck and Alford 1980 for a discussion of MITS—this will be
discussed in greater detail in the methods section).
7.5 Data
As mentioned in the introduction, crises here are taken from the work of Brecher and
Wilkenfeld, or more specifically, from these authors’ International Crisis Behavior Primary Data
Collections coding scheme.59 This database is widely used in empirical international relations
work, and provides an array of variables concerning every major international crisis from the
Russian Civil War in 1918 through the Chad-Sudan conflict of 2005. Ultimately, 31 of these
crises were examined where the U.S. is listed as the “crisis actor” (see Appendix C for a list of
the crises examined, as well as those excluded and the reasons for their exclusion). This project
examines crises that occurred during the administrations of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon,
Ford, Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush.
Excluded cases are: those during presidencies in which the U.S. initiates a crisis, but is
not listed as a crisis actor; instances in which a crisis overlaps two presidencies; crises that occur
near the beginning or ending of a presidency so that there is not enough speech data to assess
pre-, or post-crisis measures at 3-month intervals; and crises that are outliers in terms of duration
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Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/projects/project.asp?id=15
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(i.e. those lasting over 6 months). Crises that occur in the first 7 months of a presidency are also
left out of analysis, as I require this period for the establishment of MITS baseline levels.
Additionally, some crises in the time period examined here overlap, or occur soon after another.
For any crises that occurred while another was ongoing, or where one occurred in the 3 months
following another, I treated each of these crises as part of a “crisis period.” This was done in
order to minimize the difficulties in evaluating true pre- and post-crisis changes when the
beginning of one crisis occurred during, or soon after, the end of another. As such, I examine 25
total “crisis periods,” though as noted above, I actually examine 31 crises.
For all hypotheses in this chapter, only events where a non-U.S. actor is the first to
initiate crises are evaluated. 60 If, according to Brecher and Wilkenfeld, the U.S. first “initiates”
a crisis (where another state perceives a crisis prior to the U.S.), then this crisis is not included.
Though all crises in which the U.S. is threatened might be expected to have a serious impact on
leaders’ beliefs, these crises in which the U.S. feels more like the “victim” might be expected to
have the most impact.
As is discussed in the hypothesis section, the operational code indices examined here are
the image (P1), strategic preferences (I1), and feelings of control (P4) beliefs. For all analyses,
monthly aggregations of operational code beliefs are examined (note: these are not the “3 month,
moving averages” evaluated in previous chapters). Thus, I do not examine speech material
leading up to the day prior to crisis exposure. Instead, I look at those that occur up until the
month within which a crisis began. Exceptions to this are times when a crisis occurs in the last 4
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Ideally, I would look here at crises in which the U.S. was clearly not the instigator, but
oftentimes, crises are the result of a series of inter-state interactions, and even long histories,
where it is difficult to assess who truly “started” a dispute. As such, the manner of selecting
crises here is a proxy for “non-U.S. initiated” crises, though this may not always actually be the
case.
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days of a month, or ends in the first 4 days of a month. When this occurs, the month during
which a crisis takes place is included in either the pre-, or post-crisis period belief measure,
respectively. In other words, if a crisis begins on December 31, then speeches made in
December will be included in the calculation of a leader’s pre-crisis belief values. Further, if a
crisis ends on January 1, then speeches made in January will be included in the calculation of a
leader’s post-crisis belief values.
7.6 Methods
I examine beliefs by looking at leaders’ monthly operational code data for the entire
period leading up to and following each crisis period during their presidencies. Data are
evaluated using the Multiple Interrupted Time Series Analysis (MITS) technique. The
interrupted time-series method possesses advantages over other methods in that a simple
comparison of pre- and post-crisis period belief mean levels would not allow us to account for
trends in belief change following each crisis “interruption.” That is to say, it may be that each
successive crisis impacts a given leader’s beliefs, but unless we look at the trends of change
along with mean changes, then we cannot know the initial versus long-term impacts of each
crisis. For a further discussion on this issue, see the work of Lewis-Beck and Alford (1980) and
Garand, Monroe, and Vlosky (2001).
The first variable contained in these MITS models is a counter for each month of a given
presidency, with a “1” associated with the first month, a “2” associated with the second month,
etc. This measure examines the impact of time on learning from the president’s inauguration up
until the first “crisis period” of interest. In other words, for a given belief, a positive coefficient
here reflects a positive slope for the period prior to the first crisis period experienced by a given
president, and a negative coefficient reflects a negative slope for this period.
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The other independent variables of interest evaluate the impact of each crisis period on
beliefs. These variables are of two types. The first is a binary measure, in which a “0” is applied
to all months prior to the occurrence of a given crisis period, and a “1” is applied for all months
following this occurrence, up until the end of a given presidency. This measure evaluates the
“short-term” impact of crises, as the shift in the intercept point from pre-crisis period to postcrisis period is examined here. Trends in the degree of belief change in this period (that is to say,
longer term changes in the slope of belief values following a crisis) are not accounted for by this
variable.
The second type of variable is a post-crisis count variable. On this measure, a “0” value
is given to all months prior to a given crisis period’s onset, similar to the binary measure.
However, following the onset of a crisis period, a count value (i.e. 1=the first month following a
crisis period, 2=the second month following a crisis period . . . t=month t following a crisis
period) is associated with each subsequent month, up until the end of a leader’s presidency. The
post-crisis count variable, in opposition to the binary variable, does take belief trends (or slopes)
into account, by examining longer-term learning changes following crisis periods. The
interpretation of “negative” or “positive” coefficients on post-crisis-count variables is made in
the manner described previously for the general count variable, but only for the period following
the onset of a given crisis, up until the next crisis period (or until the end of the presidency, if it
follows the final crisis period). In the results section, I will describe the Kennedy case in detail,
in order to further elaborate on what these variables are tapping into, and what significant
negative and positive coefficients tell us about the impact of crisis periods on beliefs.
At this point, borrowing from Garand, Monroe, and Vlosky’s (2001, 5) work, the
interrupted time series model for a single crisis interruption would look like this:
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7.6.1 Single President, Single Crisis Interruption Model:
Belief Valuest = a + b1 (Time Countert) + b2 (Binary Crisist) + b3 (Post-Crisis Countert)
Following Garand et al.’s (2001, 5) description, Belief Valuest is the belief value on a
given index for a president at time t; Time Countert is a monthly time counter beginning at the
first month of a given presidency (measured as 1 in the first month of the time series, 2 in the
second year, etc.) and lasting until the end of a presidency; Binary Crisist is a binary measure,
coded “0” for all years leading up to the onset of a given crisis period, and a “1” for every
subsequent year until the end of a presidency; and Post-Crisis Countt is the post-crisis count
measure, where a “0” is applied to every month leading up to a crisis, and a count begins in the
month following the onset of a crisis period, continuing until the end of a presidency (“1” for the
first month following the onset of a crisis period, “2” for the second month following the onset of
a crisis period, etc.). a represents the intercept of the pre-crisis time period, b1 represents the
slope of the total pre-crisis period, b2 represents a “shift in the level (intercept) of the time series”
associated with the onset of a crisis period (i.e. the phenomenon represented in Figure 7.1) and b3
represents the “change in the slope of the time series that occurs following the adoption” (Ibid.)
of the crisis (i.e. the phenomenon represented in Figure 7.2). If an immediate, expected, shortterm impact of crisis periods is found, then this will be represented with a negative b2 value,
indicating that crises have an immediate, negative impact on presidential belief levels. If crises
have a more “gradual, longer-term” (Ibid.) impact on presidential beliefs, we would expect b3 to
be positive, indicating that the initial negative shift decays in the period following the crisis
period.
If a single set of the above variables were employed, then the effect of a single
“interruption” in a time series for a single president could be examined. However, given that
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there are multiple crises being examined here in each model, I examine a multiple interrupted
time series. Note that I evaluate three types of multiple interrupted time series models in this
chapter. Examined first are individual, presidential models. Examined second are pooled
models, including all crises experienced across all presidencies. Examined third are “fixed
effect” pooled models including presidential dummy variables.
In all models examined in this chapter, I only include one “general” count variable,
evaluating the slope of belief values leading up to the first crisis period. However, for the
individual, presidential models, I include a set of “binary” and “post-crisis count” variables for
each crisis period examined for each presidency. As such, I can tell whether each crisis period
has the expected impact described in the two hypotheses tested here, whether only one or some
crises have this impact, or whether no crises have this impact. The individual, presidential
models are a basic form of the MITS model that do not include cross-sectional data across
presidents. These models are similar to the single interruption model outlined above, but include
indicators to account for additional crisis periods. Thus:
7.6.2 Single President, Multiple Crisis Interruption Models Equation
Belief Valuest = a + b1 (Time Countert) + b2 (Binary Crisis Period 1t) + b3 (Post-Crisis Period 1
Countt) + b4 (Binary Crisis Period 2t) + b5 (Post-Crisis Period 2 Countt) . . . + bn-1 (Binary Crisis
Period zt) + bn (Post-Crisis Period z Countt)
z reflects the number of crisis periods examined for a given president, and n reflects the
ultimate number of covariates examined. The additional Binary Crisis and Post-Crisis Count
measures reflect those variables added to account for additional crisis periods. Thus, a negative
b4 coefficient would demonstrate a negative, short-term impact of the second crisis period
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experienced by a given president on belief levels, and a positive b5 coefficient would reflect a
longer-term “decay” of this impact over time on belief levels.
For pooled models, there are two broad changes to the individual presidential models
(note that in my pooled database, rows represent months, and there is one row of data for each
month of interest starting with January of 1961 and ending in December of 2003; each column
represents a given variable of interest). First, I include a set of binary and count variables for
each “first,” “second,” “third,” etc. crisis period that a given president encounters (or for each
“ordered crisis period” experienced), so that I am testing the extent to which the “first,”
“second,” “third,” etc. crisis period encountered affects all presidents’ beliefs before and
following a crisis period. In other words, I am testing whether the first crisis period, second
crisis period, etc. yield systematic effects across presidents.
Secondly for the pooled measures, values on the general count measure, for each binary
measure (one binary variable is created for each “ordered” crisis), and for each post-crisis count
measure (one post-crisis count variable is created for each “ordered” crisis) re-start in the month
when a new president takes office. As stated above, I only include one “general” count variable
in all MITS models, and this is the case in the pooled models. However, in pooled models, given
that more than one president is examined, this “general” count re-starts at the beginning of each
presidency of interest. For example, 35 months are examined for Kennedy, so his “general
counter” measure goes up to 35, and for the next month/row of data (Johnson’s first month
evaluated), the count re-starts at 1.
Further, for each “ordered” crisis period associated with a given president, the binary
measure ends at the last month of a given presidency, and re-starts at the first month of the
subsequent presidency. Thus, during the last month of the Kennedy Administration, the binary
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value associated with each “ordered” crisis period that he experiences is a “1.” For the next
month, however (the first month of the Johnson Administration), the value on each binary
variable reverts to “0,” since at this point, Johnson had not yet experienced a crisis.
Similarly, the post-crisis count measure ends at the last month of a given presidency, and
re-starts at the beginning of the subsequent one. Thus, during the last month of the Kennedy
Administration, the post-crisis count value for the first “crisis period” experienced is “28” (that is
to say, 28 months had passed since the onset of the first crisis period evaluated). For the next
month (the first month of Johnson’s Administration), this value reverts to “0,” and remains zero
until his first crisis period, at which time the new count begins.
Additional “fixed effect” models are run including presidential dummy variables to
control for the impact of each president on belief values here. The pooled models with multiple
crises are reflected in the following:
7.6.3 Multiple President, Multiple Crisis Interruption Model
Belief Valuesi,t = a + b1 (Time Counteri,t) + b2 (Binary Crisis Period 1i,t) + b3 (Post-Crisis Period
1 Counti,t) + b4 (Binary Crisis Period 2i,t) + b5 (Post-Crisis Period 2 Counti,t) . . . + bn-1 (Binary
Crisis Period zi,t) + bn (Post-Crisis Period Count zi,t)
Again, following Garand and colleagues (2001, 5), this model is identical to the
individual president, multiple crisis model, except that the “i” suffix is included, referring to the
“ith” president. As Garand and colleagues state, “in this formulation the coefficient b2 represents
the global effect” (Ibid.) of the first crisis period on the presidential beliefs levels, and the b3
coefficient evaluates the effect of the first crisis period on the slope of presidential beliefs
following the first crisis period. I include a separate “fixed effect” model with dummy variables
included in order to “capture the possibility of different intercepts” (Ibid.) for each president

193

(Kennedy is the excluded case here). Note that Stata does not give an overall “variance
explained” measure for the pooled, interrupted time series. As such, pseudo R-squared values
are taken by calculating predicted values for these models, correlating predicted with observed
values, and squaring this value for each model.
Note that for all MITS evaluations, a preliminary baseline is required in order to establish
the degree of change following a crisis “interruption” in the data. Though there is no solid rule
regarding the number of observations required to establish such a baseline, I decided on a
minimum of 7 months. As such, any crisis periods occurring within the first 7 months of a
presidency (or 7 data points) are not examined. This decision only impacted the analyses of
Kennedy (where the “Pathet Leo Offensive” and “Bay of Pigs” crises were not examined) and
Nixon (where the “Vietnam Spring Offensive” and “EC-121 Spy Plane” crises were not
examined).
For individual presidential MITS analyses, Prais-Winsten regression models were
employed in order to account for the potential effect of autocorrelation (which is not unexpected,
given the nature of the time series data employed). For the pooled MITS, generalized least
squared models were employed in order to further account for potential heteroskedasticity across
the presidential samples evaluated. Here, the “xtgls” command in Stata was used, in which
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity were accounted for, and in which an autocorrelation
coefficient (rho) was calculated separately for each president.
7.7 Results
7.7.1 Individual Presidential Analysis
To reiterate, I am examining both the immediate-, and longer-term impact of crises on
leaders’ images of the international political environment, strategic preferences regarding the
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international political environment, and feelings of control over the international political
environment. Here again are the hypotheses being tested61:
H1: Crisis exposure will lead to a quickly-occurring shift in the magnitude of presidential belief
values following crisis exposure. The manner of this belief change will be a shift toward: a)
seeing the world as a more hostile place (decrease in leaders’ image [P1] operational code
values), b) preferring the use of conflict as a strategy more than he did prior to crisis exposure
(decrease in leaders’ strategic preference [I1] operational code values), and c) feeling less control
than he did prior to crisis exposure (decrease in leaders’ feelings of control [P4] operational code
values).
H2: The initial impact of crises on leaders’ beliefs will be fairly strong (in the manner described
in hypothesis H1), but this impact will decay over time in the period following crisis exposure, as
the initial impact of the crisis fades somewhat. Thus, when evaluating the trends in belief values,
a slight increase in leaders’ P1, I1, and P4 values (toward increased perceptions of friendliness,
preferences for cooperation, and increased feelings of control, respectively) will occur in the
period following a given crisis.
First, I run individual presidential models to assess how each crisis period impacts each
president independent of all others. Results are contained in Tables 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3. Again, the
“general” counter variable reflects the slope of belief data prior to the onset of the first crisis
period. The binary crisis-related variables tap into hypothesis H1. They do this by telling us if
there is a significant, short-term change in the magnitude of each president’s belief values
following the occurrence of crisis periods. The post-crisis count variables for each crisis tap into
hypothesis H2. These measures look at trends in the same way that the general count variable
61

Note that these hypotheses are evaluated at the one-tailed level of significance, given that I am
testing directional hypotheses.
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does, except that they look only at the changes following the occurrence of a given crisis period,
up until the onset of the next crisis period.
The general count variables in Table 7.1 indicate that President Kennedy initially yielded
a modest to strong change in each belief of interest over the first few months of his time in office
(recall that this period actually contains the first major crises of the Kennedy Administration,
including the failed Bay of Pigs invasion). First, he experienced a modest, negative shift on the
image (P1) variable (t=1.43, prob<.10), suggesting that in the period following his election,
Kennedy learned to see the world as a more hostile place than he did initially. However,
Kennedy also yielded a significant, positive change on the strategic preferences (I1) variable
(t=2.84, prob<.001), indicating that he learned to more strongly prefer cooperation over conflict
during this time. Finally, Kennedy yielded a modest, positive increase on the control over events
(P4) variable (t=1.36, prob<.10), suggesting that during this time he learned to feel more control
over events than he did initially.
Following the Berlin Wall/Vietcong Attack crises (the “Crisis 1” period in the MITS
models here—refer to Appendix D for a list of the crises evaluated during each “crisis period”
for each president in Tables 7.1-7.5), Kennedy began seeing the world as a slightly friendlier
place as time wore on leading up to the next crisis (on the image measure, as reflected by the
post-crisis counter coefficient: t=1.43, prob<.10). This would appear to give some support to
hypothesis H2, except that he failed to demonstrate a significant “short-term” shift in this belief
immediately following the onset of this first crisis period (as reflected in the binary variable
coefficient). The H2 hypothesis assumes that there is initially an immediate, downward shift in
each belief of interest, supporting hypothesis H1. Thus, given that hypothesis H1 was not given
support, hypothesis H2 cannot be given support, either.
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The impact of this first crisis period on Kennedy’s strategic preferences is that, relative to the
“pre-crisis period” trends, he began to more strongly prefer conflict as time wore on, as indicated
by the post-crisis count variable (t=2.14, prob<.05). However, similar to the image measure,
there were no notable short-term effects of this crisis on Kennedy’s strategic orientation beliefs.
As such, no support is given to either hypothesis H1 or H2 for the strategic orientation belief for
Kennedy. Regarding both the image and strategic orientation measures, subsequent crisis
periods (2 and 3) do not appear to have affected Kennedy in a significant manner.
Regarding the “feelings of control” variable, after the initial movement toward feeling
increased control over events (t=1.36, prob<.10), Kennedy’s feelings of control appeared to have
leveled off following subsequent crisis exposure, with the exception of a shift toward feeling
slightly less control over time following the second crisis period (Nam Tha), and an immediate
shift toward feeling slightly more control following the third crisis period (the Cuban Missile
Crisis). Taken as a whole, I fail to find support for either hypothesis H1 or H2 for Kennedy on
any belief measure, since we do not consistently see significant, negative coefficients on the
crisis binary variables (which would support hypothesis H1), alongside consistently modestly
positive coefficients on the crisis Count variables (which would support hypothesis H2).
Johnson appears to have maintained fairly stable image perceptions, strategic preferences,
and feelings of control toward the international political environment for his first months in
office. However, his first crisis period (Gulf of Tonkin/Congo II) had the short term effect of
Johnson seeing the world as more hostile (t=1.37, prob<.10) while more strongly preferring
conflict over cooperation (t=2.12, prob<.05). This gives support to hypothesis H1 for Johnson’s
first crisis period on the image and strategic preference variables. Further, following this initial
crisis period, Johnson yields a positive, long-term shift toward seeing the world as more friendly,
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Table 7.1: Multiple Interrupted Time Series Results for Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon
Kennedy
Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferences
(I1)

Johnson
Feelings of
Control
(P4)

Image of the
Other (P1)

Strategic
Preferences
(I1)

General
Counter
Crisis 1
Binary
Post- Crisis
1 Counter
Crisis 2
Binary
Post- Crisis
2 Counter
Crisis 3
Binary
Post- Crisis
3 Counter
Crisis 4
Binary
Post- Crisis
4 Counter
Constant

-0.005
0.027
-0.055
0.111
0.015
[0.20]
[1.19]
[1.43]*
[2.84]***
[1.36]*
0.069
-0.132
-0.024
-0.267
-0.422
[0.34]
[0.64]
[0.39]
[1.37]*
[2.12]**
-0.01
0.048
0.066
-0.096
0.07
[0.75]
[0.99]
[1.43]*
[2.14]**
[1.46]*
0.028
0.225
0.018
-0.08
-0.135
[0.11]
[0.84]
[0.24]
[0.56]
[0.91]
-0.03
-0.082
-0.028
-0.064
-0.075
[0.43]
[1.18]
[1.37]*
[1.54]*
[1.73]**
-0.094
0.135
-0.1
0.124
0.108
[0.48]
[0.66]
[0.65]
[0.81]
[1.84]**
0.028
0.067
0.016
-0.007
-0.007
[0.43]
[0.99]
[0.83]
[0.24]
[0.25]
-------0.073
-0.044
------[0.44]
[0.26]
------0.037
0.012
------[1.11]
[0.35]
0.679
-0.111
0.163
0.445
0.476
[3.97]***
[0.64]
[3.24]***
[3.47]***
[3.70]***
N
35
35
35
61
61
R²
.13
.57
.29
.15
.15
Note: All analyses tested at the 1-tailed level of analysis; t-scores in brackets
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10
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Nixon
Feelings of
Control
(P4)

Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferences
(I1)

Feelings of
Control
(P4)

0.003
[0.32]
-0.081
[1.02]
0.014
[0.71]
-0.081
[1.42]*
-0.016
[0.94]
-0.073
[1.17]
0.012
[1.06]
0.031
[0.46]
-0.026
[1.88]**
0.325
[6.23]***
61
.2

0.003
[0.20]
-0.233
[0.88]
0.067
[0.93]
-0.226
[1.10]
-0.069
[0.96]
0.114
[0.91]
-0.008
[0.76]
--------0.459
[4.03]***
67
0.09

0.005
[0.53]
-0.353
[1.67]*
0.107
[1.85]**
-0.471
[2.87]**
-0.102
[1.78]**
0.09
[0.89]
-0.016
[1.96]**
--------0.646
[7.05]***
67
0.3

-0.006
[0.98]
0.163
[1.40]*
-0.025
[0.76]
0.102
[1.12]
0.023
[0.73]
0.002
[0.03]
0.011
[2.22]**
--------0.399
[7.38]***
67
0.12

following his initial, short-term negative shift (t=1.46, prob<.05), giving support to hypothesis
H2 on this measure for Johnson following the first crisis period evaluated. The longer-term
effects of this crisis period on his strategic preferences belief are more negligible, but also
positive, as expected. Thus, hypotheses H1 and H2 are given some support for Johnson
following his first crisis period. However, he yields neither a long- nor a short-term shift on the
control measure following the first crisis period.
Following the second crisis period (Pleiku/Dominican Intervention), Johnson yields only
a short-term decrease in feelings of control (t=1.43, prob<.10), but experiences a longer-term
trend toward seeing the world as more hostile (t=1.54, prob<.10) and more strongly preferring
conflict (t=1.73, prob<.10). The third (Six Day War) crisis period of the Johnson Administration
did not yield any significant shifts in the beliefs of his evaluated here, and the fourth crisis period
(Tet Offensive) only yields a long-term decrease in his “feelings of control” (t=1.88, prob<.05).
Thus, on the whole, hypotheses 1 and 2 are not given much support for Johnson, either, except
following the first crisis period that he experiences.
Table I also contains results for President Nixon. Findings here show that Nixon did not
change his beliefs much from his inauguration up until his first crisis period on any belief.
Further, no crisis affected his image of the world in any significant way. The only times that
Nixon experienced a change in his feelings of control were after his first crisis period (Invasion
of Cambodia), which had the short-term effect of making him feel more control (t=1.40,
prob<.10), and the third crisis (Vietnam Ports Mining), which had the longer-term impact of
making Nixon progressively feel more control from the onset of these crises until his resignation
from office (t=2.22, prob<.05).
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Following the second crisis period (Black September/Cienfuegos Submarine Base),
Nixon’s strategic orientation become more and more conflictual as time goes on, with each of the
final two crisis periods exacerbating this trend (Crisis 2: t=1.78, prob<.05; Crisis 3: t=1.96,
prob<.05). The second crisis additionally has a more immediate, short-term influence of leading
Nixon to more strongly prefer conflict (t=2.87, prob<.05). However, neither hypothesis H1 nor
H2 are ultimately given much support for Nixon.
I described results for the above presidents in detail in order to convey the manner in
which these coefficients can be interpreted, but from the pool of remaining presidents, I will only
discuss Clinton, as he is the only individual president to give notable, albeit partial support to the
hypotheses presented here.
Results for President Clinton can be found in Table 7.3, and show that each of the first
three crisis periods (Haiti Military Regime/Iraq Military Deployment Kuwait; Desert Strike;
UNSCOM I) have a significant, short-term impact on his control belief (Haiti/Iraq Deployment:
t=2.83, prob<.05; Desert Strike: t=1.90, prob<.10; UNSCOM I: t=2.23, prob<.05), demonstrating
that he feels less control following each subsequent crisis period than he did previously. This
supports hypothesis H1 for President Clinton on the control variable for the first three crisis
periods, and the positive trend shift following these changes in the first and third crises gives
some support to hypothesis H2. However, these feelings stabilize for the final two crisis periods
of his presidency (U.S. Embassy Bombings/UNSCOM II; Kosovo).
Following the second crisis period (Desert Strike), Clinton also yields a notable, longterm shift toward seeing the world as more friendly (t=2.96, prob<.05) and more strongly
preferring cooperation (t=1.49, prob<.10), whereas he yields a significant, short-term shift
toward seeing the world as more hostile (UNSCOM I: t=1.43, prob<.10; U.S.
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Embassy/UNSCOM II: t=1.68, prob<.05; Kosovo: t=1.41, prob<.10) and more strongly
preferring conflict (UNSCOM I: t=1.63, prob<.10; U.S. Embassy/UNSCOM II: t=2.00,
prob<.05; Kosovo: t=3.22, prob<.001) following the third, fourth, and fifth crisis periods. These
findings thus support hypothesis H1 for Clinton on the third, fourth, and fifth crisis periods on
the image and strategic preference measures. Finally, Clinton experiences a significant, longterm change toward more strongly preferring cooperation following his fourth crisis period (U.S.
Embassy/UNSCOM II: t=1.52, prob<.10), but yields a long-term shift toward more strongly
preferring conflict after his fifth crisis period (t=2.18, prob<.05). Overall then, hypothesis H1
receives some pretty strong support for Clinton, though there is not consistent support for
hypothesis H2.
On the whole, however, each president seems to respond to crises, and subsequent crises
in their own, unique ways. There does not seem to be a great deal of systematic behavior across
presidents, certainly not in the manner hypothesized. In the next section, I will test the
possibility that, despite this, there may be systematic findings that become evident when
presidential data are evaluated together.
7.7.2 Pooled Analyses
Table 7.4 contains results for a pooled, multi-interrupted time series analysis of
presidential learning from crises. This evaluates the impact of each “ordered” crisis period (the
first, second, third, etc.) on learning across presidents on their image, strategic orientation, and
feelings of control beliefs. That is to say, does the first, second, third, fourth, or fifth crisis
period that presidents encounter have a systematic effect on leaders’ beliefs in the manner
predicted in hypotheses H1 and H2, across presidencies? Results show that there is a tendency
for presidents to start seeing the world as slightly more hostile (t=1.57, prob<.10) and to feel less
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Table 7.2: Multiple Interrupted Time Series Results for Ford, Carter, and Reagan
Ford
Carter

Counter
Crisis 1
Binary
Post- Crisis
1 Counter
Crisis 2
Binary
Post- Crisis
2 Counter
Crisis 3
Binary
Post- Crisis
3 Counter
Constant
N
R²
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10

Reagan

Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferenc
es (I1)

Feelings of
Control
(P4)

Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferen
ces (I1)

Feelings of
Control
(P4)

Image of
the
Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferences
(I1)

Feelings
of Control
(P4)

-0.002
[0.13]
0.081
[0.60]
0.009
[0.26]
-0.165
[1.44]*
-0.001
[0.02]
0.134
[1.09]
-0.058
[1.97]**
0.537
[7.13]***
30
.53

-0.049
[1.61]*
0.218
[0.82]
0.058
[0.74]
-0.159
[0.70]
0.02
[0.27]
0.002
[0.01]
-0.045
[0.75]
0.789
[4.60]***
30
.15

-0.011
[1.59]*
0.12
[1.72]**
-0.01
[0.55]
0.063
[1.06]
0.022
[1.20]
-0.001
[0.02]
-0.019
[1.20]
0.382
[9.95]***
30
.54

-0.002
[0.25]
0.125
[1.25]
-0.014
[1.46]
0.135
[1.23]
0.017
[1.40]
--------0.489
[6.46]***
49
0.2

0.015
[1.40]
0.057
[0.44]
-0.044
[3.47]**
0.03
[0.20]
0.052
[3.27]**
--------0.55
[5.56]**
49
0.43

-0.006
[1.71]**
0.011
[0.24]
0.003
[0.61]
0.035
[0.72]
0.003
[0.60]
--------0.409
[12.16]***
49
0.32

-0.004
[1.34]*
0.023
[0.20]
0.022
[1.54]*
-0.213
[2.09]*
-0.019
[1.37]*
--------0.49
[7.64]**
95
0.15

-0.006
[1.39]*
0.114
[0.74]
0
[0.00]
-0.01
[0.07]
0.005
[0.28]
--------0.755
[9.40]**
95
0.05

-0.002
[1.91]**
-0.011
[0.32]
0.008
[1.88]**
-0.069
[2.27]***
-0.006
[1.48]*
--------0.298
[17.66]**
95
0.14
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Table 7.3: Multiple Interrupted Time Series Results for George H.W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush
H.W. Bush
Clinton
W. Bush

Counter
Crisis 1
Binary
Post- Crisis
1 Counter
Crisis 2
Binary
Post- Crisis
2 Counter
Crisis 3
Binary
Post- Crisis
3 Counter
Crisis 4
Binary
Post- Crisis
4 Counter
Crisis 5
Binary
Post- Crisis
5 Counter
Constant
N
R²
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10

Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preference
s (I1)

Feelings
of
Control
(P4)

Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferen
ces (I1)

Feelings
of Control
(P4)

Image of
the Other
(P1)

Strategic
Preferences
(I1)

Feelings
of
Control
(P4)

-0.005
[0.25]
0.119
[0.75]
-0.018
[0.70]
-0.017
[0.13]
0.028
[1.57]*
------------------------0.541
[4.35]**
48
0.13

0.036
[2.23]**
-0.142
[1.07]
-0.037
[1.74]**
-0.072
[0.70]
0
[0.00]
------------------------0.552
[5.46]**
48
0.25

0
[0.07]
0.068
[1.18]
-0.005
[0.49]
-0.018
[0.39]
0.007
[1.10]
------------------------0.275
[6.06]**
48
0.08

0.002
[0.25]
0.004
[0.04]
-0.006
[0.72]
-0.125
[1.26]
0.029
[2.96]**
-0.184
[1.43]*
-0.021
[0.97]
-0.271
[1.68]**
0.044
[1.11]
-0.171
[1.41]*
-0.041
[1.17]
0.427
[5.59]**
95
0.18

0
[0.00]
-0.056
[0.78]
-0.004
[0.59]
0.02
[0.26]
0.011
[1.49]*
-0.175
[1.63]*
0.016
[0.93]
-0.277
[2.00]*
0.051
[1.52]*
-0.348
[3.22]*
-0.067
[2.18]*
0.695
[12.00]
95
0.27

0.001
[0.70]
-0.074
[3.02]**
0.003
[1.15]
-0.05
[1.90]**
-0.001
[0.48]
-0.08
[2.23]**
0.003
[0.45]
-0.016
[0.35]
-0.01
[0.93]
0.043
[1.21]
0.004
[0.41]
0.287
[14.46]**
95
0.31

-0.018
[0.81]
-0.303
[2.83]**
0.021
[0.96]
--------------------------------0.612
[5.51]**
36
0.5

0.03
[0.75]
-0.28
[1.42]
-0.033
[0.81]
--------------------------------0.47
[2.30]**
36
0.14

-0.016
[2.12]**
0.102
[2.70]**
0.013
[1.66]
--------------------------------0.369
[9.44]**
36
0.27
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control (t=6.30, prob<.001) in their first months of office leading up to their first crisis period (as
measured by the counter variable). The first crisis period then yields a modest, immediate effect
on the strategic preferences belief, leading presidents to more strongly prefer conflict over
cooperation (t=1.54, prob<.10), but the slope of strategic preference belief values is negative (to
reiterate, a positive slope trend is expected, which would indicate the “decay” of the impact of
crises on presidential beliefs). Additionally, despite there being no immediate “shift,” the first
crisis period has a longer-term impact on presidents’ feelings of control beliefs, so that they feel
more control as time goes on, following this event or series of events (t=2.14, prob<.05).
Presidential images of the “other” are not significantly affected by their “first” crisis period.
Table 7.4: Basic Pooled MITS Results
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10

Counter
Crisis 1
Binary
Post- Crisis
1 Counter
Crisis 2
Binary
Post- Crisis
2 Counter
Crisis 3
Binary
Post- Crisis
3 Counter
Crisis 4
Binary
Post- Crisis
4 Counter

Image of the
Other (P1)

Strategic
Preferences (I1)

Feelings of
Control (P4)

-0.002
[1.57]*
-0.004
[0.13]
-0.000
[0.15]
0.008
[0.25]
0.001
[0.67]
0.033
[0.78]
-0.004
[1.02]
-0.152
[1.67]**
0.039
[2.35]**

0.000
[0.26]
-0.047
[1.54]*
-0.003
[1.27]
0.017
[0.52]
0.003
[1.47]*
0.092
[2.17]**
-0.004
[1.16]
-0.042
[0.48]
0.018
[1.14]

-0.002
[6.30]***
0.015
[1.42]
0.001
[2.14]**
0.008
[0.80]
0.001
[0.97]
-0.028
[1.55]*
0.004
[2.04]**
0.017
[0.49]
-0.012
[1.82]**
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Table 7.4 (cont.)

Crisis 5
Binary
Post- Crisis
5 Counter
Constant
N
Pseudo R²

Image of the
Other (P1)

Strategic
Preferences (I1)

Feelings of
Control (P4)

-0.106
[1.19]
-0.026
[1.51]*
0.480
[22.67]***
516
0.055

-0.135
[1.70]**
-0.007
[0.45]
0.656
[28.78]***
516
0.042

0.038
[1.22]
0.007
[1.10]
0.330
[43.98]***
516
0.088

The effects of the first crisis period may be particularly notable, as we might expect
initial crises to have a similar, systematic impact on leaders’ beliefs as they first come face-toface with the harsh reality of international politics. We see this with the strategic preference
finding (an immediate shift toward a preference for conflict), but not as much in terms of
presidential images or feelings of control.
The second crisis has a single modest, long-term effect on presidential belief trends,
where cooperation is more strongly preferred as time goes on (t=1.47, prob<.10). The third crisis
has the short term impact of persuading presidents to more strongly prefer cooperation (t=2.17,
prob<.05) and to feel less control (t=1.55, prob<.10), and only has the longer term impact of
leading presidents to feel more control than they did previously as time wears on (t=2.04,
prob<.05). In this sense, both hypotheses H1 and H2 are given some support following the
“third” crisis period in terms of feelings of control. Following fourth crisis periods, presidents
tend to experience an immediate shift toward seeing the world as more hostile (t=1.67,
prob<.10), but start seeing the world as more friendly (t=2.35, prob<.05) and feel less control
over time (t=1.82, prob<.05). Thus, both hypotheses are again given support for the fourth crisis
period, but only regarding image beliefs. Finally, following fifth crisis periods, presidents tend
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to yield a short-term shift toward more strongly preferring conflict (t=1.70, prob<.05), and a
longer-term shift toward seeing the world as more hostile (t=1.51, prob<.10).
Ultimately, neither the individual presidential nor the basic pooled MITS models give
clear support to either hypotheses H1 or H2. Instead, it seems to show us that across presidents,
there is a great deal of variation in belief change from crisis to crisis. For instance in the pooled
model, each subsequent crisis tends to influence beliefs in alternating directions in a rough kind
of cycle (i.e. negative, positive, negative, positive, etc.). Of the three beliefs evaluated, the
control variable appears to be the most consistently affected by crises (as leaders tend to feel
more control, in both the short, and long-terms, following crisis exposure). However, even this
shifts following the third and fourth crisis periods. It may be that crises tend to have a
moderating influence on beliefs, by pulling them to one extreme, and then to the other, but the
“back and forth” trends aren’t consistent enough to warrant even this explanation. Instead, it
may be simple, random variation, based upon the idiosyncrasies of the crises examined and the
presidents experiencing them.
Following from the basic pooled MITS, I ran the same model, additionally controlling for
individual presidential influences by including presidential dummies (Kennedy is the excluded
president). Results are located in Table 7.5. Findings show that, even accounting for individual
presidential influences, crisis periods tend to have a fairly erratic impact on beliefs over time.
However, it is interesting that, as with the basic MITS model, presidents feel progressively less
control in the first months of their presidency (t=2.45, prob<.05), but shift toward feeling
progressively more control following the first crisis period (t=1.68, prob<.05). Also similar to
the basic model, the first crisis leads presidents to more strongly prefer conflict (t=1.29,
prob<.10), but here it is a longer-term shift, whereas an immediate shift with no corresponding
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change in the slope is evident in Table 7.4.
Table 7.5: Pooled MITS Results with Presidential Dummies
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10

Counter
Crisis 1
Binary
Post- Crisis
1 Counter
Crisis 2
Binary
Post- Crisis
2 Counter
Crisis 3
Binary
Post- Crisis
3 Counter
Crisis 4
Binary
Post- Crisis
4 Counter
Crisis 5
Binary
Post- Crisis
5 Counter
Johnson
Dummy
Nixon
Dummy
Ford
Dummy
Carter
Dummy

Image of the
Other (P1)

Strategic
Preferences (I1)

Feelings of
Control (P4)

-0.002
[0.85]
0.000
[0.01]
-0.000
[0.08]
-0.008
[0.26]
0.002
[0.82]
0.020
[0.50]
-0.004
[1.05]
-0.150
[1.66]**
0.039
[2.38]**
-0.176
[1.97]**
-0.018
[1.03]
0.014
[0.30]
0.035
[0.72]
0.114
[2.59]**
0.038
[0.78]

-0.000
[0.04]
-0.023
[0.65]
-0.004
[1.29]*
0.019
[0.58]
0.004
[1.82]**
0.106
[2.51]**
-0.004
[1.15]
-0.046
[0.54]
0.020
[1.29]*
-0.202
[2.55]**
-0.001
[0.06]
0.025
[0.47]
0.043
[0.77]
0.011
[0.17]
0.014
[0.23]

-0.002
[2.45]**
0.008
[0.71]
0.002
[1.68]**
-0.003
[0.33]
-0.000
[0.06]
-0.026
[1.65]**
0.002
[0.97]
0.020
[0.62]
-0.009
[1.44]*
0.030
[1.03]
0.008
[1.20]
0.062
[3.72]***
0.104
[5.33]***
0.088
[5.53]***
0.066
[3.59]***
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Table 7.5 (cont.)
Image of the
Other (P1)
Reagan
Dummy
H.W. Bush
Dummy
Clinton
Dummy
W. Bush
Dummy
Constant
N
Pseudo R²

0.016
[0.23]
0.036
[0.73]
0.045
[0.90]
-0.113
[1.95]**
0.448
[10.72]***
516
0.112

Strategic
Preferences (I1)

Feelings of
Control (P4)

0.056
[0.72]
0.150
[2.74]**
0.084
[1.47]*
-0.050
[0.73]
0.607
[11.90]***
516
0.098

0.033
[1.64]*
0.036
[2.03]**
0.048
[2.94]***
0.029
[1.66]**
0.266
[18.90]*
516
0.198

Regarding the presidential dummies, every president feels significantly more control over
events than does Kennedy, when the impact of crises is taken into account. Additionally, Ford
sees the world as friendlier (t=2.59, prob<.05), H.W. Bush (t=2.74, prob<.05) and Clinton
(t=1.47, prob<.10) more strongly prefer cooperation, and George W. Bush sees the world as
more hostile (t=1.95, prob<.05) than does Kennedy.62
7.8 Discussion
There were a number of questions addressed in this project, but what broad lessons can
we take away from all of this, if anything? First off, the various significant findings on the
general counter variables tell us that when presidents are first elected, a great deal of learning
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I additionally ran the two pooled models, substituting the square root of the post-crisis period
counter measure for the non-transformed version of this measure. This way, I could account for
a more gradual positive shift away from the new, hypothesized negative shifts after crisis periods
(as expected by the binary measures), which would become more drastic as time wore on. If the
initial shift were to “stick” a bit, followed by a later-occurring shift “toward the mean,” this
transformation would account for that phenomenon. Results for those models yield higher
pseudo-R-squared values than those included in this chapter, but demonstrate no notably
different findings (in terms of direction or significance of findings) from those in the nontransformed models. Thus, they are not included here.
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seems to take place in the first few months of office. This differs from president to president, but
tells us that learning begins early on, and that beliefs tend to methodically change toward seeing
the world as somewhat different as presidents encounter the world in their new role as leader of
the free world.
Across presidents (in the pooled models), this is most evident on the feelings of control
measure, as it appears that leaders begin to feel much less control when they are actually in
office than they do when they initially take over. Additionally, crises do appear to have a
number of notable influences on presidents’ core beliefs. These influences do not vary
systematically across crises and presidents as I had anticipated, but they are evident, and suggest
that crises do play some role toward influencing presidential perceptions of both the international
political environment, and of themselves within this environment.
Further, the process of experiencing multiple crises often has an important impact on
belief change throughout presidencies. Leaders’ beliefs often change in fundamental ways from
crisis from crisis, where their pre-existing beliefs are either strengthened or brought into question
and changed. Perhaps the best example of crises reinforcing beliefs is the case of Clinton who,
following each of the first three crisis periods, feels progressively lower absolute levels of
control than he did in each previous period, before maintaining a stable feeling of control for the
latter part of his presidency. Clinton additionally experiences something similar with his image
and strategic preference variables for the final three crisis periods of his presidency, where
subsequent crises further exacerbate his perception of the world as hostile, and his preference for
conflict.
On the other extreme is President Reagan. In terms of his longer-term belief trends, he
initially “learns” to see the world as more hostile than he initially does, but then begins to see the
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world as more friendly following the first crisis period, and then reverts back to viewing the
world as significantly more hostile following the experience of his second crisis period. A
similar dynamic occurs for Reagan regarding his feelings of control. Though my hypotheses
help somewhat toward explaining Clinton’s changes, I cannot answer the question of why each
of these different leaders seems to be impacted in these respective ways by multiple crises.
However, this observation opens up the possibility for future projects evaluating these
phenomena. Further observations regarding these findings will be discussed at the end of the
following chapter, in which I make broad observations regarding the role of crises on
presidential learning.
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CHAPTER 8: THE INFLUENCE OF PRE-EXISTING BELIEFS AND CRISIS
SALIENCY ON BELIEF CHANGE FOLLOWING CRISES
In the previous chapter, I looked at the narrow influence of crises on belief change.
Though I examined both the magnitude levels and trend level changes of presidential belief
values following crises, I did not take into account a number of factors that might facilitate or
prohibit change following belief exposure. First, the president’s pre-crisis belief levels might be
more or less conducive to change following exposure to a crisis. Further, the variable
components of crises themselves may play a role in mediating the impact of belief change
following crisis exposure. I test both of these possibilities in this chapter, in an attempt to better
flesh out the impact of crises on presidential learning.
8.1 Hypotheses
8.1.1 Section 1: The Influence of Pre-Existing Beliefs on Belief Change Following
Crisis Exposure
The first set of hypotheses are distinct from those in the previous chapter in that I am
concerned with the content of the beliefs that one holds prior to experiencing a crisis, and the
effect of these initial beliefs on learning following crisis exposure. In the previous chapter,
change in these belief levels was tested, but I did not account for the possibility that the type of
belief one holds prior to exposure might play some role in amplifying or muting the influence
that a crisis has on post-crisis beliefs. Here, I test this.
Crises, as noted in the previous chapter, tend to be anxiety-provoking stimuli that bring a
leader face-to-face with what are often the ugly realities of global politics. For the purposes of
“learning,” the interpretation of this reality as either an expected norm or an unexpected violation
of the status quo may be of critical importance. Could it be that some leaders are less
“surprised” encountering conflicts and their aftermaths than are others? Further, might it be that
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the degree of perceived “surprise” experienced by crises may affect belief change to a greater
extent than would be expected in normal, non-crisis situations? I suspect that these two
questions could be answered in the affirmative, an expectation derived from work on cognitive
dissonance (see Festinger, Riecken, and Schachter 1956; Jervis 1976; and Larson 1985).
Cognitive dissonance theory states that the process of undergoing experiences that run
counter to our previously held beliefs are typically either ignored or rationalized, so that they fit
into an individual’s existing belief framework. However, Jervis (1976) notes, “the influence of
an event varies directly with its importance for the person. . .,” and “major events. . .influence
people deeply” (262). Thus deep, meaningful change in one’s beliefs is not unexpected, but
perhaps only in specific, exceptional situations. On such situation might well be exposure to
stimuli of a highly salient nature.
I hypothesize that crisis exposure will most strongly influence learning in certain
instances. Specifically, I expect that those leaders who initially see others in the system as
wicked and hostile (low image of the “other” [P1] levels), who prefer conflict as a strategy over
cooperation (low strategic preference [I1] levels), or who feel that they do not have much control
over events (low feelings of control [P4] levels), will not be significantly influenced by crises.
That is to say, if the world is filled with bad people who do bad things, and if conflictual
preferences breed conflictual outcomes, then why should conflict, when it inevitably occurs, lead
to a change in these beliefs? Similarly, if a leader does not have control over outcomes, and thus
does not possess the ability to avoid crises by forcing his opponents to capitulate, then why
should this leader change his feelings regarding control when these situations arise? In the above
instances, perceptions and reality should intersect in such a way that the belief change occurring
following crisis exposure for those with initially low P1 (image of the “other”), I1 (strategic
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preference), or P4 (control) levels should be minor, if not in the direction of actually reinforcing
previously held beliefs.
On the other hand, I expect that those who initially see the world as a friendly,
cooperative place (high image values), who prefer cooperation over conflict (high strategic
orientation values), and who feel that they have control over events and historical outcomes
(high control values), will be significantly affected by exposure to crises. I expect these
individuals to be quite shocked when their rosy perceptions of reality are brought into question
by a major conflict in the international system involving hostility, threats, or worse. Following
these events, no longer will the friendly image hold, as this will have been replaced by a
cautious, skeptical perception of others who would rather hurt than help if given the choice.
Similarly, the preference for cooperation will have been replaced by a preference for conflict.
Maintaining cooperative preferences toward a world in which conflict can occur might be
viewed as maladaptive at best. And finally, the initial belief of control is gone. Conflict has
occurred despite initial feelings of power and influence, and disturbed the self-image of a
benevolent leader who should inspire others to follow, rather than rebel. The following
hypotheses reflect these expectations:
H1: Following a crisis, leaders who initially perceive the other as hostile, who hold a conflictual
strategic orientation, or who feel low levels of control, will not experience a more significant
change in their beliefs than would be expected by chance, or following non-crisis situations.
H2: Following a crisis, leaders who initially perceive the other as friendly, who hold a
cooperative strategic orientation, or who feel high levels of control, will experience a more
significant change in their beliefs than would be expected by chance, or following non-crisis
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situations. These changes should result in perceptions of an increasingly hostile world, an
increased preference for conflict, and decreased feelings of control over events.
I evaluate Hypotheses H1 and H2 at 6 month time intervals by looking at the average preand post-crisis belief levels for the 6 month periods before and after crisis exposure.63
8.1.2 Section 2: The Influence of Pre-Existing Beliefs and Crisis-Related Factors on
Belief Change Following Crisis Exposure
One possible reason for the lack of findings in the previous chapter is that all crises were
treated as the same. That is to say, I anticipated a uniform manner of belief change following
from each crisis period experienced, as if each crisis were equally influential. However, some
crises should yield a stronger impact on presidents and U.S. behavior than others. For this
second section, I account for this by examining factors that may contribute to the saliency of a
given crisis on presidential perceptions, and thus, on beliefs. For instance, does a crisis that
threatens higher priority values affect leaders to a greater extent than do those that only threaten
lesser values?64 Does the physical proximity of a crisis to the U.S. affect the degree of belief
change? What of the discrepancy in power between the U.S. and its rival in the crisis?
Further, as hypothesized above, might leaders’ pre-existing beliefs have a notable impact
on post-crisis belief change, controlling for crisis saliency? The final set of hypotheses here
begins with an evaluation of the influence of crises on beliefs, accounting for the influence of
other, largely crisis-related influences. I expect that, even accounting for these other influences,
leaders’ pre-crisis beliefs will yield a strong influence on post-crisis belief change, in the manner
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Given that I am aggregating belief values at 6 month intervals, I account for the problem of
outlier values from overly small speech samples in some months as discussed in chapter 4.
64
Relatively speaking, since one component of all crises examined here, as noted in the previous
chapter, is the threat to “basic” values.
214

described for hypotheses H1 and H2 for those with initially low or high values on the image,
strategic preference, and control indicators. Thus:
H3: Following a crisis, controlling for crisis-related factors and the relative novelty of crisis
experience, leaders who initially perceive the other as more friendly, who hold a more
cooperative strategic orientation, or who feel higher levels of control will experience a
significant change in their beliefs toward seeing the world as more hostile, will take on a more
conflictual strategic orientation, and will feel lower levels of control, respectively.
Additional hypotheses are based on the crisis-related variables employed here.
8.1.2.1 Crisis Outcome65
The first crisis-related characteristic tested as an influence on presidential beliefs is crisis
outcome. My interest here comes from an article by Leng (1983) that predicted learning
outcomes based solely on whether one “loses” or “wins” a crisis conflict. His intuitive
assumption is that losses influence leaders to a greater extent than do wins, as wins should only
serve to reinforce the pre-existing behavior that leads to this outcome. Further, Leng argued that
experiencing a loss typically leads to increased belligerence in the next conflict (following realist
expectations that leaders will err on the side of acting more aggressively following a policy
failure). Here, I am able to provide at least a preliminary test of this hypothesis. This is
preliminary because not all military conflicts involving the U.S. are classified as crises as
examined here. Secondly, Leng was predicting behavioral outcomes and not changes in beliefs,
though it could be assumed that the former follows from the latter. Third, in the data examined
here, there is a heavy skew toward U.S. victory in crises (53% of total cases examined) and there
are very few crises in which the U.S. is classified as the “loser” (9% of cases examined),
65

See Appendix F for a description of all crisis-related variables examined here as they are
coded.
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meaning that a simple test of those two categories would not provide an equal comparison of
cases and presents a statistical “power” issue. Regarding this last issue, I expand on Leng’s
notion a bit by including an examination of compromises and stalemates.
Following from the idea developed by Leng, I expect that presidents will learn from the
most to the least following these crisis outcomes, in this order: losses, stalemates, compromises,
and wins. Further, I expect that the kind of learning that takes place following losses and
stalemates will be in the negative direction (toward increased perceptions of hostility, increased
preferences for conflict, and decreased feelings of control), whereas learning following
compromises and wins will lead to belief stability. Though belief stability is the most anticipated
outcome, it is possible that beliefs could also witness increased positive movement on the image
(toward increased perceptions of friendliness), strategic preference (toward increased preference
for cooperation), and feelings control (toward increased feelings of control) indices, as leaders
may “let their guard down” and fail to remain psychologically prepared for future conflict
situations following the satisfaction of a victory. Thus:
H4: The worse the crisis outcome, the more likely presidents will see the world as more hostile,
will more strongly prefer conflict, and will feel less control than they did previously. The better
a crisis outcome, the more likely leaders will maintain their pre-existing beliefs (yielding stable
P1, I1, and P4 scores), or will become more optimistic, leading to an increased perception of
external friendliness, an increased preference for cooperation, and an increase in feelings of
control over events.
Thus, a linear, negative relationship is roughly expected between the degree of “directional”
belief change (measured as post-value belief scores – pre-value belief scores—see the methods
section for more on this) and crisis outcome (ranked from best [victory = 1] to worst [loss = 4]).
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8.1.2.2 Learning over Time
I also examine the role of exposure to international events over time on learning. I expect
that leaders will be more likely to learn early in an administration—when there are fewer
preconceived ideas of how to handle what are, at first, novel situations—than they will be at
some later point. I expect that all crises should “harden” presidential perceptions of the
international environment as specified in earlier hypotheses, but that this “hardening” will be
most extreme following the first crisis. As time goes on and the president gets more accustomed
to conflicts, I expect later, successive crises to have similar, but less profound hypothesized
shifts in beliefs. This hardening would take the form of increased perceptions of hostility,
increased preferences for conflict, and decreased feeling of control over events. Thus:
H5: Initial exposure to crises will yield the most noticeable changes in leaders’ image, strategic
preference, and control beliefs in the negative direction (i.e. toward increased perceptions of
hostility, increased preferences for conflict, and decreased feelings of control, respectively).
However, as time goes on, learning will be less and less pronounced, as further negative shifts
will be less extreme than were previous changes.
This hypothesis predicts a roughly positive relationship between crisis order and “directional”
belief change as measured here.
8.1.2.3 Other Crisis-Oriented Influences
In addition to crisis outcome and the order of crisis exposure, other components of the
crisis itself may play a role in mediating crisis influence on the degree and type of learning that a
president undergoes. Crisis characteristics examined here that might account for belief change
beyond the influence of one’s initial beliefs, are: 1) the extent of violence experienced by the
crisis actor—higher levels of violence experienced are expected to correlate with higher degrees
of belief change in the negative direction; 2) the precipitating cause of the crisis (i.e. a verbal act,
217

political act, violent act, etc.)—expectation being that violent acts should have the strongest,
negative influence on belief change and that “verbal” acts will have the least influence; 3) the
proximity of the crisis to the U.S.—expectations are that crises occurring “closer to home” will
have a greater impact on belief change than crises that occur further away; 4) the discrepancy in
power between the U.S. and its major opponent in a crisis—expectations are that the president
will learn more when interacting with more formidable and threatening adversaries; 5) the initial
issue at stake in the crisis—when issues of greater importance are initially threatened in a crisis,
then presidents are expected to learn more in a “negative” direction; and 6) the most important
object to receive a “grave” level of threat to the U.S. stemming from the crisis—when objects of
greater importance are seriously threatened in a crisis, the president is expected to learn more,
and to learn in a more negative direction. Examples of “objects” that could be threatened here
are: political influence in the world, one’s military or security well-being, and a threat to one’s
existence or way of life (see Appendix F for a more detailed list). Thus, these influences will be
modeled here.
8.2 Methods
8.2.1 Section 1
Whereas the MITS analysis in the previous chapter evaluated all operational code data
for the period before and after crisis initiation, for Hypotheses H1 and H2 in this chapter, I
evaluate only the 6 month periods before and after entire crisis periods. That is to say, I examine
the 6 month periods prior to the onset of these crisis periods, and the 6 month periods following
the termination of these crisis periods. Note that this differs from the analysis of crises in the
previous chapter, where I examine learning immediately following the onset of a crisis in a time
series fashion (a necessary concession given the nature of the statistical analysis employed).
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Unlike in the previous chapter, the order in which the crisis occurs, and the specific president
experiencing the crisis are not taken into account in this section—pre-crisis belief levels are the
only independent variables examined.
Recall that for these hypotheses, I expect those presidents with higher pre-crisis image,
strategic preference, and control values prior to crisis exposure will learn more than will those
with lower values on these indices. To test these hypotheses, “high” and “low” categories were
determined based upon presidents’ pre-crisis operational code scores on each index of interest
for the 6 month periods prior to crisis exposure.66 All average pre-crisis values across all
presidents were rank ordered for each 6 month period, with those falling above the median score
classified as “high,” and those below the median classified as “low.”67 Analysis of Variance
(ANOVA) and Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) methods are used to evaluate the
Hypotheses H1 and H2.
Note that the crises examined here (both in sections 1 and 2) also differ slightly from the
sample of crises examined in the previous chapter. Given the necessity of establishing pre- and
post-crisis event periods for multiple interrupted time series analyses in chapter 7, all
overlapping crises, as well as those that occurred within a few months of each other were lumped
together. In this chapter, this is not as much of an issue. Overlapping crises are still examined as
a single “crisis period” in some instances, but if one crisis occurs more than a few months after
another, they are examined separately. Further, some crises occurring within the first or final
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I settled on the “high” and “low” labels over “positive” and “negative” because U.S. beliefs on
these values are typically positive overall. As such, I am really evaluating those of a “high”
versus “low” positive nature, rather than those that are actually “negative” versus “positive.”
67
I had considered determining “high” and “low” pre-crisis values by looking at the top and
bottom third of rank ordered pre-crisis values, but given the small sample size that would result
from this, I chose instead to include into these groups all operational code averages above and
below the median crisis value.
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few months of a presidency are also included here, though they could not be included in the
MITS analyses of the previous chapter. I did not want to exclude any of these critical events if at
all possible, and as such, made the decision to violate the 6 month rule in a few instances (note
that this was possible as it did not present methodological issues in this chapter as it would have
using MITS analyses in the previous chapter). Thus, early and late crises are included as long as
I have 2 months of pre- or post-crisis data to work with, respectively. A list of crises and crisis
periods examined in this chapter can be found in the Appendix E.
8.2.2 Section 2
As with Section 1 of this chapter, for Section 2 I evaluate the mean belief values for the 6
month periods prior to the onset, and following the termination of crisis periods on the image of
the “other,” strategic preference, and feelings of control operational code belief indices.
However, for this section, the dependent variable of “belief change” was obtained by calculating
each leader’s average belief scores for the 6 month periods following a crisis minus his
respective belief score for the 6 month periods prior to crisis exposure, respectively, resulting in
a value for each belief index that could theoretically range from -2 (in the case of the image and
strategic preference beliefs) or -1 (for the control belief) to +2 (for all beliefs evaluated here).68
A positive score here indicates that a leader’s belief scores increased in value (i.e. these leaders
saw the world as more friendly [increase in P1], preferred more cooperation [increase in I1], or
felt more control [increase in P4]), and negative scores indicate that these scores decreased in

68

I experimented with squaring this value, or taking the absolute value of such in order to
examine absolute forms of belief change, or one’s propensity to “adapt” to one’s environment,
narrowly. However, in this conceptualization of learning a great deal of information is lost, as
this form of data transformation does not allow for an examination of directional changes in
beliefs (e.g. toward increased perceptions of friendliness or hostility). Ultimately, for the
hypotheses being tested in this section, the simple calculation of post-crisis minus pre-crisis
belief scores was seen as the most useful way of evaluating “learning” as it is of interest here.
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value (i.e. these leaders saw the world as less friendly [decrease in P1], preferred less conflict
[decrease in I1], or felt less control [decrease in P4]) following crisis exposure).
By controlling for other potential influences, I can provide a more stringent test of the
influence of psychological predispositions on learning. Here, I employ a number of independent
variables to do just this, taken from the characteristics of the crisis periods, while also testing for
the respective impact of these factors. All crisis-related, independent variables used can be
found in Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s International Crisis Behavior database (see Brecher and
Wilkenfeld, 2009). Variables included are: 1) the crisis outcome for the U.S.; 2) the level of
violence experienced by the U.S.; 3) the act or situation that caused the crisis (i.e. the triggering
event); 4) the proximity of the crisis to the U.S.; 5) the power discrepancy between the U.S. and
its major rival in the crisis; 6) the most important initial issue of concern in the crisis, as
experienced by the U.S.; 7) the most serious U.S. value threatened during the entirety of the
crisis; and 8) the order in which the crisis was experienced for a given president. A description
of these variables and their values can be found in Appendix F. All of these variables are either
interval or ordinal, and thus, hypotheses are tested using OLS regression models.
8.3 Results69
8.3.1 Section 1
Section 1 Evaluates Hypotheses 1 and 2. Again, these are the hypotheses being tested
here:
H1: Following a crisis, leaders who initially perceive the other as hostile, who hold a conflictual
strategic orientation, or who feel low levels of control, will not experience a more significant
change in their beliefs than would be expected by chance, or following non-crisis situations.
69

Note that all hypotheses are evaluated at the one-tailed level of significance, given that I am
evaluating directional hypotheses.
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H2: Following a crisis, leaders who initially perceive the other as friendly, who hold a
cooperative strategic orientation, or who feel high levels of control, will experience a more
significant change in their beliefs than would be expected by chance, or following non-crisis
situations. These changes should result in perceptions of an increasingly hostile world, an
increased preference for conflict, and decreased feelings of control over events.
To begin, Table 8.1 shows the impact of crises on those with initially low and high image
of the “other” (P1) levels for the 6 months70 prior to crisis exposure. Those with initially low P1
levels see the world as a relatively hostile place prior to crisis exposure, and those with initially
high P1 levels see the world as a relatively friendly place prior to crisis exposure. Again,
expectations are that those with initially high P1 levels will yield a significant, negative change
in image belief value following crisis exposure reflecting increased perceptions of hostility, and
that those with initially low P1 levels will not yield a significant change in beliefs.
Table 8.1: ICB 6 Months Image of the External Environment (P1) ANOVA Results
Initially Low P1 (perceptions of hostility)
M
St Dev
N
Pre-Crisis
.380
.042
15
Post-Crisis
.421
.051
15
SS
df
MS
F
Between
.012
1
.012
5.643**
Within
.061
28
.002
Initially High P1 (perceptions of friendliness)
M
St Dev
N
Pre-Crisis
.525
.071
15
Post-Crisis
.436
.097
15
SS
df
MS
F
Between
.059
1
.059
8.116**
Within
.204
28
.007

70

Note that I also tested all hypotheses here by looking at the 3 month pre- and post-crisis
periods in order to gauge “short” term learning (versus the “moderate” term learning examined at
6 month intervals here). However, the results for the 3 month analyses were so similar to that of
the 6 month tests that they were not included in the results described here.
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Note: all statistical tests evaluated at the 1-tailed level of significance
**prob<.05
These results provide some preliminary support for hypothesis H2, as leaders who
initially see the world as a friendly place do, in fact, see the world as significantly more hostile
following crisis exposure (F=8.116, prob<.05). However, hypothesis H1 is not given support, as
those who initially see the world as a hostile place actually see the world as significantly more
friendly than they initially did in the 6 months following crisis exposure (F=5.643, prob<.05).
This latter finding is surprising, as it does not make intuitive sense that those who see the world
as hostile would shift their perceptions toward seeing the world as friendlier following a crisis
situation. Further, this finding may bring into question the above stated support for hypothesis
H2. Instead of the expected belief change process taking place in Hypotheses H2 and H1, it may
be that crises act as a type of generalized, moderating influence on perceptions of the other,
bringing them to some “equilibrium” point irrespective of whether they are initially hostile or
friendly. However, let us put further speculation regarding this finding on hold for the moment
(I will come back to this later).
Table 8.2 conveys the impact of crises on those with initially low and initially high
strategic preferences (I1 levels) for the 6 months prior to crisis exposure. Those with initially
high I1 levels prefer the strategy of cooperation to a greater extent than do others prior to crisis
exposure, whereas those with initially low I1 levels prefer the strategy of conflict to a greater
extent than do others. Findings here are similar to those in Table 8.1. Hypothesis H2 is given
preliminary, modest support, as those with initially high strategic preference levels yield a
statistically significant downward shift on this measure following crisis exposure, toward
increased preferences for conflict (F=2.597, prob<.10). However, as with findings on the image
index, hypothesis H1 is not supported for the strategic preferences index, as those who initially
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prefer conflict actually yield a statistically significant shift toward preferring cooperation
following crisis exposure (F=3.786, prob<.05). As with the image measure, this finding
regarding those with initially low strategic preference levels is surprising. That is to say, why
would leaders who first prefer conflict prefer cooperation following a crisis?
Table 8.2: ICB 6 Months Strategic Preferences (I1) ANOVA Results
Initially Low I1 (preference for conflict)
M
St Dev
N
Pre-Crisis
.526
.187
15
Post-Crisis
.634
.108
15
SS
df
MS
F
Between
.088
1
.088
3.786**
Within
.654
28
.023
Initially High I1 (preference for cooperation)
M
St Dev
N
Pre-Crisis
.707
.047
15
Post-Crisis
.668
.080
15
SS
df
MS
F
Between
.011
1
.011
2.597*
Within
.121
28
.004

Note: all statistical tests evaluated at the 1-tailed level of significance
**prob<.05
*prob<.10
Table 8.3: ICB 6 Months Feelings of Control (P4) ANOVA Results
Note: all statistical tests evaluated at the 1-tailed level of significance
*prob<.10
Initially Low P4 (low feelings of control)
M
St Dev
N
Pre-Crisis
.262
.033
15
Post-Crisis
.279
.030
15
SS
df
MS
Between
.002
1
.002
Within
.028
28
.001
Initially High P4 (high feelings of control)
M
St Dev
N
Pre-Crisis
.337
.025
15
Post-Crisis
.331
.046
15

F
2.192*
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Table 8.3 (cont.)
Between
Within

SS
.000
.038

df
1
28

MS
.000

F
.156

Table 8.3 gives results concerning the impact of crises on those with initially low and
initially high control (P4) levels for the 6 months prior to crisis exposure. Recall that those with
initially high control levels feel more control than others do prior to crisis exposure, and those
with initially low control levels feel less control than others prior to crisis exposure. Hypothesis
H2 is not given support in this analysis, as those who initially feel higher levels of control do not
feel less control following crisis exposure. However, H1 also fails to receive support as, similar
to the results regarding the image and strategic preference measures, those who initially feel
relatively powerless tend to feel significantly more control following crisis exposure (F=2.192,
prob<.10). Though counter to hypothesized expectations, this specific finding may not be so
surprising on further thought. In the sample of cases evaluated, the U.S. “lost” only 3 crises, and
won 16 of them. Given that the U.S. usually comes out of crises without “losing” (even if they
don’t always “win”), the experience of undergoing a crisis in the U.S. may well help to give
leaders increased feelings of control and power over their environment than they felt beforehand.
Now that we have evaluated the 3 psychological variables of interest for 6 month periods
before and after crisis exposure, let us come back to the unexpected results for those with
initially low image (P1) and strategic preference (I1) levels. Does this finding really suggest that
both Hypotheses H2 and H1 are not supported for these belief variables? Though only H1 does
not appear to be supported on its surface, if crises simply behave as generalized moderating
influences on beliefs, or if they act no differently than might be expected in any given non-crisis
period, then the assumptions behind the findings that support hypothesis H2 would be incorrect
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as well, despite technical empirical support to the contrary for the “image of the ‘other’” and
“strategic orientation” variables.
Given the above dilemma, I test the degree to which these findings could have been the
result of chance. Toward this end, I examine 37 randomly chosen, non-crisis (and non-dispute71)
time periods for the presidencies examined here (these periods are referred to from here on out as
“non-occurrences,” since there were no major international crisis or dispute occurrences of note
during the times examined). These times were chosen during non-crisis periods with the idea
that if there were noticeable differences in either the direction or degree of belief change
following from these periods versus those found with the crisis models above, then there may
well be something to the peculiar relationship found above, beyond a simple “regression to the
mean.” However, if a similar trend to that found in Tables 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 were found in this
random selection of data, then the relationship found in the above analyses could be said to
simply reflect a regression to the mean with no other systematic explanation.
In order to evaluate these possibilities, the “non-occurrences” were evaluated as if they
were crises (these “non-occurrences” lasted from a few days up to a few months in length—
length was chosen at random to roughly correlate with the variable length of the crises
examined). Thus the image, strategic preference, and feelings of control scores for the 6 months
prior to the onset of these “non-occurrences” were averaged out, and rank-ordered into “high”
and “low” “pre-non-occurrence” groups on each operational code index (grouping was again
based upon the median belief value, with half of the cases falling into the “high” category, and
half falling into the “low” category). These data were then used to compare the data evaluated in
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I also ensured that these crises did not occur during periods of Militarized Interstate Disputes
(MIDs—see Jones, Bremer, and Singer [1996]) in order to best ensure that these were periods of
relative “peace.”
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Tables 8.1-8.3 against a non-crisis, “control” group. This comparison was made via betweengroups Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA). The factors compared in these
MANOVAs are crisis vs. non-occurrence, and pre- vs. post-crisis belief values. The main
finding of interest in these MANOVAs is the interaction between the two factors of interest. If
there is a significant difference between the interactions of crisis vs. non-occurrence samples on
the direction and degree of pre- vs. post-crisis belief change experienced, then we might say that
the crisis sample differs in a notable way from the non-crisis sample in the manner of learning
that takes place following crisis exposure. If, on the other hand, we find no significant
difference, then we may presume that crises do not affect learning as evaluated here in any
noteworthy way. Instead, we could say that crises only affected belief change in the direction
and degree that one would expect by chance.
I examine 2 models for each belief measure. The first will compare those with initially
low “pre-crisis” values against those with initially low “pre-non-occurrence” values. The second
will compare those with initially high “pre-crisis” values against those with initially high “prenon-occurrence” values. I expect that there will be no significant difference in belief change
between those groups evaluated in the “low” models, which would suggest that crises do not
have any special, notable effect on belief change, as measured here, for those with initially low
belief values. However, I expect that there will be a significant difference between those groups
evaluated in the “high” models, as I expect that crises will have a stronger, expected influence on
those with high belief values prior to crisis exposure, in expected directions, than “nonoccurrences” will on presidents with similar pre-“non-occurrence” belief levels.
Table 8.4 gives the results of the crisis/non-occurrence comparisons for presidents’ belief
change on the image of the “other” (P1) index, at evaluation periods of six months before and
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after crises and “non-occurrences.” The first section of this table examines leaders with “low”
image values (again, those who saw the world as a relatively hostile place) prior to either crises
or “non-occurrences.” Results suggest that, when they initially see the world as hostile, the
degree of belief change experienced by presidents does not differ significantly based upon
whether or not a crisis occurs (F=.03, prob=.427). This follows hypothesized expectations. The
second section of this table evaluates how the beliefs of leaders with initially “high” image
values (that is, those who initially see the world as relatively “friendly”) change following
exposure to crises and “non-occurrences.” Results here also suggest that, when they initially see
the world as “friendly,” the degree of belief change experienced by presidents also does not
differ significantly based upon whether or not a crisis occurs (F=.13, prob=.326). This runs
counter to hypothesized expectations, as I expected that these individuals would “learn” from
these crisis experiences to a more significant extent than would be expected by chance.
Table 8.4: ICB 6 Month MANOVAs for P1 Crisis/Non-Crisis Comparisons
Leaders with Initially Low P1 Values
Factors
M
SD
Non-Occurrence
Pre-Event
.368
.043
Post-Event
.415
.095
Crisis
Pre-Crisis
.380
.042
Post-Crisis
.421
.051
For Entire Sample
.396
.066
SS
DF
MS
Within Cells
.25
62
.00
Non-Occurrence/Crisis .00
1
.00
Pre/Post
.03
1
.03
High/LowXPre/Post
.00
1
.00
Model
.03
3
.01
Total
.28
65
.00
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

.118
.075
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N
18
18
15
15
66
F
.33
7.75**
.03
2.76**

Table 8.4 (cont.)
Leaders with Initially High P1 Values
Factors
M
SD
Non-Occurrence
Pre-Event
.509
.047
Post-Event
.435
.110
Crisis
Pre-Crisis
.525
.071
Post-Crisis
.436
.097
For Entire Sample
.476
.092
SS
DF
MS
Within Cells
.45
62
.01
Non-Occurrence/Crisis .00
1
.00
Pre/Post
.11
1
11
High/LowXPre/Post
.00
1
.00
Model
.11
3
.04
Total
.56
65
.01
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

N
18
18
15
15
66
F
.15
15.02***
.13
5.06***

.197
.158

***prob<.01
**prob<.05
Given that expectations are not supported by the empirical evidence, including the
crisis/non-occurrence comparisons, I cannot reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis H2
regarding the image index. Hypothesis H1 is given partial support, in that crises do not affect
those who initially see the world as hostile to any greater extent than would be expected by
chance. However, the lack of support for Hypothesis H1 regarding the image index in the
earlier, ANOVA results (i.e. following crisis exposure, there is a significant degree of belief
change experienced by individuals who initially see the world as hostile) suggests that we cannot
reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis H1, either.72
Table 8.5 gives the results of the crisis/non-crisis comparisons for presidents’ belief
change on the strategic preferences (I1) index, at evaluation periods of six months before and
72

If the earlier ANOVA findings showed that there was no significant change in beliefs
following crisis exposure for those with initial perceptions of the world as a hostile place (which
would have supported Hypothesis H1), then a null finding on the interaction term in the
MANOVA here would give further support to Hypothesis H1, but that was not the case.
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after crises and “non-occurrences.” As with Table 8.4, the first section evaluates those
presidents with initially low strategic preference levels—that is to say, those who preferred
conflict over cooperation in the six months leading up to a crisis or “non-occurrence.” Here, the
interaction finding suggests that there is no significant difference in the degree of belief change
that occurs between the crisis and “non-occurrence” samples (F=.26, prob=.306), as expected.
The second section evaluates those presidents who preferred cooperation to a greater extent than
did others prior to crisis or “non-occurrence” exposure. Findings show that there is a statistically
significant difference in belief change between those who encountered crisis periods and those
who did not (F=2.76, prob=.051—both groups experience a change toward increased preferences
for conflict following crises and “non-occurrences,” respectively). However, the degree of belief
change experienced by those in the “non-occurrence” time periods is actually greater than the
belief change experienced by those in the crisis periods (an I1 belief index change of .101 is
found for “non-occurrence” group, and a change of .039 is found for the crisis group). Thus, if
anything, we might say that crises stabilize, or reinforce the strategic preferences of those who
initially prefer cooperation to a greater extent than would be the case in non-crisis situations.
Following from this, as well as the findings from Table 8.2 showing that those with initially low
I1 values (preferences for conflict) experience a significant, upward shift in belief values
following crisis exposure (toward increased preferences for cooperation), we cannot reject the
null hypothesis for hypotheses H1 and H2 regarding the strategic preferences operational code
belief index at the 6 month level of evaluation.
Table 8.6 contains the results of the crisis/non-crisis comparisons for presidents’ belief
changes on the feelings of control (P4) index, at evaluation periods of six months before and
after crises and “non-occurrences.” Note that, based upon the results found in Table 8.3, we
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Table 8.5: ICB 6 Month MANOVAs for I1 Crisis/Non-Crisis Comparisons
Note: all statistical tests evaluated at the 1-tailed level of significance
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10
Leaders with Initially Low I1 Values
Factors
M
SD
Non-Occurrence
Pre-Event
.573
.061
Post-Event
.651
.113
Crisis
Pre-Crisis
.526
.187
Post-Crisis
.634
.108
For Entire Sample
.597
.130
SS
DF
MS
Within Cells
.93
62
.02
Non-Occurrence/Crisis
.02
1
.02
Pre/Post
.14
1
.14
High/LowXPre/Post
.00
1
.00
Model
.16
3
.05
Total
.16
3
.02
R-Squared
.146
Adjusted R-Squared
.105
Leaders with Initially High I1 Values
Factors
M
SD
Non-Occurrence
.709
.039
Pre-Event
Post-Event
.608
.112
Crisis
Pre-Crisis
.707
.047
Post-Crisis
.668
.080
For Entire Sample
.672
.086
SS
DF
MS
Within Cells
.36
62
.01
Non-Occurrence/Crisis
.01
1
.01
Pre/Post
.08
1
.08
High/LowXPre/Post
.02
1
.02
Model
.12
3
.04
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N
18
18
15
15
66
F
1.10
9.43**
.26
3.53**

N
18
18
15
15
66
F
2.32*
13.83***
2.76*
6.73**

Table 8.5 (cont.)
Total

.48

R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

.246
.209

65

.01

already know that we cannot reject the null hypothetical expectations for Hypotheses H1 or H2
on this belief index. Nonetheless, it may still be useful to compare the impact of president’s precrisis feelings of control on belief change versus what might be expected by chance, for the sake
of understanding how control beliefs are affected by crises. As such, I report MANOVA results
here. The first section of Table 8.6 gives results for those presidents with initially low feelings
of control levels—or those who felt less control than others over world events in the six months
leading up to a crisis or “non-occurrence.” Results indicate that there is no significant difference
in belief change between for presidents in crisis and non-crisis samples (F=.26, prob=.306), as
expected. The second section here evaluates those presidents with initially high feelings of
control levels—or those who felt more control over world events than did others prior to crises
and “non-occurrences.” Results here show that crisis exposure does have a modestly significant
impact on the learning behavior of these leaders (F=2.14, prob<.10). However, as with the I1
findings in Table 8.5, those in the “non-occurrence” sample actually yielded a stronger,
downward shift in their P4 values (a change in belief values of .032) than did those in the crisis
sample (who yielded a downward shift in their P4 values of .006). Thus, when evaluating those
presidents with relatively high feelings of control in a given six month period of time, crises
appear to actually reinforce existing feelings of control to a greater extent than is the case in noncrisis situations.
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Table 8.6: ICB 6 Month MANOVAs for P4 Crisis/Non-Crisis Comparisons
Leaders with Initially Low P4 Values
Factors
M
SD
Non-Occurrence
Pre-Event
.266
.021
Post-Event
.275
.031
Crisis
Pre-Crisis
.262
.033
Post-Crisis
.279
.030
For Entire Sample
.271
.029
SS
DF
MS
Within Cells
.05
62
.00
Non-Occurrence/Crisis .00
1
.00
Pre/Post
.00
1
.00
High/LowXPre/Post
.00
1
.00
Model
Total

.00
.06

3
65

.00
.00

18
18
15
15
66
F
.00
3.48**
.26
1.20

R-Squared
.055
Adjusted R-Squared
.009
Leaders with Initially High P4 Values
Factors
M
SD
Non-Occurrence
Pre-Event
.331
.030
Post-Event
.299
.043
Crisis
Pre-Crisis
.337
.025
Post-Crisis
.331
.046
For Entire Sample
.323
.039
SS
DF
MS
Within Cells
.09
62
.00
Non-Occurrence/Crisis .01
1
.01
Pre/Post
.01
1
.01
SS
DF
MS
High/LowXPre/Post
.00
1
.00
Model
.02
3
.01
Total
.10
65
.00
R-Squared
Adjusted R-Squared

N

N
18
18
15
15
F
4.41**
4.18**
F
2.14*
3.78**

.155
.114

**prob<.05
*prob<.10
Note: all statistical tests evaluated at the 1-tailed level of significance
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8.3.2 Section 2
Section 2 evaluates Hypotheses H3 through H5. Here, I look at the relative impact of
individual psychological and crisis-based factors on learning following crisis exposure. As
stated in the methods section, the dependent variable (the degree of belief change following
crisis exposure) was calculated by subtracting pre-crisis belief values from post-crisis belief
values. Negative values here indicate belief change in a negative direction, with stronger
negative values indicating more negative change. In other words, negative values suggest a
tendency toward increased perceptions of hostility on the image of the external environment (P1)
variable, an increased preference for conflict on the strategic preferences (I1) measure, and a
decreased feeling of control over world events on the control (P4) variable. Conversely, positive
values on this dependent variable indicate belief change in a positive direction, with more
positive values indicating more positive change. That is to say, toward increased perceptions of
friendliness on the image (P1) variable, an increased preference for cooperation on the strategy
(I1) variable, and an increased feeling of control on the control (P4) variable.
Here again are the hypotheses being evaluated in this section:
H3: Following a crisis, controlling for crisis-related factors and the relative novelty of crisis
experience, leaders who initially perceive the other as more friendly, who hold a more
cooperative strategic orientation, or who feel higher levels of control will experience a
significant change in their beliefs toward seeing the world as more hostile, will take on a more
conflictual strategic orientation, and will feel lower levels of control, respectively.
H4: The worse the crisis outcome, the more likely presidents will see the world as more hostile,
will more strongly prefer conflict, and will feel less control than they did previously. The better
a crisis outcome, the more likely leaders will maintain their pre-existing beliefs (yielding stable
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P1, I1, and P4 scores), or will become more optimistic, leading to an increased perception of
external friendliness, an increased preference for cooperation, and an increase in feelings of
control over events.
H5: Initial exposure to crises will yield the most noticeable changes in leaders’ image, strategic
preference, and control beliefs in the negative direction (i.e. toward increased perceptions of
hostility, increased preferences for conflict, and decreased feelings of control, respectively), but
as time goes on, learning will occur to a lesser and lesser degree, and further change will be less
negative in nature (i.e. toward increased perceptions of friendliness, increased preferences for
cooperation, and increased feelings of control).
Table 8.7 gives regression results for belief change on all three psychological variables of
interest at six month periods before and after crisis exposure. Findings indicate that for the
model examining the image of the “other” (Model I), the president’s pre-crisis belief score on
this index plays a significant mediating role regarding the influence of crisis exposure on belief
change, when taking assorted crisis-related factors into account (t=-4.859, prob<.001). Thus,
after undergoing a crisis, presidents who initially view the world as a relatively friendly place
tend to see the world as more hostile than they did beforehand. However, this finding also
suggests that leaders who initially view the world as hostile tend to see the world in a much
friendlier manner (as we saw in the earlier ANOVA and MANOVA analyses).73 Thus, the
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I had initially planned on looking at those with initially “high” and “low” operational code
belief measures separately in regression analyses here (similar to how they were evaluated in
section 2). However, this would have reduced the sample size by half, creating statistical
“power” problems in evaluating the number of controls included in these models. Further, given
the observed linear relationship between pre-crisis belief values and belief change irrespective of
pre-crisis beliefs (as evidenced by the findings in section 2), there is no real reason to expect
notable findings in a model exclusively evaluating those with initially “high” or “low” belief
values.
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support for this hypothesis is moderated by the fact that the impact of presidential pre-crisis
image values on belief change is not restricted solely to those with initially friendly perceptions
of the outside world.
Regarding the crisis-related variables in Model I, the more important the initial “issue”
threatened in a crisis, the more hostile presidents see the world following crisis exposure (t=1.743, prob<.05). This suggests that when issues of a military and security variety lie at the basis
of a crisis, leaders view the world in a more hostile fashion following crisis exposure than is the
case when less salient issues (such as those of a “cultural” or economic nature) are at issue.
Further, the more significant the threat occurring within a crisis (t=-2.545, prob<.05), the more
hostile presidents see the world following crisis exposure, following hypothesized expectations.
Interestingly, the “level of violence experienced” variable runs counter to expectations
(t=1.814, prob<.05), indicating that the higher the level of violence experienced during a crisis,
the more friendly leaders will view the world in the period following crisis exposure. Similarly,
the “triggering event” factor in Model I suggests that the more significant and threatening the
triggering event, the more friendly the president sees the world following crisis exposure. Given
that neither the crisis outcome or crisis order variables are statistically significant, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis for hypotheses H4 or H5 regarding the image variable.
In Model II of Table 8.7, I evaluate factors impacting changes in presidents’ strategic preferences
following crisis exposure at six month periods. Similar to Model I, the psychological variable
here is statistically significant, suggesting that leaders who initially prefer cooperation tend to
prefer conflict following crisis exposure, and that those who initially prefer conflict tend to
prefer cooperation following crisis exposure. This pre-crisis belief value, though not having the
precise effect hypothesized, again appears to strongly influence belief change to a greater extent
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than any other variable examined. The “grave threat” variable is also modestly significant here
(-1.478, prob<.10), indicating that the graver the threat during a crisis, the more the president
Table 8.7: Influences on U.S. Presidential Belief Change following Crisis Exposure (Measured
as Post Crisis Beliefs – Pre Crisis Beliefs) at Six Month Intervals
Model II: Strategic
Preference (I1)

Model I: Image of the
Opponent (P1)
b
Pre-Crisis Belief Value
(-)
Outcome (-)

t

b

t

Model III: Feelings
of Control (P4)
b

t

-0.844

-4.859***

-0.816

-5.569***

-0.427

-2.699**

-0.009

-0.578

-0.006

-0.276

0.013

1.614*

Violence (-)

0.026

1.814**

0.001

0.030

0.011

1.491*

Triggering Event (-)

0.007

1.383*

-0.001

-0.141

0.001

0.354

-0.012

-0.760

-0.012

-0.590

-0.005

-0.604

0.000

-0.728

0.000

-0.717

0.000

-0.484

Issue (-)

-0.040

-1.743**

-0.014

-0.438

-0.017

-1.374*

Grave Threat (-)

-0.064

-2.545**

-0.053

-1.478*

0.019

1.369*

Crisis Order (+)

0.008

0.995

0.007

0.611

0.002

0.505

(Constant)

0.570

3.673***

0.746

4.324***

0.105

1.381*

Proximity (+)
Power Discrepancy (+)

N

30

30

30

R2

0.747

0.725

0.418

Adjusted R2

0.633

0.602

0.156

***prob<.001
**prob<.05
*prob<.10
will prefer conflict following such. No other crisis-based variable is significant in this model.
Thus, hypothesis H3 is given support for the strategic preferences variable in the manner that it
was supported in Model I, whereas hypotheses H4 and H5 are not given support.
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Model III of Table 8.7 evaluates factors impacting changes in feelings of control at six
month periods following crisis exposure. Once again, the psychological variable of interest here
is statistically significant, suggesting that those who initially feel higher levels of control will
feel significantly less control following crisis exposure, whereas those who initially experience
lower levels of control will feel more control following crisis exposure (F=-2.699, prob<.05).
Though it appears that Hypothesis H3 is given support here, when we look at the results from
Table 8.3, it seems that this finding can be largely attributed to those leaders that have initially
low control values, whose post-crisis belief change values help to produce the expected, negative
relationship between pre-crisis control beliefs and post-crisis belief change values.
Additionally, there are a few modestly significant findings regarding crisis-based
variables here. The more significant the initial issue being disputed in the crisis, the less control
a leader feels following crisis exposure (F=-1.374, prob<.10). However, three other variables
yield unexpected findings. The more negative the outcome for the U.S., the more control
presidents feel following crisis exposure (F=1.614, prob<.10), running in opposition to
Hypothesis H4. Further, presidents who experience higher levels of violence during crises also
seem to feel more control following crisis exposure (F=1.491, prob<.10), and when more serious
threats are experienced, these leaders also seem to feel more control following crisis exposure
(F=1.369, prob<.10).
Taken together, the latter three findings above tell a strange tale that begs the question:
why would worse experiences and outcomes lead to a president feeling greater control following
a crisis, and better experiences make him feel less control? It may be that following highly
undesirable experiences and outcomes, presidents feel a stronger than average need to convince
the U.S. public, the international community, and other members of their own government feel
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that they have a “grip” on things. That is to say, once the U.S. goes through hard times during
crises, leaders would have an interest in propagating the idea that such negative experiences are
not likely to occur again in the future. Otherwise, they might lose domestic political support,
which is necessary to obtaining preferred policy outcomes. Further, the U.S. might lose
credibility in the eyes of those abroad, which could have a detrimental impact on U.S. foreign
policy. This is not to say that this is a conscious decision, as this belief might change
subconsciously as a means to better adapt to the international environment. Examined from this
perspective, the findings here might not be that surprising. Ultimately, however, hypotheses H4
and H5 fail to receive support when evaluating the control variable at six month periods.
8.4 Discussion
There were a number of questions addressed in this chapter, but what broad lessons can
we take away from all of this? In section 1, I find that beliefs tend to fluctuate around an
equilibrium point at both 6 month periods of analysis, and are not affected in a systematic,
predictable way by the impact of crises. Additionally, I found that for those who initially prefer
cooperation, or who feel high levels of control, crises actually help to reinforce existing beliefs to
a greater extent than what would be expected by chance (via the crisis vs. “non-occurrence”
comparisons). This is an interesting finding, and though it suggests the exact opposite of what
was hypothesized, it is not unreasonable to imagine certain personality-types, or leaders in
certain situations, finding greater faith in their pre-crisis beliefs if a crisis either turns out in a
way that reinforces pre-crisis beliefs, or reinforces something about their pre-conceived belief
framework—even if these beliefs are not based on a pessimistic, negative view of the world.
That is to say, perhaps some crises are not viewed as being noxious, painful experiences, a fact
that may explain many of the results both in this, and the previous chapter.
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With section 2 I find some support for my hypothesis that, accounting for the impact of
crisis-related controls, those with initially high image, strategic preference, and control values
tend to experience a significant downward shift on these belief values. However, as the findings
from section 1 demonstrate, those with initially low belief values also experience a fair degree of
belief change in the opposite direction, counter to hypothesized expectations. Despite this, these
regression findings do seem to tell an interesting story in that, even controlling for crises-related
factors, learning from crises can be best explained by evaluating pre-crisis belief levels, as those
coefficients were the most statistically significant of all variables examined. As with the general
findings from section 1, this suggests that the need for leaders’ beliefs to reach an equilibrium
point of sorts is incredibly powerful—those with values that are too extreme one way or the other
will tend to experience a shift of values in the opposing direction following a crisis. This again
gives support to the notion that cognitive balance is critically important for political leaders, as it
is for the rest of us.
Additionally, the regression results in section 2 regarding the crisis-related variables,
though not giving much support to formal hypotheses posed, did yield some interesting expected,
as well as unexpected findings. For example, when more serious issues are at stake, leaders
seem to view the world as more hostile, and to more strongly prefer conflict following crisis
exposure. Conversely, when more violence takes place, and when more significant values are
threatened in a crisis, leaders tend to feel more control following this experience.
Despite these interesting and potentially useful findings, however, I would be remiss not
to note that throughout this and the previous chapter, there is only sporadic support for the
various hypotheses laid out. As such, crises do not appear to hold the type of systematic
influence on leaders’ beliefs that I initially expected.
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Thus, for future analyses, researchers evaluating crises in a “large-n” manner might do
well to take a more hands on role in determining which crises are being evaluated and why. I
attempted here, concurrently, to minimize my own subjective influence on crisis case selection
while maximizing my sample size. I did this by using Brecher and Wilkenfeld’s database and
using a set of simple and limited criteria for including or removing cases from analysis.
However, again, some crises clearly matter more to the U.S. than do others, and are more clearly
“crises” for the U.S. than are others. I attempted to account for some of these factors in section
2, but the results from chapter 7 and section 1 in this chapter might have been far different if a
different selection of crises were evaluated.
Secondly, it might simply be that crises and pre-crisis beliefs simply don’t play the kinds
of systematic roles on belief change that I anticipate here. There are innumerable influences on a
leader’s beliefs at a given point in time, and it may just be that the experience of going through a
crisis does not have a simple, directional, systematic impact on beliefs when there are so many
other factors that might play a role. As noted in the beginning of this section, there are some
interesting findings here, but when these findings vary so much from president to president, and
across different crises, they might be better suited to evaluation as idiosyncratic and independent,
rather than systematic, phenomena.
One other potential reason for my lack of findings could be that I was not looking at the
right psychological variables. Here, I examine initially high and low values on three major belief
indices, and the systematic, anticipated impact of crises on these different groups appears not to
have occurred. However, there are a number of other psychological and non-psychological
differences (and different ways to evaluate these differences) between presidents and other
political elites. By examining these different phenomena, we might be better able to tell a more
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complete story of how crises affect beliefs, and of how predispositions and other individual-level
factors help to mediate the impact of crises on psychological change. For example, looking at
other operational code beliefs, levels of conceptual complexity, motivations, levels of experience
and interest in foreign policy, and perhaps even political ideology could help us to better
understand how leaders learn from crises.
Additionally, for future work, it might be useful to evaluate crises as having multiple
potential influences on leaders’ beliefs, in ways that are more complex and nuanced than those
hypothesized here. Here, I test whether crises have an influence on leader’s beliefs. Behind this
expectation is an assumption that leaders will not only be impacted by crisis events in a certain
way, but will be impacted by these events at all. However, this might not always be the case.
The psychologist Robert White (following the work of Jean Piaget) listed three forms of
“adaptation”—1) mastery (trying to take control over one’s environment); 2) coping (allowing
the environment to impact the individual); and 3) defense (ignoring one’s environment, and thus
refusing to either change it, or to be changed by it—Oneal, 1982: 14-15). The assumption
behind this chapter is that leaders adapt by “coping,” at least to a certain extent. However, it
may well be that presidents often engage in mastery and/or defense to such an extent that they do
not “learn” much, if anything, from certain crisis experiences.
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CHAPTER 9: THE INFLUENCE OF PRESIDENTIAL LEARNING ON
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ACTIONS
Thus far, this dissertation has been focused on presidential belief change as the dependent
variable. That is to say—what are the dynamics of belief change, and what accounts for these
changes? In this chapter, I instead treat belief change as an independent variable potentially
influencing U.S. policy behavior.
The ultimate goal of elite-level political psychological research for many researchers is
not to understand leader psychology for its own sake, but rather to better understand how and
when psychology matters toward influencing policy and political outcomes. Even if we know
what leaders think and feel, what does this matter if these thoughts and feelings do not influence
behavior? Most political psychologists assume that psychology “matters,” and the line of
research treating behavior and outcomes as dependent variable is necessary toward
demonstrating if and when this is the case.
Here, I take a preliminary step toward understanding how one specific psychological
phenomenon—the change in leaders’ operational code beliefs—may impact U.S. foreign policy
actions. Elsewhere (Robison 2009) I have examined the impact of the “image” operational code
belief values on policy actions, and found that this belief is a significant predictor of U.S. policy,
even controlling for other various domestic and international factors. But beyond belief levels
narrowly, the degree and type of belief change may also play a role toward influencing policy.
For instance, is U.S. policy more hostile following a sharp change in beliefs toward seeing the
world as more hostile, beyond what would be expected when these beliefs undergo less notable
change, or a change toward perceptions of friendliness? The expectation here is that when
beliefs change in a dramatic fashion over a short period of time, U.S. behavior will be more
affected than when a less dramatic change occurs.
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Of course, there are multiple potential reasons for dramatic, short-term change in beliefs
(many of which were discussed and tested previously in this dissertation). In this chapter, I am
not concerned with this, from a theoretical or methodological standpoint. Instead, I simply want
to know if belief change, when it does occur for whatever reason, is a statistically significant
predictor of U.S. policy action (in that more dramatic change leads to more extreme policy
behavior), and if this finding holds controlling for other potential influences.
U.S. policy itself is influenced by a complex array of factors, and is generally quite stable
from month to month. Thus, if I can demonstrate that changes in beliefs play a notable role
toward influencing policy, then I would be making a strong case for the inclusion of
psychological variables in analyses of the factors influencing U.S. foreign policy. As with
previous chapters, I examine the three “master” beliefs here of the president’s image of “the
other,” strategic orientation, and feelings of historical control over the international political
environment.
9.1 The Use of Force
Perhaps the area of research most closely approximating that undertaken here is that
examining the use of force (usually, but not always or only, initiated by the United States).
Similar to much of the work in this dissertation, the use of force literature frequently integrates
factors from both the international and domestic political spheres as influences on state policy
action, demonstrating that both are important to consider when examining the decision to use
military force. This literature also explicitly takes into account the role of important decisionmakers as “cognitive misers” who are unable to fulfill the requirements assumed by rational
actor models (Ostrom and Job 1986, 543). Much of this work has focused on the “diversionary”
use of force, which examines whether periods of low public support or economic well-being will
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contribute to the use of force abroad as a means to distract attention from domestic political woes
(Clark 2003; Enterline and Gleditsch 2000; James and Oneal 1991; Miller 1999). Dependent
variables in this literature can range from the use of force as measured by militarized interstate
disputes (Fordham 2001) to Blechman and Kaplan’s database of forceful acts (Ostrom and Job
1986) to the use of events data (Goldstein and Freeman 1990).
Despite all the work that has been done in this area, however, none of it has, to this
author’s knowledge, included actual variables representing leader psychology in the statistical
models employed. Psychology is often embedded in the theory within these works,
distinguishing them from more “structural” examinations of world politics. However, these
psychological factors are usually assumed to be intervening variables between various
international- and domestic-based factors and the dependent variable of the decision to use force.
This project departs from these works by explicitly factoring psychology into these models on
the independent variable side of the equation. Specifically, I look at operational code belief
change as a potential influence on policy actions.
Further , this project diverges from most in its evaluation not simply of conflict, but of
cooperation as a form of policy behavior. The reasons for this difference are more based on
theory than a lack of empirical data (which may account for the failure to include psychological
measurements on the “right” side of the equation), since much research treats conflict as existing
in a fundamentally separate theoretical domain from cooperation, necessitating independent
analysis. However, when considering the potential influence of psychology, I do not wish to
assume from the get-go that conflict alone may be explained by presidential beliefs—or by other
foreign or domestic influences, for that matter. Nor do I wish to suggest that cooperation is
unworthy of attention. Instead, here I examine belief change and other factors as potential
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influences on actions across the cooperation-conflict spectrum. Note however, that I do run
statistical models examining conflict and cooperation alone, as a preliminary test of whether it
makes some sense to disentangle these “types” of behavior in models of this kind.
9.2 Hypotheses
9.2.1 Operational Code Belief Change Hypotheses
Hypotheses follow from the earlier stated expectation that more dramatic change in
beliefs will lead to more extreme policy actions—being either more hostile or cooperative than
what would be expected following less dramatic belief change. Note that I am concerned with
the independent variable of short-term belief change from month to month, and with the
dependent variable of “typical” U.S. policy actions at the level of the month (I will elaborate on
this in the methods section). Thus, longer-term belief change and policy trends are not taken into
account. Specific belief expectations are the following.
9.2.1.1 Image of “the Other” and Strategic Orientation
When presidential image belief levels change to reflect an increased perception of
hostility abroad (decreased P1 levels), I expect that policy will be more hostile, given that an
increasingly dangerous, hostile world may be best dealt with by more hostile actions by the self.
A response to increased hostility with indifference or more cooperation would be akin to a form
of appeasement, a generally undesirable policy for U.S. presidents. When strategic orientation
belief levels demonstrate an increased preference for conflict (decreased I1 levels), I also expect
that resulting policy will be more hostile in nature, as dramatically increased preferences for
conflict may promote increased actual levels of conflict.
In opposition to the above, when presidential image belief levels shift toward an
increased perception of friendliness abroad (increased P1 levels), I expect that ensuing policy
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will be more cooperative. If the world is not a particularly dangerous place, then there is much
less need for hostile behavior than when hostility is perceived to be prevalent. Further,
employing hostility toward this world might breed more conflict, an unnecessary and undesirable
outcome, whereas friendliness might better promote cooperation directed toward the self. When
presidential strategic orientation belief levels shift toward an increased preference for
cooperation (increased I1 levels), I expect that ensuing U.S. policy will be more cooperative in
nature, as increased preferences for cooperation should promote increased actual levels of
cooperation.
H1 (image hypothesis): More conflictual U.S. policy will result following a shift toward seeing
the world as more hostile (decreased P1 levels). Further, more cooperative U.S. policy will
result following a shift toward seeing the world as more friendly (increased P1 levels).
H2 (strategic orientation hypothesis): More conflictual U.S. policy will result following a shift
toward more strongly preferring conflict (decreased I1 levels). Further, more cooperative U.S.
policy will result following a shift toward more strongly preferring cooperation (increased I1
levels).
9.2.1.2 Feelings of Historical Control
When feelings of historical control (P4) decrease, I have competing directional
expectations. Some strains of offensive realism might expect that policy will be less conflictual
in nature following decreases in feelings of control, since states would be expected to act more
aggressively whenever they have (or in this case, when heads of state feel that they have) the
capability to do so. From this perspective, lower levels of control would result in more
cooperation, as leaders would not feel that they possessed the capacity to act aggressively, and
would thus fail to do so.
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Conversely, it is possible that decreased feelings of control will result in more aggression.
The frustration-aggression hypothesis suggests that when an individual is blocked from
achieving some goal, he is likely to respond with aggression (Dollard, Miller, Doob, and
Mowrer, 1939). Hypothetical expectations here would be that a perceived decrease in power will
likely reduce one’s perceived ability to reach goals, which may then lead to increased aggression
abroad. Conversely, when one feels that he is able to achieve his goals (as might be expected
when feelings of control are high), aggression is not as likely to result, and thus more cooperative
actions might be expected. The frustration-aggression hypothesis focuses on mood and emotion
as influences on short-term behavior, and generally is not concerned with longer-term actions
such as policy-making, at least in the manner that it was originally conceptualized. However, it
is possible that a variation of this phenomenon will be manifested in the form of policy
aggression, as may have been the case when frustrated Irish leaders Patrick Pearse and James
Connolly responded to the British with aggression in the form of the 1916 Easter Rising
(Schafer, Robison, and Aldrich 2006).
H3a (feelings of control offensive realist hypothesis): More conflictual policy will result
following a shift toward feeling greater control over historical events (increased P4 levels).
Further, more cooperative policy will result following a shift toward feeling less control over
events (decreased P4 levels).
H3b (feelings of control frustration-aggression hypothesis): More conflictual policy will result
following a shift toward feeling less control over historical events (decreased P4 levels). Further,
more cooperative policy will result following a shift toward feeling more control over events
(increased P4 levels).
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Since there are competing expectations, feelings of control (P4) hypotheses will be tested
at the two-tailed level of analysis. Conversely, the image (P1) and strategic orientation (I1)
hypotheses will be tested at the one-tailed level of analysis, given that those beliefs only have
single, directional expectations.
9.2.2 Control Variables
In addition to the belief change variables listed above, a number of domestically-, and
foreign-based control variables are also included in statistical models, in order to provide a more
stringent test of the impact of belief change on U.S. foreign policy behavior. Though I will not
develop formal hypotheses for testing here, I do have directional expectations that I will briefly
discuss. These variables are all included in Chapter 6, and for the most part, possess similar
directional expectations.
9.2.2.1 Relative Power Capabilities (-)
This variable provides a more direct test of the “offensive realist,” “feelings of control”
hypothesis outlined above. When the U.S. is more powerful relative to other states—
operationally defined as months when U.S. percentage of worldwide GDP is higher—then some
offensive realists might expect that U.S. policy will become more conflictual, whereas policy
would be more cooperative when the U.S. is weaker.
I test this expectation at the 1-tailed level of analysis, as I do not expect that the
“frustration-aggression” explanation will be useful here. I am already pushing the hypothesis
when testing the influence of the “feelings of control” belief by presuming that presidential
frustrations (represented by his belief levels) might be realized in terms of policy behavior as a
form of aggression. Here, I do not want to make the more convoluted presumption that either: a)
relative power capabilities will in fact impact presidential feelings of control (an expectation not
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given support in chapter 6), which would then impact policy behavior beyond the degree
expected by examining the feelings of control belief change itself; or that b) the “state” will
somehow be affected by its relative power levels in the manner hypothesized for individuals in
the “frustration-aggression” hypothesis. Given that the “offensive realist” expectation is really
built around the influences on and actions of the state, I do not run into these issues taking this
perspective.
9.2.2.2 Actions Targeting the U.S. (+)
Another powerful potential influence on U.S. behavior is the actions of others. This is a
“tit-for-tat,” reciprocation measure, where I expect that levels of either conflict or cooperation
initiated by others will be met with an in-kind response.
9.2.2.3 Bureaucratic Inertia (+)
I also look at the influence of the previously observed dependent variable value (the
measure for the previous month examined as it impacts the behavior of this month) as a measure
of “bureaucratic inertia.” One of the strongest influences on behavior this month is expected to
be the behavior of last month, and this is examined here.
9.2.2.4 Public Support for the President (+/-)
As with chapter 6, I have competing expectations regarding the potential influence of
public support for the U.S. president on U.S. foreign policy. The “diversionary theory of
conflict” expectation would be that low public support levels for the president result in more
conflictual behavior, whereas the inherent preference for conflict/“offensive realist” expectation
would be that higher public support levels for the president result in more conflictual behavior.
For this second potential expectation, note that offensive realists are not overtly
concerned with feelings of power in the domestic sphere due to domestic support, so much as
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relative international power stemming largely from military and economic influence. However,
the implicit assumption in this line of thought is that political leaders will generally prefer
conflict over cooperation as a means to expanding state power—through aggression. Thus, if
leaders gain more public support, some “offensive realists” might expect that they would use this
domestic advantage in order to pursue the inherent foreign policy preference of conflict held by
all state leaders. Note that though this potential inherent preference may influence leaders’
formal “strategic orientation” belief levels (as explored in chapter 6), it is also possible that these
phenomena are independent, and the degree of this dependence or independence is an empirical
question. For instance, it is conceivable that strategic orientation levels—which may be
relatively short-term and which may shift and change in response to one’s environment and
predispositions—are not as entrenched as this inherent preference for conflict (should this
inherent preference exist at all), or that its influence will not be realized to the extent that this
inherent preference for conflict will.
9.2.2.5 House of Representatives/Senate Support for the President (+/-)
Similar to the public support measure, I have competing expectations for the House and
Senate support measures. The “diversionary theory” and inherent preference for
conflict/“offensive realist” expectations are the same as those for the public support measure
regarding each of these groups.
9.2.2.6 U.S. Inflation/Unemployment Rates (+/-)
Again, as with chapter 6, I have competing expectations for these economic measures.
The “hawkish” expectation is that decreased levels of economic well-being in the form of
increased levels of inflation and unemployment will result in more conflictual policy behavior.
Conversely, the “dovish” expectation is that increased inflation and unemployment levels will
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result in more cooperative policy behavior.
Note that I am not including analysis of the various potential “policy domains”
previously examined in this dissertation. However, I will include presidential dummy variables
in these models.
9.3 Data and Methodology
9.3.1 Primary Independent Variables of Interest: Operational Code Belief Change74
Belief change is determined by subtracting belief levels (on the image [P1], strategic
orientation [I1], and historical control [P4] belief indices, respectively) at time t (values as they
occur in the “current” month) from belief levels at time t+1 (values as they occur in the “next”
month). Thus, a 1 value in January and a 0 value in February would yield a value of -1 that
would be applied to the month of February, signifying a decrease of 1 that was observed in this
time period. Note that the dependent variable of U.S. policy behavior is examined as a onemonth lag in relation to monthly independent variables. This will be discussed below, but in the
example of belief change variables, values in February (signifying a change from January to
February) are examined as an influence on policy action values for the month of March. By
examining the lag of the dependent variable in this way, I ensure that the observed belief change
temporally precedes the policy actions of interest, which helps to demonstrate causality.
9.3.2 Dependent Variable: U.S. Foreign Policy Actions
The dependent variable of U.S. foreign policy behavior is calculated in a manner similar
to the “actions targeting the U.S.” measure used in chapter 6. This data is based off of Gary
King’s 10 Million International Dyadic Events database, specifically those events occurring
between 1990 and 2003. Of course, the principle difference between the data as it is used here
74

Note: More information for most of these variables can be found in chapter 6 and/or chapter 3
(in the case of the Gary King, events data-based variables).
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and that used in chapter 6 is that I am not interested in actions targeting the U.S. (though I am
including this as a control variable), but rather U.S. actions targeting others.
Thus, for this chapter I filtered out all events data in the manner outlined in chapters 3
and 6, but for actions initiated by “state” actors within the U.S. and targeting non-U.S. targets.
To briefly re-summarize, I first convert all data into the Goldstein-level format described
previously, which re-codes the initially nominal-level data (as it exists in its raw state in Gary
King’s database) into an interval-level scale. Then, I filter out this data to only those events
initiated by U.S. “state” actors. Finally, I determine the average Goldstein value for all U.S.
initiated events targeting external/foreign actors in a given month. Thus, this measure is a
reflection of the general “mood” of U.S. policy behavior targeting non-U.S. actors in a given
month, as initiated against friendly actors, enemy actors, and all actor-types in-between.
This measure is examined as a one-month lag in relation to monthly independent
variables. That is to say, the monthly independent variable values occurring in January will be
examined as an impact on dependent variable values occurring in February.
9.3.3 Relative Power Levels
U.S. relative power levels are examined as the percentage of U.S. GDP out of the total
world GDP in a given year. Both the component parts of this indicator—U.S. GDP and World
GDP measures—were taken from the World Development Indicators Online.75
9.3.4 Actions Targeting the U.S.
This measure is constructed in the same way that it was in chapter 6. That is to say, in
the same manner as the dependent variable of “U.S. Foreign Policy Actions,” but for actions
initiated by non-U.S. actors targeting the U.S.
75

Available at: http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org.libezp.lib.lsu.edu/ext/DDPQQ/; Values shown are
in billions of dollars, and reflect the U.S. dollar as of July 2009.
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9.3.5 Bureaucratic Inertia
The measure of bureaucratic inertia is simply the prior month’s value on the dependent
variable (the dependent variable value at t-1) employed as an independent variable.
9.3.6 Public Support for the President
Public support values are taken from the Roper Center for Public Opinion, and are the
average values for a given month, as discussed in chapter 6.76
9.3.7 House of Representative/Senate Support for the President
House and Senate support measures are taken from George C. Edwards’ research on
Presidential-Congressional relations.77 I use the “overall support scores” from his House and
Senate databases, respectively. This is the percentage of bills that a given congressman votes for
supporting a policy for which the president has openly given support. I averaged out the
percentage for each all congressmen for a given year on each indicator, essentially giving me the
“average congressman’s” level of presidential support in both the House and Senate,
respectively.
9.3.8 Inflation Levels
U.S. inflation data were taken from the “historical inflation data” page on
inflationdata.com. 78
9.3.9 Unemployment Levels
U.S. unemployment levels were taken from the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics web
page.79
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Available: http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/
Available: http://presdata.tamu.edu/
78
Available:
inflationdata.com/inflation/Inflation_Rate/HistoricalInflation.aspx?dsInflation_currentPage=3
77
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9.3.10 Statistical Methodology
As with chapter 6, all models here are examined using heteroskedastic generalized least
squares models. Given that I am dealing with pooled data, this model helps to account for
potential issues of autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Pseudo R-squared values are
calculated by calculating predicted dependent variable values, correlating them with observed
values, and squaring these values.
Each of the first three models contains the impact of one presidential belief on U.S.
policy behavior. The fourth model includes the impact of all beliefs on the dependent variable of
U.S. policy behavior.
9.4 Results
All results are found in table 9.1. The first model examines the impact of changes in the
presidential image of the external political environment on U.S. policy behavior. The image
change coefficient is statistically significant at the 1-tailed, .05 significance level, in the expected
(positive) direction (t=1.70, prob<.05). This means that following presidential image shifts
toward viewing the world as more friendly (an increase in the image value), U.S. policy tends to
be more cooperative. Conversely, following months in which the president “learns” to see the
world as more hostile (a decrease in his image value), U.S. policy tends to be more conflictual.
This is accounting for the various other control variables included in this model. This finding
gives support to hypothesis H1.
Another significant variable in this model is bureaucratic inertia (t=4.75, prob<.001),
which is significant in the expected direction at the one-tailed, .001 level of significance. This
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Available: http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet, accessed 07/03/08. These
data contain seasonally adjusted unemployment levels for all persons in the U.S. over 16 years
old.
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Table 9.1: Influences on U.S. Foreign Policy Behavior (Actions)
Image of the External
Environment

Strategic Orientation

Historical Control

All Beliefs

0.347

---

---

0.324

[1.70]**

---

---

[1.46]*

Strategic Orientation

---

0.259

---

0.16

Change (+)
Historical Control
Change
U.S. Rel. GDP
(-)

---

[1.49]

---

-----

-----

3.447
[0.97]
0.118
[0.84]
0.356
[4.75]***
-0.002
[0.37]
-0.021
[1.76]*
0.003
[0.30]
0.05
[0.85]
0.145
[1.43]
0.449
[1.70]*
-0.141
[0.43]
-0.883
[0.64]
167
. 414

3.5
[0.96]
0.113
[0.80]
0.335
[4.43]***
-0.002
[0.38]
-0.022
[1.78]*
0.003
[0.34]
0.048
[0.80]
0.15
[1.45]
0.457
[1.69]*
-0.164
[0.49]
-0.894
[0.63]
167
. 403

-0.21
[0.36]
3.54
[0.98]
0.157
[1.12]
0.353
[4.62]***
-0.002
[0.33]
-0.021
[1.76]*
0.002
[0.22]
0.052
[0.87]
0.147
[1.42]
0.461
[1.70]*
-0.115
[0.34]
-0.915
[0.65]
167
.402

[0.86]
-0.44
[0.73]
3.587
[1.00]
0.103
[0.73]
0.351
[4.65]***
-0.002
[0.29]
-0.022
[1.81]*
0.003
[0.31]
0.052
[0.88]
0.156
[1.53]
0.474
[1.77]*
-0.139
[0.42]
-0.987
[0.71]
167
0.414

Image Change
(+)

Other-Initiated
Actions (+)
Bureaucratic
Inertia (+)
Public Support
House Support
Senate Support
Inflation
Unemployment
Clinton
Dummy
W. Bush
Dummy
Constant
N
R-Squared

See text for discussion of variables examined at one- vs. two-tailed levels of analysis.
***prob<.01
**prob<.05
*prob<.10
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means that what the U.S. did in the last month has a significant, predictable impact on its
behavior this month, controlling for other potential influences. If last month’s actions were fairly
conflictual, then this month’s actions are likely to follow suit. Conversely, if the U.S. behaved
fairly cooperatively last month, then it can be expected to behave similarly this month.
Additionally, support from the House of Representatives is a significant predictor of U.S.
policy behavior, yielding a modest, negative influence at the .10, two-tailed level of significance
(t=1.76, prob<.10).80 This negative relationship gives support to the inherent preference for
conflict/“offensive realist” expectation, which suggests that increased levels of support will
result in increased conflict, given that presidents will inherently prefer to engage in increased
conflict as a means to expanding political and military power when possible. Thus, increased
political capital, which allows the leader more of an opportunity to pursue his policy preferences,
will coincide with increasingly conflictual behavior.
Finally, the Clinton dummy coefficient is significant here in the positive direction,
suggesting that U.S. policy during the Clinton Administration was more cooperative than it was
during either the “Bush 41” or “Bush 43” Presidencies.
For the second model, I examine the impact of changes in presidential strategic
orientation levels on U.S. foreign policy behavior. The strategic orientation change variable is
not shown to be a statistically significant predictor of U.S. policy. Thus, no support is found for
hypothesis H2. However, bureaucratic inertia (t=4.43, prob<.001), House support for the
president (t=1.78, prob<.10), and the Clinton dummy measure (t=1.69, prob<.10) are all
significant in a manner similar to the findings in the “image of the other” model (in terms of the
direction and rough magnitude of their relationship to the dependent variable).
80

Note that I examine this relationship at the two-tailed level due to the competing directional
hypotheses associated with this variable.
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For the third model, I test the impact of changes in presidential feelings of historical
control on U.S. foreign policy behavior. Results are very similar to that of the strategic
orientation model, as the feelings of control belief change coefficient is insignificant, but the
bureaucratic inertia (t=4.62, prob<.001), House support (t=1.76, prob<.10), and Clinton dummy
variables (t=1.70, prob<.10) are all statistically significant influences on the dependent variable
of U.S. foreign policy behavior. Thus, no strong support is given to either hypotheses H3a nor
H3b.
Finally, I look at the influence of belief change on all three indices of interest on the
dependent variable of U.S. policy behavior. Results suggest that, even accounting for changes in
presidential strategic orientation and feelings of historical control, changes in the “image of the
other” yield a modestly significant, expected influence on U.S. policy (t=1.46, prob.<.10, 1tailed test). Similar to previous models, bureaucratic inertia (t=4.65, prob<.001, 1-tailed test),
House support (t=1.81, prob<.10, 2-tailed test), and the Clinton dummy variable (t=1.77,
prob<.10, 1-tailed test) all yield statistically significant coefficients.
9.5 Discussion
I do not find unanimous support for the expectation that change in “master” beliefs will
have a notable impact on U.S. foreign policy behavior. However, I do find that the changes in
the “image of the other” master belief do influence policy to a greater extent than do several
other potential influences, and that this influence is greater than what would be expected by
chance.
Regarding other potential explanatory variables, bureaucratic inertia (previous U.S.
behavior) is the strongest influence on current U.S. behavior in a logical, expected manner.
Presidential support in the House of Representatives also appears to have an influence on the
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tone of U.S. policy behavior, as decreased levels of support coincide with more cooperative
behavior, and increased levels of support coincide with more conflictual behavior—giving some
modest support to the inherent preference for conflict/“offensive realist” expectation on this
variable. Finally, U.S. policy under Clinton appears to have been noticeably more cooperative
than it was under George H.W. Bush or George W. Bush.
The analyses undertaken in this chapter are a preliminary attempt to demonstrate that
belief change can impact U.S. policy, but one specific factor that should be integrated into future
analyses is the interactive nature of the relationship between U.S. policy and presidential beliefs.
Though I expect that beliefs and belief change will impact policy (such as I have demonstrated
here with the “image” belief), I expect that policy will also influence beliefs, as has been the
focus of the bulk of this dissertation. Where the influence of one these factors starts and ends
relative to the other is a complex question that I do not address here, but hope to examine in
future works.
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CHAPTER 10: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, my primary objective was to explore the nature of U.S. presidential
operational code belief change. Toward this end, I proposed hypothetical expectations and
attempted to systematically test these expectations via the use of an extensive database of
quantitative, speech-based data. Along the way, I specifically examined the general trends of
U.S. presidential belief change, hypotheses concerning the nature of belief inter-connectivity and
change, the influence of various U.S. domestic and foreign factors on belief change, and the
impact of crisis events and pre-crisis belief levels on belief change following crisis exposure.
Additionally, I conducted a preliminary analysis of the impact of belief change on U.S. policy
behavior—though not concerned with the nature of belief change narrowly, this is the ultimate
goal of such research, and I wanted to explore a way in which this type of research might be
pursued. Here I will summarize some of the major findings of this dissertation by posing
questions that provided the impetus to many of the hypotheses posited in the various chapters of
this dissertation. Note that I will answer these questions in general terms, more detailed answers
(including exceptions to the answers provided) can be found in the discussion and concluding
sections of individual, preceding chapters.
10.1 Hierarchical Belief Change and the Inter-Relationship of Beliefs
Are “central” beliefs (i.e. “image of the other,” “strategic orientation,” and “feelings of
control”) more stable than more “secondary” beliefs?
When examined at the level of the 3-month, “moving” average period, this is not the case
for any of the three “central” beliefs. Instead, the “image of the other” beliefs of U.S. presidents
are actually far less stable than the other, more peripheral “philosophical” beliefs, contrary to
expectations. “Strategic orientation” beliefs, though not significantly less stable than other, more
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peripheral “instrumental” beliefs, are not significantly different from these beliefs in this sense.
Similarly, “feelings of control” beliefs of U.S. presidents are not significantly more or less
variable than other “philosophical” beliefs.
When “central” beliefs do change, are more “secondary” beliefs also more likely to
change?
Sometimes, but not always. In 3-month “moving” average periods when the “image of
the other” belief values experience a significant change, the “realization of political values” (P2)
and “predictability of the political future” (P3) also tend to experience a significant change.
When the “strategic orientation” beliefs experience a significant change, “tactical orientation”
(I2) and “the timing of conflict vs. cooperation” (I4a) beliefs also usually experience a
significant change. However, no other operational code belief index experiences a significant
change in over 50% of the cases where the “feelings of control” belief yields a significant
change.
Do presidents’ “image of the other” and “strategic orientation” beliefs remain more stable
in instances when they do not run counter to one another?
No. Though more over-time variability is found on both belief indexes following months
when they run counter to one another, these changes are not statistically significant.
10.2 The Impact of Domestic and International Factors on Presidential Learning
Which factors in the international or domestic political domains systematically contribute
to presidential learning?
None of the factors examined have a statistically significant impact on monthly
presidential learning (defined as a change in operational code beliefs from one month to the next)
in terms of change in either the “image of the other,” “strategic orientation,” or “feelings of
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control” beliefs for U.S. presidents. As such, the models examined were not correctly specified
to address the specific dependent variable of interest (monthly belief change).
Are presidents more likely to “learn” from events that occur within the “dissimilar states”
and “conflictual actions” domains than they are from the “similar states” and
“cooperative actions” domains, respectively?
Not particularly. Based upon the dependent variable of monthly belief change, U.S.
presidents do not appear significantly more responsive to factors in any one “domain” over any
other.
10.3 The Impact of Crises on Presidential Learning
Do crises cause presidents to view the world as more hostile, to more strongly prefer
conflict, and to feel decreased levels of control in the short term following exposure to
crises? If so, does this effect “decay” over time following the onset of these crises?
The answer to both questions is no. Though expectations were supported for some
presidents following some crises, systematic, cross-presidential support was not found. Instead,
crises appear to have variable levels and types of influence on presidents, depending on factors
not accounted for in the analysis undertaken in chapter 8.
Do crises cause presidents who see the world as friendly, who prefer cooperation, and
who feel high levels of control to shift their beliefs toward seeing the world as more
hostile, to more strongly prefer conflict, and to feel lower levels of control? Is this
change greater than what we would expect to see by chance?
The answer to the first question is largely yes, but this is mediated by the fact that the
answer to the second question is no. As a result, the affirmative answer to the first question is
not in the spirit of hypothesized expectations. Instead, it initially appeared that crises played the
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role of “moderating” leaders’ initially more extreme beliefs, given that leaders who initially saw
the world as hostile, preferred conflict, and felt lower levels of control also experienced notable
shifts in the opposing direction (toward seeing the world as more friendly, more strongly
preferring cooperation, and feeling more control, respectively). But even this finding does not
hold very well when compared to the change of presidential beliefs following a sample of
“control,” non-crisis periods. As such, I ultimately did not find support to my hypotheses
regarding the impact of crises on U.S. presidential beliefs.
However, the regression findings from chapter 8 suggest that pre-crisis belief levels are
the best predictors of post-crisis belief change, even controlling for crisis-based factors.
10.4 The Influence of Presidential Learning on U.S. Policy
Do increasingly hostile perceptions of the world lead to more hostile U.S. actions abroad,
and do more friendly perceptions of the world lead to more cooperative actions abroad,
even controlling for other potential influences on policy?
Yes. Changes in “image of the other” belief levels yield an expected and statistically
significant influence on U.S. policy action in the models examined. This finding even holds
when accounting for the impact of changing “strategic orientation” and “feelings of control”
beliefs.
Do increasing preferences for hostility lead to more hostile U.S. actions abroad, and do
increasing preferences for cooperation lead to more cooperation abroad, even controlling
for other potential influences on policy?
No. Changes in “strategic orientation” belief levels do not yield a statistically significant
influence on U.S. policy actions in the models examined.
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Do increasing feelings of control lead to either more or less hostility abroad, even
controlling for other potential influences on policy?
No. Changes in “feelings of control” belief levels do not yield a statistically significant
influence on U.S. policy actions in the models examined.
10.5 Conclusion
So what does all of the above mean? First, I do find a degree of support for some of the
hypotheses set out in chapter 5. The findings in that chapter are probably the most useful of all
those in the dissertation, as they help to provide “large-n” evidence supporting or failing to
support hypotheses previously not examined beyond, at most, a small handful of cases. Let me
reiterate, I am not suggesting that we should discount or even downplay the importance of
“small-n,” case study evidence. However, the type of broad, cross-case examination as that
undertaken here provides us with another useful perspective for engaging in “at-a-distance,”
psychological research. By pursuing evidence via the “large-n” route, of course we lose detail
and nuance. We also lose the researcher’s subjective evaluation of events, behaviors, and
thoughts, which can be invaluable when attempting to analyze phenomena that cannot be easily
or effectively quantified. However, what we gain via this approach is the equally important
ability to say whether findings hold across a larger number of cases or fail to do so. This is a
major goal of much social scientific research. If we fail to find this support, then we must take
care to qualify the findings from associated research on smaller samples.
Beyond that single chapter, however, there is a lack of support for formal hypotheses
regarding the factors that might influence learning. As such, the variables examined in several of
the previous chapters are not sufficient to answer the questions of how, when, and why
presidential beliefs change. On the one hand, this is a bit disappointing, since researchers
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typically set up hypotheses with the intention of finding support for some of them, and I am no
different in this respect. However, there is still a potentially important story to be told.
Operational code beliefs apparently are not representative of the “smooth transmission
belt” hypothesized by structural realists. In some instances and for some presidents, factors do
appear to affect leaders as one might expect. But in other cases, and across the board, this is not
the case. As such, perhaps we should not always assume that the environment is a stimulus that
directly affects policy outcomes via the intervening variables of the beliefs of political leaders.
U.S. presidents are not automata. They have preferences, beliefs, and general perceptions that
filter the “real world” in a way that may not always be initially intuitive to the outside observer.
But this does not mean that research should cease attempting to tease out the potentially
systematic relationships between the factors that impact political leaders in terms of their
thoughts and their actions. Presidential operational code beliefs do change. The questions left
unanswered here are still those of “how, when, and why”? Perhaps my models were not
correctly specified, and additional variables, methods, and analytical viewpoints are required to
identify whether the hypothesized phenomena actually take place or not. Of course, it is also
entirely possible that the specific questions I address are sufficiently answered, and that we
should move on to addressing other questions that require attention through the means of
statistical analysis employing operational code belief data. In either case, I do believe that there
are important, systematic phenomena that influence beliefs across individuals. Similarly, I
believe that there are systematic processes across cases by which beliefs influence outcomes.
And I believe that quantitative psychological data could and should be used toward determining
answers to the questions of how, when, and why these instances will take place.
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Related to this, and beyond the specific hypotheses tested, there was an additional goal
for the research conducted in this dissertation. This is related to the theoretical and
methodological nature of the operational code data used toward addressing the first goal of
examining the nature of presidential belief change and its impact on policy behavior. Many
research programs that actually implement quantitative data in the statistical analysis of conflict
studies or foreign policy analysis fail to include measures quantifying leader psychology. Some
do this for the simple reason that psychology is not expected or hypothesized to matter. But
many likely never even think to include such a measure to begin with, largely because these
researchers do not know that such data exists. This is not to say that many of these researchers
would decide to use such data, but before such a decision can be made, they must understand the
nature of the data and how such might be obtained.
I believe that this project, despite the lack of support for several of the hypotheses
posited, demonstrates the utility of automated operational code analysis as a means to providing
a less subjectively derived, more replicable, and frankly easier to obtain form of psychological
investigation than that of more traditional works. I additionally believe that this work promotes
the idea of operational code variables as potential independent and dependent variables in
research examining peace and conflict, as well as foreign policy decision-making processes and
outcomes. When all is said and done, it may be that psychology does not matter or is not
influenced in the ways that many political psychologists expect. But it is also possible that these
factors play much greater roles than others would give them credit. Without empirical analysis,
examined across cases and over time, I do not believe that we can fully answer these questions
one way or the other.
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APPENDIX A: FURTHER NOTES REGARDING THE SPEECH GATHERING
PROCESS FOR OPERATIONAL CODE ANALYSIS
A.1 Selective Sampling of Potentially Irrelevant Speeches
I did not read through every presidential speech over the time-frame of interest to see if a
given speech contained foreign policy-relevant information or not. If I were to have done this,
then this project would have taken much longer to complete than has been the case. Instead, a
sampling process was employed, where some speeches were either ignored, or were only briefly
scanned for foreign policy material, based upon their titles. Initially, I did attempt to read
through every speech, but after going through a few hundred of them, I could pick up cues (who
the audience was, what the title of the speech was) that would help to classify a speech as one of
the following: a) definitely containing foreign policy-related material; b) probably containing
foreign policy-related material; c) possibly containing foreign policy-related material; or d)
almost certainly not containing foreign-policy related material. Speeches falling into the “a” or
“b” categories here were always read and coded, and most of those falling into category “c” were
also read through, and coded if necessary. However, only a very small sample of speeches
falling into category “d” was read through at all. Every once in a while, just to “keep myself
honest,” I would read through one, but in the vast majority of cases, no foreign-policy related
material was contained.
When selecting which non-foreign policy focused speeches to evaluate (based upon the
speech’s title), I more often examined commencement speeches, speeches to democratic
organizations (national or state-based), and speeches oriented toward specific ethnic (e.g. Jewish
lobbying groups) or national sub-groups (e.g. Greek-Americans or regional groups such as
“Asian-Pacific” Americans). Speeches toward members of the military or military veterans were
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always examined. All generically titled “press conferences” or “radio addresses” were evaluated
for foreign policy speech-related material.
Additionally, speeches immediately following important foreign policy events, or
following important meetings with foreign policy leaders, were also typically examined for
foreign-policy relevant material, as these speeches, in some instances, start or end with a brief
discussion of these events.
Speeches examined less frequently (though still read and examined periodically) were
those focusing explicitly on domestic groups or domestic interests (e.g. “townspeople in San
Jose, California”, a group of elementary school students, or a local social organization of some
kind during times of relative international calm).
A.2 Trade and Finance
A key consideration for choosing speech material was the necessity of evaluating the
relationship between the U.S. and any other foreign actor or foreign-related activity.
International trade is almost always an international issue, but economic growth may or may not
be framed in relation to foreign actors in the global economy. As such, some references to the
international economy were coded, and some were not.
A.3 Pleasantries
When evaluating “pleasantries,” it is often difficult to evaluate when a leader is following
protocol, and when he is actually displaying his attitudes and/or beliefs toward a given actor.
This is particularly the case when heads of state come to visit the White House. Generally, I
erred here on the side of caution, and coded much of this as if it were statements regarding the
president’s belief toward these actors (with the assumption that there would be variance here
between presidents in terms of both the number of White House meetings held with foreign

276

leaders and dignitaries, and in terms of the language used in regard to them). However, this was
not always the case.
For instance, the following comment was made the following day regarding the Opening
of the Summit of the Peacemakers in Sharm al-Sheikh, Egypt, and was not coded: “Thank you
very much, President Mubarak. Your Majesties, Your Highnesses, heads of state, heads of
government, Foreign Ministers, and Mr. Secretary-General.” Though this comment was focused
on foreign actors, similar to the first comment, it was not seen as containing any relevant
references to Egypt or other foreign actors regarding Clinton’s operational code. Instead, this
appears to be purely a reflection of etiquette.
On the other hand, not every type of “pleasantry” is irrelevant to the evaluation of a
leader’s beliefs. In fact, oftentimes speaking in positive, albeit “soft” terms about another actor
is assumed to be a reflection of a leader’s beliefs, and is evaluated as such. For instance, this
type of speech material was coded as containing a reflection of Bill Clinton’s operational code:
Let me say that we are delighted to have Prime Minister Chernomyrdin here. He and the
Vice President have had very good meetings, and the relationship that they have
established and the work they have done I think has played a major role in the continued
strengthening of our partnership with Russia. And I'm very pleased at the progress of this
meeting, and I'm very pleased again to have him here in the United States.
This speech was taken from a January 30, 2006 press conference held with Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin of Russia. In these remarks, President Clinton was discussing U.S.Russian relations (e.g. “ . . . in the continued strengthening of our partnership with Russia.”—the
issue of interest regarding Clinton’s operational code beliefs in these remarks) while
concurrently engaging in the exchange of pleasantries (e.g. “I’m very pleased again to have him
here in the United States”), following convention and diplomatic protocol.
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Oftentimes, the president will speak of a historical relationship with some state, or of
some past occurrence (regarding another state, the U.S., or both). Additionally, anecdotes and
jokes are sometimes made in relation to a foreign dignitary are sometimes made, that essentially
equate to further pleasantries. Anecdotes and historical discussions of these types were largely
ignored unless they contained direct references to current issues or conflicts, as they frequently
did not match up with the contemporary reality that the president was concerned with, and thus
did not constitute his contemporary “operational code” beliefs.
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APPENDIX B: FILTERING STEPS FOR GARY KING’S EVENTS DATA
1) Initially, I filtered out all non-U.S. data, from both the initiator side (actions originating in
non-U.S. states toward the U.S.).
2) Next, I needed to measure only events, and I had to convert all events to a Goldstein
value.
a. In Gary King’s database, all events (and non-event occurrences) are coded in text
format. Thus, I had to convert these text measures into IDEA numerical format
(via Excel’s “vllookup” function), following from the conversion tables available
in Gary King’s events data documentation.
b. IDEA values are not an interval-level conflict-cooperation scale. Thus, next, I
had to convert these IDEA numbers into interval level values, or the “Goldstein”
scale (where events were coded on a scale ranging from -10 [most cooperative] to
+10 [most conflictual]). For this, 1) I had to go through the various
IDEA/Goldstein conversion tables in order to determine which IDEA events had
Goldstein conversions already available; and after converting those that did
(available on the KEDS website, on the vranet.com website, and the
documentation on Gary King’s website), 2) I determined the other occurrences
that were actually events by looking at them manually, filtering out those that
were not events, and determining codes for those that were events (by consulting
the aforementioned resources).
3) The next step was to determine relevant actors that would likely reflect foreign “state’s”
or “actor’s” influence on the U.S.
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4) Next, I created 3 separate files, relevant to research questions posed in the empirical
chapter examining this data: 1) all relevant state actors; 2) all “different” state actors
(based upon regionally weighted alliance similarity S-Scores, as taken from the Eugene
program); 3) all “similar” state actors (based upon S-Scores)
5) Similarly, I created 2 separate files for each of these three sub-files, looking at “all
cooperative actions” and “all conflict actions,” again for the purposes of hypothesis
testing. This process is discussed in chapter 6.
6) Following this, I then further broke each of these 3 files down into 2 groups: 1) all
potential actors; 2) explicitly relevant “state” political or military actors. For the
purposes of analysis in this project, I only look at “state” actors in the political or military
domains.
B.1 Sectors included in analyses
State Actors:
<ROYA> Royalty
<DIPL>

Diplomats

<GAGE>

Government

<MACT> Military
<MILH>

Military

<MILI>

Military

<OFFI>

Officials

<POLI>

Police

<RAID>

Military
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APPENDIX C: CRISES EXAMINED/NOT EXAMINED
C.1 Crises Included in Analysis
John F. Kennedy
Crisis #185: Last crisis over the Berlin Wall
Crisis #186: Viet Cong attack
Crisis #193: Nam Tha (2nd Pathet Lao Crisis)
Crisis #196: The Cuban Missile Crisis
Lyndon Johnson
Crisis #210: The Gulf of Tonkin
Crisis #211: Congo II
Crisis #213: Pleiku
Crisis #215: Dominican Intervention
Crisis #222: Six Day War
Crisis #225: The TET Offensive
Nixon
Crisis #237: Invasion of Cambodia
Crisis #238: Black September
Crisis #239: Cienfuegos Marine Base
Crisis #246: Vietnam Ports Mining
Gerald Ford
Crisis #259: Mayaguez
Crisis #260: War in Angola
Crisis #274: Poplar Tree
Carter
Crisis #292: SHABA II
Crisis #303: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
Ronald Reagan
Crisis #343: Invasion of Grenada
Crisis #354-Nicaragua MIG 21-S
George H.W. Bush
Crisis #391: Invasion of Panama
Crisis #393: the Persian Gulf War
Bill Clinton
Crisis #411: Haiti Military Regime—(note: beginning time estimated from description [mid-July,
speeches taken prior to July 11] because of an apparent data input error)
Crisis #412: Iraqi Troop Deployment in Kuwait
Crisis #419: Operation: Desert Strike
Crisis #422: UNSCOM I
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Crisis #427: US Embassy bombings
Crisis #429: UNSCOM II: Operation Desert Fox
Crisis #430: Kosovo 1999
George W. Bush
Crisis #434: Afghanistan-US
C.2 Crises Excluded from Analysis:
Occurred too early in presidency to establish MITS baseline:
Crisis #180: Pathet Lao Offensive
Crisis #181: Bay of Pigs
Crisis #230: Vietnam Spring Offensive
Crisis #233: EC-121 Spy Plane
Outliers:
Crisis #224: The USS Pueblo Crisis (crisis listed as lasting 336 days)
Crisis #255-October/Yom-Kippur War (crisis listed as lasting 232 days)
Crisis #408: North Korea Nuclear I (crisis listed as lasting over 500 days)
Overlap between 2 presidencies or insufficient pre-/post-crisis data:
Crisis #309: US hostages in Iran (begins with Carter, ends with Reagan)
Crisis #386: Libyan Jets (terminates during last few days of Reagan presidency)
U.S. is listed as the crisis initiator, but not as the preliminary crisis actor:
Crisis #206: Panama Flag (Canal Zone Crisis)
Crisis #249: Christmas Bombing
Crisis #330: Gulf of Syrte I
Crisis #338: OGADEN III
Crisis #340: Libya threat to Sudan
Crisis #344: Able Archer 83
Crisis #350: Omdurman bombings
Crisis #363: Gulf of Syrte II
Crisis #383: Contra Rebels III
Crisis #441: Iraqi Regime Overthrow
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APPENDIX D: CRISIS PERIOD KEY BY PRESIDENT FOR MULTIPLE INTERRUPTED TIME SERIES ANALYSES
Crisis
Period

Kennedy81

Johnson

Nixon

Ford

Berlin
Wall/Viet
Cong
Attack

Gulf of
Tonkin/
Congo II

Invasion of Cambodia

Mayaguez

2

Nam Tha

Pleiku/
Dominican
Intervention

Black
September/Cienfuegos
Submarine Base

War in
Angola

3

Cuban
Missiles

Six Day War

Vietnam Ports Mining

Poplar
Tree

1

4

Carter

Reagan

HW
Bush

SHABA II

Invasion
of
Grenada

Invasion
of
Panama

Afghanistan
Invasion

Nicaragua
MIG-21S

Gulf
War

Clinton

Haiti
Military
Regime/Iraq AfghanistanMilitary
USA
Deployment
Kuwait
Desert
Strike
UNSCOM I
US
Embassy
Bombings/
UNSCOM
II
Kosovo

Tet Offensive

5

81

Note that there were not enough pre-crisis time periods to include the first “crisis period” occurring during the Kennedy
Administration—Pathet Lao Offensive/Bay of Pigs.
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W Bush

APPENDIX E: CRISES AND CRISIS PERIODS EXAMINED IN CHAPTER 8
Order of Crisis
Period
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Crisis Period Name
Pathet Leo
Berlin Wall/Vietcong Attack
Nam Tha
Cuban Missiles
Gulf of Tonkin/Congo II
Pleiku
Dominican Int.
Six Day War
TET Offensive
EC Spy Plane
Invasion of Cambodia
Black September/Cienfuegos Submarine
Base
Vietnam Ports Mining
Mayaguez
War in Angola
Poplar Tree
Shaba II
Invasion of Afghanistan
Invasion of Grenada
Nicaragua MIG
Invasion of Panama
Gulf War
Haiti Regime
Iraq Deployment Kuwait
Desert Strike
UNSCOM I
US Embassy Bombing
UNSCOM II
Kosovo
Afghanistan
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APPENDIX F: CRISIS VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
1) Triggering Event/Cause of Crisis: The specific event, act, or situational change that led the
crisis actor (the U.S.) to perceive a threat to its values. Values: 1) Verbal act; 2) Political act;
3) Economic act; 4) External change; 5) Other non-violent act; 6) Internal verbal or physical
challenge to regime or elite; 7) Non-violent military act; 8) Indirect violent act; 9) Violent
act.
2) Crisis Outcome: The content of crisis termination for the U.S. Values: 1) Victory; 2)
Compromise; 3) Stalemate; 4) Defeat
3) Violence Experienced: The highest level of violence experienced by the U.S. during the
crisis. Values: 1) No violence; 2) Minor clashes; 3) Serious clashes; 4) Full-scale war
4) Grave Threat: The object of gravest threat to the U.S. at any time during the crisis. Note:
this variable was re-coded so that it would be roughly ordinal. Re-coded Values: 1) other; 2)
political threat or threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem; 3)
limited military threat or territorial threat; 4) threat of grave damage or threat to existence
Note: a) the original values for this indicator were: 1) Limited military threat; 2) Political
threat; 3) Territorial threat; 4) Threat to influence in the international system or regional
subsystem; 5) Threat of grave damage; 6) Threat to existence; 7) Other
b) For “crisis periods” where more than one crisis took place and where the crises involved
had different “grave threat” measures, the object of gravest threat among those listed was
evaluated for this period
5) Order of Crisis: The order in which this crisis was experienced for a given president (i.e. 1st ,
2nd, 3rd, etc.)
6) Proximity (Note: here lower values are likely going to have a stronger, negative impact): The
distance of the crisis from the U.S. Values: 1) Home territory; 2) sub-region; 3) same
continent; 4) elsewhere
7) Power Discrepancy: The difference in power between the U.S. and its major rival in a given
crisis. Values calculated based on six separate scores evaluating: size of population; GNP;
territorial size; alliance capability; military expenditure; and nuclear capability. The value
for both these two major actors of interest and their respective “tight alliance partners (if
any)” (ICB Codebook, pg. 44) were combined and evaluated just prior to the onset of the
crisis of interest to determine this value. Higher values indicate more power than the
adversary, and lower values indicate less power than the adversary (Brecher and Wilkenfeld,
1997: 55).
8) Duration of Crisis: Length of crisis from perception of onset by the U.S. to resolution in days
9) Issue: The most important initial issue area of concern in the crisis as perceived by the U.S.
Note: this variable was re-coded so that it would be roughly ordinal. Re-coded Values: 1)
other; 2) cultural-status; 3) economic-developmental or political-diplomatic; 4) militarysecurity
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Note: the original values for this indicator were: 1) military-security; 2) political-diplomatic;
3) economic-developmental; 4) cultural-status; 5) other
Note: Variable descriptions taken from “Codebook for ICB2: International Crisis Behavior
Project,” available http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ICB2-2006-final.pdf
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